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Abstract 
Popular interpretations and academic scholarship tends to emphasize the relationship 
between jihad, military action, and communal violence. These reinforce a sense that 
violence is inherent to Islam. Investigations into the contexts where jihad has been 
deployed highlight how its use is often a call for unity believed to be necessary for 
political goals. Therefore, in order to deconstruct this belief, this thesis tackles instead the 
relationship between textual interpretations and historical actions, and how these varied 
across specific moments in time. The case studies examined range from the initial 
evolution of a theory of jihad in the late antique world, to the Crusades in the 11th and 
12th centuries, to early modern dynamics of the Ottomans and Safavids, and finally to 
modern state-making projects in the Arabian Peninsula These examples seek to create a 
comprehensive picture of the intricacies rooted in jihad and the narrative that can be 
associated with a religion that is most often misunderstood. The effort to shed some light 
on the multiple facets of jihad is hinged upon how these case studies differ from one 
another, thus forcing the reader to question how they previously understood the modern 
day phenomenon of jihad. While the conversation will reiterate various themes and 
concepts as discussed in previous scholarship, it should push the boundaries on how jihad 
has been framed as a modern day extremist ideology.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
eptember 11th, 2001 will forever be known as an iconic day in history for 
more than just the tragic events that took place in the United States of 
America. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, US foreign policy was deconstructed 
and revamped into an entirely new beast, focused upon an aggressive counter-attack that 
would set a precedent against future threats. While this process was directed towards the 
Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the entirety of the Muslim world was branded in 
association with the attacks. The sense of fear that permeated societies accommodating 
Muslims has been a common generalization in the post 9/11 world and resulted in 
unjustified assumptions about what Islam teaches and its role in shaping Muslim 
societies. At the core of these generalizations has been the use of the word jihad, which 
arguably catapulted to prominence when Osama Bin Laden declared it as a framework of 
action against the West. The context in which this word emerged in the 21st century and 
dominated religious and political dialogue has led to accompanying connotations of 
aggressiveness on the entire Muslim community. In light of these events, this thesis 
investigates the history and evolution of jihad from the late antique world to the present 
in order to better contextualize contemporary processes. There have been many efforts to 
understand the history of the term, but this portrait of jihad remains as most do not 
investigate the relationship between the Qur’an and distinct historical contexts and 
S 
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interpretations. While the essence of jihad is derived from the Qur’an, its consequent 
manifestations represent the wildly different circumstances of where it has been evoked. 
The journey of jihad has manifested itself in multiple forms, with the majority of 
modern scholarship attempting to place recent events in a historical context in order to 
reveal the various complexities inherent in the term. In Jihad in Islamic History: 
Doctrines and Practices, Bonner looks at the Qur’an’s messages about how fighting and 
jihad are inseparable from its requirements of generosity and care for the poor. Bonner 
examines how “jihad is a complex set of doctrines and practices that have changed over 
time and continue to evolve today.”1 Thus, within his text, Bonner tries to dispel the 
binary notion that jihad means only violence or only peace. Reuvan Firestone also 
conducted his research within this sphere of academic scholarship, basing his hypothesis 
on evidence from the Qur’an and early Islamic literary sources. Firestone locates the 
origin of Islamic holy war “as a response to the changes affecting the new community of 
Muslims in its transition from ancient Arabian culture to the religious civilization of 
Islam.”2 By approaching any understanding of jihad through the Qur’an, the reader is 
exposed to the series of events that led to the formation of Islam. Therefore, jihad 
automatically becomes situated in the broader context of the late antique period, 
inextricably linked to the rise of monotheistic religions. Therefore, the opening chapter of 
this thesis shall also dive into the events that gave birth to Islam in order to acknowledge 
how notions of just and holy war were part of the inheritance of Islam. Furthermore, this 
chapter will build upon examinations into this period of time to demonstrate the issues of 
1 Bonner, Michael David. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006. 
2 Firestone, Reuven. Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
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interpretation that result from the events of the Prophet Muhammad’s life and the 
creation of the Qur’an. As a result, this process leads to the intersection between divine 
word and historical contingency within the context of the Arabian Peninsula. This 
contingency becomes the framework for investigating particular historical moments in 
the rest of the thesis. 
The need for a framework is crucial in determining the role of jihad as applied to 
different contexts. This framework becomes extremely relevant especially as scholarship 
tends to promote the link between holy war and jihad, particularly highlighted in the 
Crusades. In Crusading and the Crusader States, Andrew Jotischky explains how the 
idea of holy wars came into being and why they took the form that they did - a clash 
between western and Islamic societies that dominated the Middle Ages.3 John Kelsay and 
James Johnson highlight the particular questions that connect with the phenomenon of 
holy war through the lens of jihad via both literary and historical sources on war and 
peace, and explore the relationship between western and Islamic societies.4  
Furthermore, the influence of the Crusades on contemporary interpretations of 
jihad often derive from the success of Salah al-Din, and how he was portrayed as using 
jihad as a uniting factor for Sunni Islam, as well as how he embodied and advocated for it 
in all aspects of his life.56 Salah al-Din’s life was further illuminated through the 
translation of previously unpublished material supporting the inextricable link between 
3 Jotischky, Andrew. Crusading and the Crusader States. Harlow, England: Pearson/Longman, 2004. 
4 Kelsay, John, and James Johnson. Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War 
and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991. 
5 Bartlett, W. B. Islam's War Against the Crusaders. Stroud: History Press, 2008. 
6 Hring, Hannes. Saladin, the Sultan and His Times, 1138-1193. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2008. 
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jihad and his philosophies.7 This concept has become especially important in widely 
circulated popular histories. In the The Shade of Swords, MJ Akbar further explains how 
jihad thrives on “complex and shifting notions of persecution, victory and sacrifice, and 
illustrating how Muslims themselves have historically tried to direct and control the 
phenomenon of Jihad.”8 This concept was also incorporated in Peter Partner’s book God 
of Battles: Holy Wars of Christianity and Islam who works towards informing his readers 
about allowing crusading war propaganda fuelling our judgments today. The influential 
nature of the Crusades in shaping modern interpretations of jihad prompted the basis of 
the second chapter in this thesis. In acknowledging the importance of the Crusades and of 
Salah al-Din’s leadership, the foundations of the chapter will demonstrate how the 
fragmentation of the Sunni Muslim identity provided an opportunity for the resurgence of 
jihad. Yet, this chapter will demonstrate that the role of Salah al-Din and his predecessors 
is only significant insomuch that the chroniclers of the time presented him as the vehicle 
that embraced jihad in order to unite Sunni Islam. Therefore, the importance of the 
relationship between Salah al-Din and religious entities is necessary as it defined an era 
where aggressively asserting religious principles through justified military actions was 
necessary for the survival of Islam. 
The connection between religious and political entities in applying jihad to a 
particular context relates to the greater dynamic of legitimizing war and conquest, in the 
name of religion, in order to attain a specific goal. As a result, a large amount of 
scholarship has been devoted to the notion of jihad and its use in legitimizing war. Nazih 
7 Lyons, M. C., and D. E. P. Jackson. Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982. 
8 Akbar, M. J. The Shade of Swords Jihad and the Conflict between Islam and Christianity. London: 
Routledge, 2002. 
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Ayubi examines the claim of those Islamists who contend that, as a belief system and a 
way of life, Islam carries with it a theory of politics and the state which should be applied 
unquestioningly.9 Thus, the historical connection between Islam and politics can be 
explained as an attempt by rulers to legitimize their actions. Through such scholarship, 
jihad has often been understood as a category of its own when analyzing different types 
of wars. Yet, the role that jihad has played in developing the relationship between 
religion and politics provides a new theoretical understanding of Islam with an emphasis 
on the authority of those who could demand it.10 Consequently, the third chapter of this 
thesis will look at the restructuring of religious authority in the Ottoman Empire, in order 
to unite religious and political goals, which could be achieved through jihad. 
Subsequently, this chapter will also recognize that these actions were employed in an 
attempt to control and regulate such vast areas of land. Furthermore, this chapter will 
highlight how the Ottomans through this new order, justified holy war sentiment 
particularly towards their Shi’i Muslim neighbors, the Safavids. The shift in Ottoman 
mentality that allowed aggressive actions towards other Muslim entities highlights a 
departure from many implementations of jihad due to the overarching goals of the 
Empire. 
The varying degrees of scholarship surrounding jihad tend to lean towards 
religious and political relationships, especially as Islam moves past the Ottoman era. 
Research surrounding the politicization of jihad and how it impacted political and 
military structures of different empires takes precedence in the eras of imperialist and the 
9 Ayubi, Nazih N. M. Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. London: Routledge, 1991 
10 Baer, Marc David. Honored by the Glory of Islam Conversion and Conquest in Ottoman Empire. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
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rise of the nation-state.11 David Cook focusses on the practical and theoretical meanings 
of jihad, citing from scriptural, legal and newly translated texts to give readers a taste of 
the often ambiguous information that is used to construct Islamic political doctrine in the 
modern period.12 Thus, the final chapter of this thesis will draw upon the impact of the 
relationship between Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud in 
demonstrating how orthodox interpretations of jihad also impact religious and political 
dynamics in state formation. The context that gave birth to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
which was later emphasized in the early 20th century by Abdulaziz ibn Muhammad al 
Saud, the nation’s founder, reflects upon the significance political patronage carried in 
accessing power. As a result, looking at the relationship between ibn Saud and the 
Ikhwan, a Wahhabi religious militia, reveal how both political and religious entities 
benefitted through such an alliance. Yet, this chapter also examines how unrestrained 
religious zeal was not to be tolerated, and consequently, institutionalizing Wahhabism 
and reigning in the excess of aggressive actions that were delivered under the umbrella of 
jihad, by the Ikhwan, served ibn Saud’s goals of achieving political stability and 
consolidating his power. At this juncture, the final chapter displays how powerful 
religious groups were only tolerated insofar as they did not pose a greater threat to those 
establishing political and territorial power. 
Popular interpretations and academic scholarship tends to emphasize the 
relationship between jihad, military action, and communal violence. These reinforce a 
sense that violence is inherent to Islam. Investigations into the contexts where jihad has 
11 Dale, Stephen Frederic. The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
12 Cook, David. Understanding Jihad. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. 
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been deployed highlight how its use is often a call for unity believed to be necessary for 
political goals. This thesis tackles instead the relationship between textural interpretations 
and historical actions, and how these varied across specific moments in time. The case 
studies examined range from the initial evolution of a theory of jihad in the late antique 
world, to the Crusades in the 11th and 12th centuries, to early modern dynamics of the 
Ottomans and Safavids, and finally to modern state-making projects in the Arabian 
Peninsula These examples seek to create a comprehensive picture of the intricacies rooted 
in jihad and the narrative that can be associated with a religion that is most often 
misunderstood. The effort to shed some light on the multiple facets of jihad is hinged 
upon how these case studies differ from one another, thus forcing the reader to question 
how they previously understood the modern day phenomenon of jihad. While the 
conversation will reiterate various themes and concepts as discussed in previous 
scholarship, it should push the boundaries on how jihad has been framed as a modern day 
extremist ideology. 
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I 
Demystifying the Origins of Jihad: The Emergence of Religiously 
Justified Warfare in the Late Antique World & Islam’s Inheritance 
 
 
 
n the post 9/11 world, Islam is often associated with, or directly accused of 
being, an inherently violent religion. Proponents of such an argument assert 
this point through a singular definition of jihad that brings Muslim groups into conflict 
with anyone unlike themselves. As terrorist groups, rooted in certain ideological 
interpretations of Islam, continue to wage war on innocent civilians, jihad continues to be 
used as a loaded weapon to perpetuate Islamophobic molds. Therefore, this thesis aims to 
undermine and dispel such molds by analyzing the way in which jihad, as an orientation 
and an action, evolved across distinct historical periods. 
Developing a framework for such an historical investigation is paramount to 
understanding how varying interpretations of the concept have appeared in particular 
contexts. Yet, designing this framework is inherently problematic, as this interpretative 
structure must also explore the ways in which Muslim leaders generated arguments for 
the appropriate political, religious, and moral use of jihad. Thus, acknowledging that 
these contexts each generated their own interpretation of jihad, influenced by key sources 
and debates of the time, requires a close analysis of the Qur’an to begin with, as from this 
text spawned many forms of interpretative dialogue. At the center of Islam, this sacred 
text informs every aspect of a Muslim’s life. It goes beyond just the spiritual and moral 
concepts that are offered in other religions by setting the tone for legal and administrative 
I 
Demystifying the Origins of Jihad | 11 
systems that continue to permeate various Muslim countries around the world. The 
complicated relationship between these systems and various Muslim civilizations has 
often prompted an aggressive use of jihad to further a particular agenda. 
However, this text can also not be separated from its historical creation, and from 
the evolution of Muslim-based dynasties that relied on it for governance, piety, and social 
organization. Thus, the history of jihad must also be understood as the historical 
interaction between the Qur’an and developments internal to various societies. Within the 
history of Islamic empires, distinct events often inspired widespread change leading to 
the emergence of a new structure of society. Oftentimes these events were inspired by the 
development of elements either, outside the formal borders of an empire, or, from within 
the empire itself. These elements ranged from the arrival of circumstances that allowed a 
new set of believers and monotheistic principles to flourish and form a cohesive identity 
that challenged late antique empires, to invasions from across the ocean, to dissatisfaction 
with the current status quo and the regulation of administrative and legal mechanisms that 
governed the empire. Yet, consistently these elements were invoked through a new 
interpretation of Islamic texts and their consequent association with powerful 
personalities who guided military and social reforms. The role of this key leader should 
not be understated in the history of jihad as it is from them that the declaration of jihad 
has often occurred. Therefore, contending with the dilemma of who has the authority to 
declare jihad after Muhammad and the original caliphs is crucial in how jihad appeared in 
different contexts. With each new development impacting Islamic empires, the sentiment 
that encouraged jihad shifted several times from issues such as personal obligations to 
expansionism or an aggressive agenda. Thus, those that deploy the term in the present 
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both embody and reflect this array of interpretations, which should be brought to the fore 
in order to maintain the complexity of jihad as both a set of actions and a philosophical 
construct. 
 
The Late Antique World and the Prophet Muhammad 
 
To fully understand the development of the Qur’an and its role in Islam, the set of 
events that predated its concept must be acknowledged. The late antique world was 
defined by conflicts between two major empires, Byzantine and Sasanian, which also 
shaped the fortunes of the Arabian Peninsula through trade and proxy wars. These 
empires were increasingly defined via hegemonic religions, Christianity and 
Zoroastrianism, and thus created a model for the relationship between religion and 
regional power that Islam would later emulate. These two empires dominated the lands 
from the Near East to the Mediterranean and consequently many territories either fell 
directly under their control or at least within their sphere of influence. As a result, the 
development of their territories was impacted by political allegiances, religious influence 
and economic domination.1 The Byzantine Empire subscribed to a Christianized form of 
the vision of a united world order, with all subjects loyal to the emperor and Orthodox 
Church headed by the “patriarch of the Constantinople, in close association with the 
emperor.”2 The relationship between religion and politics gained greater significance in 
the Empire when Emperor Constantine, 313 CE, declared Christianity the official faith of 
1 Donner, Fred McGraw. Muhammad and the Believers: At the Origins of Islam. Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2010, 4. 
2 Ibid., 5. 
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his territories in order to promote religious and political unity.3 The Sasanian Empire was 
less regulated and decentralized, according to most sources, until the reign of Khosro I 
Anoshirwan in 531 CE, who asserted royal prerogative against the nobility in his various 
lands by reorganizing the state and imposing greater central control.4 While the 
Byzantines often experienced several internal conflicts over the correct practices and 
traditions of Christianity, in the Sasanian lands, Zoroastrianism had long been associated 
with the monarchy as the quasi-official religion of the state. This is not to say that 
contentious matters did not exist between the religious elites and political establishment, 
but rather it did not display the divisions that existed in the Byzantine Empire.5 The close 
association of monotheistic religions to political order as well as the distinct challenges of 
administering such vast arrays of land demonstrated the similarities between the two 
empires. Yet, with both monotheistic religions proclaiming universal dominion over the 
contested regions, the clash between the Byzantines and the Sasanians was inevitable and 
manifested itself in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Such deep rooted ideological antagonisms pitted the two empires against each 
other for many centuries in the late antique world, yet this battle perhaps reached its 
climax during the sixth and seventh centuries. The recognition of the dearth of resources 
in the Arabian Peninsula and the access that it provided to trade routes to India and 
beyond escalated the strategic importance of gaining control over the area.6 Yet, the 
difficulty of attaining direct control of these territories was highlighted by fierce 
3 Ibid., 8. 
4 Ibid., 18. 
5 Ibid., 20. 
6 Ibid., 31-32. 
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hostilities to prevent such a reality from materializing. Therefore, the need to prevent an 
overextension of resources in trying to win these lands outright and administer them 
uninterrupted, involved various tribes in the Arabian Peninsula. As a result, wars by 
proxy emerged between the Byzantines and the Sasanians that resulted in certain tribes in 
the Arabian Peninsula protecting the trade interests of a particular empire and often 
attacking the other empire. The constant presence of these empires in the Arabian 
Peninsula led to the gradual receding of paganism and the arrival of monotheism.7 The 
numerous wars left them both severely weakened by 630 CE and provided the backdrop 
for the Muhammad’s career. 
The importance of trade routes to the economies of these empires was central in 
developing Mecca as a major commercial center. Its central location in the heart of 
southern Arabia meant that a majority of trading goods passed through this city on their 
way to the ports in Yemen or other southern cities.8 Consequently, the acknowledgment 
of this factor attracted many new individuals to the land and contributed to its burgeoning 
environment. As Mecca continued to grow, the Quraysh clan assumed control over it 
with their two major focuses orienting around religion and commerce.9 The clan’s 
participation in various trading fairs as well as acting as the guardians of many religious 
objects, most significantly the Ka’ba, whom many individuals and groups visited Mecca 
to practice religious duties, brought the clan into contact with many other communities.10 
The security that came with being the protectors of such religious objects also bolstered 
7 Ibid.,  
8 Ibid., 37. 
9 Ibid., 40. 
10 Ibid. 
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the commercial activity of the city. Thus, the creation of an elaborate political system 
around the pilgrimage to the Ka’ba, organized through the auspices of the Quraysh clan, 
highlighted a process that had already begun unification across the Peninsula. Yet, the 
circulation of wealth led to disadvantaged groups seeking alternatives to the clan, and 
would eventually prove receptive to Muhammad’s message, which replaced the clan. 
Muhammad was born in Mecca during this prosperous time, as part of the 
Qurayshi clan. Orphaned at an early age, Muhammad grew into a respected individual 
amongst the Qurayshi people, eventually marrying his first wife Khadija.11 While the 
narrative of Muhammad’s life is primarily told through biographies internal to the faith, 
the general consensus is around the age of 40, Muhammad began to retreat from public 
life. Taking refuge at the foot of Mount Hira, Muhammad is believed to have had his first 
revelation, which became known as the Prayer for Guidance.12 During these revelations, 
the angel Gabriel appeared to Muhammad on a night in the month of Ramadan and 
forced him to recite the first four verses of what would eventually be the Qur’an.13 
Muhammad’s early preaching brought him few followers and it was predominantly his 
wife and uncle, Abu Talib, who truly listened to his words. Abu Talib, a well-respected 
member of the Qurayshi clan was able to provide a degree of security for Muhammad 
that allowed him to spread his revelations in Mecca. However, the death of both Abu 
Talib and Khadija left Muhammad with little support and at the mercy of the Qurayshi 
elite. Regardless of the fact that Muhammad had not gained much notoriety at the time, 
11 Ibid. 
12 Muir, William, and T. H. Weir. The Life of Mohammad from Original Sources. Edinburgh: J. Grant, 
1923, 4-8., 38. 
13 Lewis, Bernard. The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years. New York, NY: Scribner, 
1995, 51. 
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his words were considered troublesome by the Qurayshi religious elites and their 
influence forced Muhammad to move his preaching to the towns on the outskirts of 
Mecca.14 It was at this moment Muhammad’s movement began to gain momentum 
through its attractiveness to the people from the neighboring city of Yathrib. A place that 
had been plagued by internal conflict and divisions between the varying political factions, 
Yathrib longed for healing.15 Thus, between the Yathribis continuous invitations to bring 
his teachings to their city and the increased opposition to Muhammad’s prayers by the 
Qurayshi, he agreed to make the journey. This moment came to be known as hijra or the 
emigration from Mecca to what would later become Medina, by Muhammad and his 
followers in 622 CE.16 Perhaps even more significant was the consolidation of political 
power that Muhammad was able to achieve in Yathrib by concluding an agreement 
between the various clans. The idea of belonging to a single community that Muhammad 
communicated to his new found followers was the birthplace of the Muslim umma, which 
also incorporated non-believers through treaty negotiations.17 The alignments that 
Muhammad made would become of great significance because they eventually became 
powerful enough to ultimately re-conquer Mecca, and then unify the Peninsula under the 
authority of Muhammad and his military commanders. 
 As the revelations could come to Muhammad at any point in his life, the 
compilation of the Qur’an is of significant importance to the history of Islam. The birth of 
the oral tradition of Islam has its roots in the fact that with every new revelation 
14 Donner., 42. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 44. 
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Muhammad received, he would recite it to those around them, who in turn would learn it 
and recite it to others.18 As these revelations continued, a close group of followers, who 
travelled with him, began to write down and memorize the recitations so as to preserve 
them for the future. This method proved successful until a year after the death of 
Muhammad at the Battle of Yamama (633 CE) where “a number of those who knew the 
Qur’an by heart died.”19 The consequent realization that along with the deaths of these 
followers, there was the possibility that the revelations of the Qur’an would be lost as 
well, Abu Bakr, the first caliph and successor to the Prophet, ordered that a written copy 
of the whole body of Qur’anic material should be made and stored with him.20 Yet, as the 
Islamic expansion continued, the third caliph, Uthman, called for a number of copies to 
be made and dispersed to different parts of the Muslim world as the official copy of the 
Qur’an.21 This traditional narrative of the ordering and compilation of the Qur’an 
symbolizes the moment that Islam began to extend beyond the regions of Mecca and 
Medina and permeate the lives of people that now acknowledged the religion as a central 
part of their identity.22 
The role of the late antique world and the birth of Islam within it highlights how 
many of the concepts attributed exclusively to Islam, had their roots in the broader 
dynamics of the region. The need for territorial expansion by the Byzantine and Sasanian 
Empires, closely associated with religious precedents, predate the birth of Islam and 
provided the foundations of a framework that justified war long before the emergence of 
18 A., Abdel Haleem M. The Qurʼan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, xv. 
19 Ibid., xvi. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 There have been some recent contestations about the exact date that the Qur’an was formally canonized, 
yet, the general sequence of events is accepted by scholars of the topic. 
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jihad and Islam. Moreover, the events that took place between the major empires helped 
foster the environment that would allow for another monotheistic religion to emerge. As a 
result, the exhaustion of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires through long warfare and 
the emergence of a vibrant new ideology that began to unify the Arabian Peninsula gave 
birth to Islam. While Muhammad was alive, he did successfully venture into conflicts 
with these declining empires, yet, his successors would quickly conquer territory from 
both, and ultimately incorporate the Sasanian Empire into its own new political 
heartlands, first in Damascus and then Baghdad. 
 
Issues with Qur’anic Interpretation 
 
The Qur’an is itself a text produced by distinct events and circumstances that 
together yield its dynamism as a scripture. Therefore, scholarship that uses the Qur’an as 
an ahistorical creation overlooks the conditions that led to the formalization of the ideas 
and themes that are contentious today. The oral tradition that predated the written 
compilation of the original manuscript inherently recognizes a certain truth that was 
vocalized to the Prophet Muhammad, by the angel Gabriel, which may have been lost in 
the book’s manifestation. While writing was not common during Muhammad’s time, 
there were certain scribes who noted down oral recitations at the time before they were 
compiled into a single text.23 However, the fact that many of those followers died before 
they could also write down these revelations allows for varying interpretations of what 
the Qur’an states since the “decided lack of agreement destroys the classic argument of 
23 Esack, Farid. The Qur’an: User's Guide: A Guide to Its Key Themes, History and Interpretation. Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2005, 3. 
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divinely guided evolution and reveals its origin as a theoretical solution to the problem of 
Quranic contract.”24 As a result, this piece work acknowledges how there may be gaps in 
what the text was intended to communicate and the interpretation of the results, which 
have been jaded through the loss of original oral insights as well as the subsequent loss 
that comes through translations. However, despite these obstacles there is much to take 
from using the Qur’an as the backbone of a framework that connected religious and 
political institutes during war, as all the proceeding events directly refer to the text as 
their inspiration in one form or another. 
The gaps that permeate the study of Islam and jihad prompt both historians and 
readers to be more aware and conduct greater discrimination of the evidence that is 
available. By overlooking such a significant factor, it may force a “focus on a single 
narrative of origin [which] can lead us to forget that any act of founding becomes obscure 
in retrospect, because it necessarily includes an element of myth.”25 Knowledge of the 
early formation and expansion of both Islam and the Qur’an comes from outsiders to the 
emergent faith or from Muslim scholars themselves. Moreover, scholars within the faith 
quite early debated the community’s history, the appropriate version of the Qur’an, and 
the meaning of individual verses. The tension that exists between interpretations and texts 
that have been derived or advanced from previous concepts is represented by the 
differing opinions, both between Muslim and non-Muslim scholars as to the origin of 
Islam and the development of a religious orthodoxy. These factors all complicate any 
24 Firestone, Reuven. Jihād: The Origin of Holy War in Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, 
51. 
25 Bonner, Michael David. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practice. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006, 15. 
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historical assessment of how specific verses were interpreted or acted upon in different 
historical contexts. The nature of verse relationship highlights the layers of difficulty that 
originate in understanding, jihad, the Qur’an and Islam. When taken in isolation the 
Qur’an can provide an individual with justifications for many actions that may prove 
controversial. Therefore, acknowledging that the revelations of the Prophet Muhammad 
were part of a broader narrative for the conduct of Islam is pivotal in determining how to 
comprehend jihad.  
The recognition of these factors prompts a brief insight into where the dilemma 
occurs and what realizations one can draw from the emergence of the Qur’an itself. 
According to the standard Muslim view, “Muhammad was confronted with many 
different and inconstant predicaments during his evolving mission as prophet 
extraordinaire,” meaning that a variety of his actions can be viewed as responsive or 
reactionary to the situation at the time.26 Moreover, “since the imam or caliph could not 
be everywhere at once, it was always necessary for him to delegate his authority in 
certain matters” highlighting the possibility of an initial departure from the revelations 
that Muhammad received.27 The fragmented nature of the creation of the Qur’an further 
problematizes the issues of interpretation. However, this does not accurately reflect the 
state in which Muslim societies developed; it would be a broad generalization to think 
that despite Muhammad’s influence one can “reduce so many societies and polities 
covering such broad extents of time and space, to any single governing principle.”28 
Thus, assessing the Qur’an as a historical text highlights the problems of interpretation 
26 Firestone, 49. 
27 Bonner., 12. 
28 Ibid., 2. 
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that is at the heart of any historical inquiry. This concept was discovered quickly by 
scholars, jurists and other religious functionaries associated with Islam as they often 
debated how the Qur’an was formed, what its canonical shape should be, and then how to 
connect the context of scripture to the ever-changing realities of time. Therefore, in 
further exploration of events that invoked jihad, recognizing that controversies exist 
regarding Qur’anic interpretation is central to shaping any understanding of a particular 
event. 
Furthermore, the term jihad and the various places and various forms it takes in 
the Qur’an, also complicate issues of interpretative. In its most literal form, jihad is a 
“verbal noun of the third Arabic form of the root, jahada, which is defined classically as 
exerting one’s utmost power, efforts, or ability in contending with an object of 
disapprobation.”29 There is some consistency with this definition, with the base concept 
of “exerting oneself as much as one can” in order to achieve a certain end.30 Such 
agreements between various scholars takes away from the popular conception that jihad 
means holy war, instead highlighting how these different entities have slowly been 
associated with one another. However, what is evident from the consistency of these 
definitions is that the Arabic root of jihad, j-h-d, requires commitment and explicit intent. 
The ability to exert oneself to one’s full capacity hints at the complete submission to the 
task at hand. Anything that reflects behavior other than complete dedication can be 
discounted as emblematic of jihad, as it has been translated and understood in its most 
literal sense.  
29 Ibid., 16. 
30 Peters, 9. 
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Situating Jihad in the Larger Conceptual Framework 
 
While these definitions do originate from literal translations and applications of 
jihad, such terms are used in broad and multifaceted ways. Therefore, the process of 
translation from the original context to different historical moments must be addressed. In 
many respects the definition of jihad “must be based both on what Muslims have written 
concerning the subject and on the historical record how they have practiced it,” thus 
inherent to this idea, is how jihad has been used in a particular time.31 Therefore, using 
the Qur’an as the cornerstone of this analysis means that independent statements that 
mention jihad are not representative of broader themes in the text but rather how 
“understanding the meaning lies in verse relationships and the fact that the contexts of 
many pronouncements remain uncertain.”32 Consequently, the literal and historical 
translation that takes place when jihad is applied in different contexts requires intense 
interpretation as “it is usually impossible to reconstruct the context of the utterances from 
the text of the Scripture itself.” 33 As a result, just as the Qur’an is a product of a series of 
events and oral traditions “the doctrine of jihad had a role of its own events,” leading to 
the popular concepts that exist in society today.34 This phenomenon highlights how the 
interpretation of the Qur’an and jihad is itself an object of some debate and concern 
within the evolving scholarship on jihad. Therefore, contemporary use of jihad implicitly 
embodies varying interpretations, which must be acknowledged in order to represent 
jihad accurately as a command and an ideal. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Firestone., 47. 
33 Ibid., 49. 
34 Bonner., 4. 
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The conjuncture between particular dynamics of conflict, the tradition of 
scholarship and interpretation of jihad, and the way it is ultimately deployed in that 
setting reveals at a fundamental level how criticisms of the religion are particular to a 
context. The nuances of where jihad is situated in the broader religion does not fully 
acknowledge the various forms that jihad can take. The fact that from the literal 
translation of jihad one can see how it can be applied to different aspects of the individual 
and the collectives lives, hints at the more problematic issue of understanding which form 
is being applied and whether multiple forms can be applied at the same time. Navigating 
the dynamic between the various forms of jihad can only be done through “recognizing a 
broad spectrum of paradigms reflected by varied cultural and religious setting in which 
they may be found.”35 Thus, the way in which particular actors embrace jihad 
demonstrates the significant role that context and interpretive variation play in its usage 
and invocation. This allows one to distinguish between acts of jihad from the religion as a 
whole. Moreover, the varying types of jihad further highlights how “many kinds of jihad 
have nothing to do with warfare,” revealing that the literal struggle jihad refers to can be 
reoriented into an aggressive idea if the individual deems his struggle worthy of such a 
dimension.36 Building out from the various intricacies that exist within jihad, has seen a 
formation of several types: 
Jihad of the Heart, i.e. struggling against one’s sinful inclinations, the 
Jihad of the Tongue, i.e. ordering what is food and forbidding what is evil, 
the Jihad of the Hand, i.e. administering of disciplinary measures such as 
beating, by rulers and men of authority in order to prevent people from 
35 Firestone., 16. 
36 Ibid., 17. 
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committing abominable acts, and, finally, the Jihad of the Sword, i.e. 
fighting the unbelievers for religion’s sake.37 
The fact that jihad can be interpreted in a variety of different ways and is the 
product of a series of events and actions means that it is only logical that jihad was used 
in radically different ways by scholars and administrators depending on historical 
circumstances. Yet, all of these interpretations attempt to define both the religious and 
geographic integrity of Islam, and to preserve it in the face of internal and external threats 
called either the “territory of Islam, the part of the world where this is Moslem rule and 
the shari’ah is applied and the rest of the world, called the territory of war.”38 The 
former, known as the Dar al-Islam, is not explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an but evolved 
from the term Dar al-Salam that appears in sura 10:25, and exists in the world as places 
that Muslims can practice their faith in peace and are governed by a Muslim ruler. 
Whereas the territory of war, or the Dar al-Harb, refers to the areas that are not governed 
by Muslim law. If the world is perceived as a binary by Muslims, then jihad must take on 
infinite number of possibilities in order to reconcile and contain all aspects of human 
experiences into these categories. If this is the case then “it is important to note one aim 
of jihad is not necessarily to bring conquered peoples to convert to Islam, but to enlarge 
the domain of Islam, the Dar al-Islam, at the expense of Dar al-Harb.”39 This sentiment 
changes the perception of whether or not jihad can be viewed as a solely aggressive or 
expansionist agenda. Instead, the motivating factors of how one should pursue jihad 
become more intrinsic in reconciling with the religion itself and about consolidating 
community. As a result, it makes sense that these spheres are so broadly defined, 
37 Peters., 9. 
38 Peters., 10. 
39 Bonney, Richard. Jihād: From Qurʼān to Bin Laden. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 48.  
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regarding what constitutes war and who Muslims believe themselves to be at war with, 
because the “loose and vague definitions of the situation depend only on their 
perspectives and interpretation.”40 Recognition of how contexts and interpretations differ 
is a testament to how jihad has been embraced in varying manners all in the name of 
Islam. 
 
The Divine Word and Historical Contingencies 
 
 As jihad was invoked in different contexts based on different premises, and as 
legal and theological interpretations developed from the ninth century onwards, these 
issues of Qur’anic interpretation came to the fore. This brief tour of the complexities 
inherent in the interpretation of jihad, within the evolving religion of Islam, opens up a 
space to engage with particular passages in the Qur’an. The first mention of jihad in the 
Qur’an appears to refer not to warfare, but rather to disputation and efforts made for the 
sake of God and in his cause. As the Qur’an states: 
And strive hard for Allah with due striving (wa-jahidu fi illahi haqqa 
jihadihi). He has chosen you and has not laid upon you any hardship in 
religion - the faith of your father Abraham. He named you Muslims before 
and in this that the Messenger may be a bearer of witness to you, and you 
may be bearers of witness to people, so keep up prayer and hold fast to 
Allah. He is your Protector; excellent the Protector and excellent the 
Helper.41 
This passage addresses an inherent debt Muslims owe to God, and the struggle they must 
conduct in order to repay the debt simply for the fortune of being a born a Muslim. The 
resulting sentiment, therefore, focuses on the effort necessary to live a life that is worthy 
40 Ibid., 16. 
41 Ali, Muhammad. The Holy Qurʼān: Arabic Text, English Translation and Commentary. Rev. Ed., 7th ed. 
Columbus, Ohio: Ahmadiyyah Anjuman Isha'at Islam Lahore,, U.S.A., 1991, 22:78, 682. 
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of God, or of the privilege inherent in leading an enlightened life synonymous with Islam. 
The reference to this fortune comes from “the revelation of Abraham, who prayed that 
from among his descendants should arise a nation of Muslims,” that should strive to lead 
a life of peace.42 Yet, this struggle is heightened because peace needs to be with God and 
the lack of direct guidance leads to the direct involvement of the individual in deciding 
how to live that peaceful life. The fact that being a Muslim presumes a life of privilege 
that is intrinsic to other religions, or so the Qur’an states, perhaps, provides greater 
impetus and opportunity for Muslims to work towards their greater jihad. This changes 
the sense of struggle that a Muslim faces, because there are less external aspects to 
engage with. Instead, it pushes the struggle inwards and out of this comes the concept of 
a greater jihad.  
The idea of the greater jihad is mentioned more explicitly later in the Qur’an, 
where it states that Muslims should “obey not the disbelievers, and strive against them a 
mighty striving with it (wa-jahidhum jihadan khabiran).”43 In this context a relationship 
is formed between jihad and an external group of people known as the “disbelievers,” 
presumably both certain kinds of Muslims and non-Muslims. The struggle between a 
particular kind of Muslim, one that is most representative of God’s will on earth, and 
“disbelievers” may come from the struggle to spread the word of God and convince 
others of the righteousness and holiness that exists in this way of life. However, it creates 
the possibility that fighting may be necessary for the message of the Qur’an to spread 
amongst all groups and peoples. As such “amongst Muslims who acknowledge the 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 25:52, 725. 
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associations of jihad with warfare, most would define the term as warfare authorized by a 
legitimate representative of the Muslim community for the sake of an issue that is 
universally acknowledged to be of critical importance for the entire community.”44 As 
time has progressed the authority that gives permission for warfare associated with jihad, 
has changed significantly depending on the context and this had led to different 
perspectives on when an issue is represented as a threat to the entire religion. Yet, what 
cannot be disputed is how those undertaking jihad, under all circumstances, should serve 
the purpose of “strengthening Islam” whether that comes from a personal, spiritual level 
or an aggressive campaign.45 
Such complexities create a conjunction of multiple definitions of jihad where 
there is the potential for both the internal war and external adversaries to merge into the 
same conflict. This presents the problem of “what it means to have such an adversary and 
to make war against it.”46 Therefore, when striving to live a life in line with Islam, one 
also battles right and wrong orientations of faith. In achieving the right orientation, 
Muslims must harmoniously align the right orientation of the self to God, of the specific 
community, and of the larger framework of the umma. The implementation of jihad in all 
of these domains suggests an effort to keep the many factors in alignment with each 
other. This effort is both a ‘natural’ everyday effort, and an extraordinary one during 
moments of outright warfare. Hence, when there are aspects of this personal struggle that 
manifests themselves in the external domain “Muslims have then extended this principle 
44 Cook., 3. 
45 Peters., 9. 
46 Bonner., 12. 
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to expansionist military campaigns, which are justified to them, since all wars are in the 
way of Allah.”47  
The framework of jihad, provided by the Qur’an, suggests that Muslims should 
continually exert a personal struggle in order to align the interests of self and community 
to those of the divine. This personal struggle and the explicit goal of preserving the 
sanctity of the community, then leads to the possibility of facing external threats, within 
the framework of jihad, now projected as an adversary. Moreover, it also highlights how 
jihad is “an obligation for the community as a whole,” creating a perpetual state of 
tension for Muslims both internally and externally.48 While this projection may align 
itself with the principles of jihad and striving in the path of God, the authority that 
declares jihad in these instances still engages an interpretive act, based on historical 
contingency. Interpretation, even when derived from Qur’an, faces internal conundrums 
as to its meaning and directives for how to conduct jihad. Therefore, the possibility 
emerges that such a jihad may not accurately reflect the path of God and consequently 
diverges from divine intent inscribed in the Qur’an. The many parts of the Qur’an that an 
individual can relate to and align with regarding jihad are numerous in number and 
highlight how the “conflicting Quranic verses cannot prove an evolution of the concept of 
jihad for religiously authorized warring in Islam from nonaggressive to a militant 
stance.”49 Verses in the Qur’an, if carefully assessed, reveal the multiple ways in which 
jihad can be understood and explored as both a moral guide and a declaration of war 
47 Bonner., 47. 
48 Peters., 12. 
49 Firestone., 64. 
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In the verses that pertain directly to “jihad of the sword” in the Qur’an there are 
statements such as “fight them until there is no persecution, and religion is only for Allah. 
But if they desist, then there should be no hostility except against the oppressors.”50 Two 
likely conclusions that could be drawn from this phrase reflect both a more aggressive 
jihad as well as a more internal jihad. In the former, there seems to be a more obvious 
idea that the only surviving religion should be that of God’s, or what is assumed to be the 
community of Islam. Therefore, the idea of desisting, in line with this thought, implicitly 
implies that those resistors should convert to Islam because that may be viewed as the 
ultimate surrender to God’s will. However, looking at the relationship between those who 
desist and those who are still oppressing, then it appears that when the persecution ceases, 
people are at liberty to practice any religion that best reflects their sense of faith, and the 
fighting should stop. In this context, those who continue to oppress can be seen as more 
non-religious entities as opposed to anti-Muslim entities. This revelation is further 
highlighted when connected to another sura from the Qur’an that states: 
Those who are driven from their homes without a just cause except that 
they say: Our Lord is Allah. And if Allah did not repel some people by 
others, cloisters, and churches, and synagogues, and mosques in which 
Allah’s name is much remembered, would have been pulled down. And 
surely Allah will help him who helps Him. Surely Allah is Strong, 
Mighty.51 
This connection highlights how Muslims did not only fight for the protection of their 
sacred spaces but also for those of other religions of the book, laying down broad 
principles of religious tolerance. This idea reflects how the spiritual jihad ideology 
reveals even greater sacrifice as it contains a suggestion that Muslim lives should not 
50 Ali., 2:193, 86. 
51 Ibid., 22:40, 676. 
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only be laid down for the protection of Islam but also for their monotheistic counterparts, 
in what has been deemed as an attempt to establish “perfect religious freedom.”52 If this 
is the motivating factor for what drives those trying to fulfill their greater jihad, then the 
incentive to act accordingly and deliver such results becomes the protection of others as 
well, because it is explicitly stated that “religion is only for Allah.” Therefore, this 
sentiment reflects an effort to ensure that there is no persecution in the name of religion, 
and everyone is at liberty to hold any beliefs that suits their needs.  
The relevance of reading beyond a single verse to gain an accurate image of 
intention in the Qur’an is further highlighted in a selection on fighting in defense. The 
Qur’an states “fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you but be not 
aggressive. Surely Allah loves not the aggressors,” which is one of the first references in 
the text that permits Muslims to fight.53 Yet, fighting “in the way of Allah” is later 
clarified in the verse to mean only fight against those who wage war upon you. Yet, it 
would appear that the next verse provides a more hostile dynamic when the Qur’an states:  
Kill them wherever you find them, and drive them out from where they 
drove you out, and persecution is worse than slaughter. And fight not with 
them at the Sacred Mosque until they fight with you in it; so if they fight 
you in it, slay them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers.54 
At a first glance, the reference of “them” reinforces the binary between those who 
practice Islam and those who do not or at least those who do not practice according to 
God’s interpreted intentions. Therefore, this text is often referenced as proof of a violent 
interpretation of Islam, a religion that condones violence against those who do not 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 2:190, 84. 
54 Ibid., 2:191, 85-86. 
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possess the same beliefs. However, this perception overlooks the contextual factors that 
inform these verses. In these circumstances, the Muslim population was few in number 
and was by no means searching for an active and aggressive military campaign, instead 
the enemies of Islam, for example the Qurayshi peoples, could see this as an opportunity 
to remove Islam from the Arabian lands.55 In this instance it is actually the Muslim 
demographic that was being persecuted, clarified when the Qur’an states later “they will 
not cease fighting you until they turn you back from your religion, if they can.”56 The fact 
that these verses are a continuation of the same set of circumstances that were meant to 
represent the emerging polity of Islam at the time, highlights how there was no other 
option for the Muslim community to take up jihad of the sword against their enemies or 
else risk being wiped from the face of the earth. Moreover, the aggressive tone is 
tempered when focusing on the importance of location in the aforementioned verses. The 
sense that Muslims should not seek wholesale extermination when reclaiming the lands 
that they lost, especially ones of sacred importance, such as Mecca, reveals that Islamic 
motivations should not come from vengeance but from the closest spiritual alignment 
with God, hence the need to recapture these places. As a result, recognizing how 
particular verses in the Qur’an that fuel popular notions of aggressiveness and war-
mongering are in fact a product of a particular situation becomes an important component 
in assessing the relationship between history and interpretation. Thus, reconciling how to 
interpret these verses in modern contexts presents the problem of acknowledging what 
aspects of the context have changed, and what aspects are similar.  
55 Malik, S. K. The Quranic Concept of War. Lahore: Wajidalis, 1979, 5. 
56 Ali., 2:217, 96. 
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Further exploration of verses that appear to work towards consolidating the 
concept of Islam as an aggressive religion and jihad being the vehicle through which it is 
expressed can also illuminate how these verses need a significant amount of in depth 
analysis before reaching a conclusion. In what is seen as the Sword Verses the Qur’an 
states: 
Slay the idolaters, wherever you find them, and take them captive and 
besiege them and lie in wait for them in every ambush. But if they repent 
and keep up prayer and pay the poor-rate, leave their way free. Surely 
Allah is Forgiving, Merciful.57 
Echoing the previous aggressive tone of the verses that also suggest the need to seek out 
those who wish to vanquish Islam from the world, this verse also requires a closer look at 
context and the audience in order to understand the application of the label “idolaters.” 
The circumstances of these events define idolaters as those tribes of Arabia that made 
agreements with Muslims allowing the safe passage for the Holy Pilgrimage, only to 
violate them.58 This realization clarifies the second part of the verse, which would 
initially suggest that the only options Muslims have in pursuing jihad is either killing the 
enemy or converting them to Islam, when in fact, because the verse actually refers to a 
specific group of people, these conclusions cannot accurately represent the message at 
hand. Thus, the opportunity for such traitorous people to join Islam is the only 
opportunity that the early Muslim movement could adopt in the face of an abandoned 
treaty agreement. The idea that Muslims were permitted to kill others simply because 
they did not practice Islam is further nullified in the next verse where the Qur’an states 
“if anyone of the idolaters seek thy protection, protect him till he hears the word of Allah, 
57 Ibid., 9:5, 398. 
58 Ibid. 
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then convey him to his place of safety. This is because they are a people who know 
not.”59 Consequently, it was not the importance of a person’s religious preference that led 
them into conflict with Muslims but rather, a more contingent factor was the emphasis on 
who was responsible for initiating war. This aspect of religious conflict is exemplified by 
the fact that the Qur’an allows an opportunity for a captive to hear the words of God and 
then make a choice as to whether to convert or not. The role of the Muslim is to 
guarantee his captives safety until they are at a place deemed to be free from harm, which 
could be broadened to include sacred religious spaces from other religions. From what is 
initially perceived to be aggressive dialogue that reflects the popularization of jihad as a 
tool of mass violence and a sweeping need of conversion or extermination, reveals 
instead a set of historical contingencies and a spiritual quest for perfection and alignment 
with God’s principles. 
 
The Battle of Badr 
 
This emphasis on context and verse relationship as a methodology to explore how 
jihad was perceived or enacted enables a more nuanced understanding of its role within 
the larger orientation of Islam. In order to further exemplify this methodology, an 
examination of a particular instance where the Prophet Muhammad was involved in battle 
and reconcile it with the framework created, reveals how this contingency becomes the 
structure for future events that invoke jihad. The Battle of Badr was a key battle in the 
early days of Islam and a turning point in Muhammad's struggle with his opponents 
among the Quraysh in Mecca. It is one of the few battles that were specifically recorded 
59 Ibid., 9:6. 
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in the Qur’an, suggesting its importance in deriving circumstances for Muslims to engage 
in war in the following years.60 Muhammad who was born into the large conglomeration 
of Qurayshi tribes, but fled to Yathrib (later renamed as the city of the Prophet, Medina) 
when the Meccans began persecuting Muslims, looked at how to recoup all the 
possessions that were forcibly taken from the Muslims that fled Mecca.61 This 
development aligns with previous notions that explain how Muslims should only engage 
in acts of aggression when oppressed in the first place. While there are varying 
interpretations as to how precisely the Battle of Badr began, tensions certainly escalated 
when blood was spilled on a Muslim raid of a Meccans caravan.62 The Qur’an reflects on 
these instances when it states: 
So you slew them not but Allah slew them, and thou smotest not when 
thou didst smite the enemy, but Allah smote him, and that He might confer 
upon the believers a benefit from Himself. Surely Allah is Hearing, 
Knowing.63 
The sense of divine intervention that permeates this verse and highlights how it was not 
really the Muslims that killed the Qurayshi people but rather that it was God who slew 
Qurayshi people, creates the impression that God was directly involved in the affairs of 
his followers. This interpretation is of utmost importance because it reflects the sense of 
desperation the Muslim people were facing from an enemy that significantly 
outnumbered them, hence the need for God’s intervention in order to prevent the 
followers from extinction. This belief is reinforced later in this section when the Qur’an 
states: 
60 Nigosian, S. A. Islam Its History, Teaching, and Practices. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004, 
4. 
61 Firestone., 50. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ali., 8:17, 380. 
                                                          
Demystifying the Origins of Jihad | 35 
If you sought a judgment, the judgment has indeed come to you; and if 
you desist, it is better for you. And if you return to fight, we too shall 
return and your forces will avail you nothing, though they may be many; 
and know that Allah is with the believers.64 
 
The suggestion, in the midst of battle, that virtue may lie in desisting, returns to the 
tension between internal striving and external action that opened the discussion of the 
multiple meanings of jihad. This verse creates and emphasizes the need for jihad to be a 
collective duty as any decision ultimately made, requires a consensus amongst the group. 
The tone of this verse suggests that regardless of how the battle developed there was 
always a sentiment that the Muslim population should consider an alternative to 
bloodshed. Therefore, portraying Muhammad as the aggressor in the Battle of Badr 
downplays or denies the persecution of early Muslims in Medina, which in many ways 
was the catalyst for the ensuing events. 
 The Battle of Badr accentuates how attaining the moral high ground is a 
significant component when invoking jihad and may signify how an individual embraces 
jihad. The Qur’an highlights this idea when it states: 
Those with whom thou makest an agreement, then they break their 
agreement every time, and they keep not their duty, 
And further: 
And if thou fear treachery on the part of a people, throw back to them 
(their treats) on terms of equality. Surely Allah loves not the treacherous. 
And if they intend to deceive thee, then surely Allah is sufficient for thee. 
He is Who strengthened thee with His help and with the believers.65 
64 Ibid., 8:19, 381. 
65 Ibid., 8:56-62, 389-390. 
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These verses reveal the type of war imagined within the Qur’an, later interpreted in 
various ways by Muslim polities. The nature of maintaining respect and honor with the 
opposing party seems to guide the moral jihad that the Qur’an preaches. Reflecting on the 
first verse, it shows how the opponents of Islam disregarded their responsibility and 
violated their agreements during the Battle of Badr.66 The use of the words “every time” 
with regard to these violations also highlights how Muslims were willing to make new 
agreements despite the lack of trust and respect displayed by the Quraysh. It is only when 
the enemy violates the agreement, that the Qur’an permits Muslims also to repeal the 
treaty, yet, the Qur’an tries to bind its people to the agreement for as long as possible. 
This concept is suggested in the second verse mentioned above, where mere 
apprehension of the opponent’s behavior is not enough to justify the termination of an 
agreement. This should be adhered to even if there is some intention to deceive the 
opponent under a guise of peace, for still, Muslims should accept the peace and deal with 
the resulting consequences when they eventually rise. 
The development of jihad and its early form of implementation, seen through the 
Battle of Badr, create an early precedent for the need for forgiveness, religious liberty and 
mindfulness when pursuing some aspects of aggressive military behavior. One can see 
how “the doctrine of jihad was actually a re-orientation of the war-like raiding of the pre-
Islamic Qurayshi Arabs,” thus shaping the nature in which jihad was undertaken.67 The 
nature of verse relationship and context that defined how jihad was implemented at the 
onset of Islam is crucial in making comparisons to other moments where jihad was 
66 Ibid. 
67 Bonney., 48. 
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reinterpreted. This approach is crucial for assessing how jihad and the Qur’an was a 
product of a series of events. The importance of the developmental process is also central 
in breaking the ‘us’ vs ‘them’ binary that is currently perpetuated by supposed Muslim 
elements that have imposed their own interpretive rubrics on the intentions of the Qur’an.  
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II 
Salah al-Din and Jihad: The Resurgence of a Sunni Islamic Identity 
through the Chroniclers of the Crusades 
 
 
 
erely a few centuries after Islam constructed an ideological framework 
for conducting warfare, the Arabian world was plummeted into what is 
remembered as one of the greatest religious ideological battles to take place, the 
Crusades. Spanning almost 200 years, the Crusades acted as a catalyst for the Muslim 
world to acknowledge and address the idea of territorial sovereignty, a united Muslim 
identity and the threat of external adversaries. The failure of the Muslim states to protect 
their own territories in the aftermath of the First Crusade prompted a reevaluation of how 
to connect the various political motivations and mentalities that had led to the divisions 
exploited by the Crusaders. Such strategies were first approached by Nur al-Din, who 
began to lay the pieces of a coordinated Muslim effort to reclaim the lost territory. Yet, 
his successor, Salah al-Din, saw even greater promise in how this effort could be tied to 
the pillars of Islam and provide the moral and motivational backbone needed to fully 
succeed in a war with the Christians. Therefore, this chapter will examine the primary 
sources of Salah al-Din’s time who constructed a particular image of the ruler and his 
relationship to Islam in order to leverage religious principles toward a specific end. By 
reconciling the tentative framework for jihad and its applicability, with the chronicler’s 
portrayal of individuals during the Crusades, a timeline can be constructed which 
recognizes the pivotal role notions of jihad played in shaping the narrative of particular 
historical context. 
M 
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Creating the Religious and Political Connection after the First Crusade 
 
 The events that allowed Salah al-Din to capitalize on jihadi propaganda and 
campaigns against the Crusaders were the foundations of the reorientation and 
intensification of Sunni Islam.1 At the eve of the First Crusades in 1096, the Muslim 
world was in a state of complete disarray and disunity, with several centers of powers 
such as the Shi’i Fatimid Caliphate, the Seljuq dynasty and local Sunni leaders in Syria. 
Thus, there was no attentive focus on the lands across the sea until after the invasion.2 
This disunity existed in a large extent as prior to the First Crusade, a succession of deaths 
in both the key power centers of the Islamic world, namely the Seljuq and Fatimid 
empires, gave way to disorientation and anarchy.3 Whether or not the Crusaders were 
aware of this fact is ambiguous, but the subsequent timing of their invasion was 
extremely fortuitous. The fact that the Muslim world lacked any significant leadership at 
the time, especially in areas that received the brunt of the Frankish invasion, meant 
coordinating any substantial defense was unlikely to yield great results.4 Thus, by the 
time the Crusaders reached Jerusalem in 1099, any idea of jihad was buried deep under 
the political fragmentation of Muslim empires. 
 The result of the First Crusade prompted a limited spiritual reaction from the 
political elites in Arabia that had not been directly impacted by these early campaigns. In 
Damascus, the Crusader’s success “generated loud but ineffectual calls for jihad from 
members of the Syrian Sunni religious establishment who believed the Frankish invasion 
1 Mourad, Suleiman Ali, and James E. Lindsay. The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad 
Ideology in the Crusader Period: Ibn 'Asakir of Damascus (1105-1176) and His Age, with an Edition and 
Translation of Ibn 'Asakir's The Forty Hadiths for Inciting Jihad. Leiden: Brill, 2013, 32. 
2 Hillenbrand, Carole. The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 2000, 33.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 47. 
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would not have been possible had Muslim political leaders attended to their religious 
duty of waging jihad against the Christian infidels.”5 The earliest example of preaching 
on the topic of jihad came from al-Sulami in 1105, whose Book of Jihad blamed Muslims 
for their weak spiritual condition and advocated for the greater jihad of internal struggle 
and spiritual renewal.6 However, his calls to jihad were poorly received, suggesting a 
level of indifference between Damascene elites, possibly because of the alliance of 
convenience with the Crusaders that preserved Damascene independence.7 The 
connection between Damascus and the Crusaders highlights how the aftermath of the 
First Crusade did not prompt a universal Muslim reaction or spark an immediate Islamic 
revival, but rather cemented the decentralization of power that had emerged in the 
preceding centuries. 
The possibility that any notion of jihad may have been extinguished altogether 
was real until the fall of Edessa in 1144 to Imad ad-Din Zengi. Zengi, the governor of 
Mosul and Aleppo, besieged Edessa, the weakest crusader state because of its placement 
across the Euphrates and its separation from the Crusader strongholds, such as Jerusalem. 
Ironically, Zengi had also tried to capture Damascus in 1137, which was then allied with 
the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem, but came to an agreement with the city in 1138.8 
The retaliation of the Crusaders to the fall of Edessa was the catalyst that prompted the 
5 Mourad and Lindsay, The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader 
Period, 32. 
6 Ibid., 37. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Zengi’s capture of Edessa is the beginning of chronicle representations that champion the actions of 
political leaders. The glorification of Zengi’s actions by chroniclers, including Ibn al-Athir, serves the 
agenda of the revival of Sunni Islam. Yet, such representations overlook the fact that Zengi was a warrior 
that had sprawling ambitions that transverse the area controlled by the Crusaders as well as those controlled 
by the Seljuqs further east in Baghdad. Moreover, Zengi’s death just a few years after the triumph at Edessa 
meant it is hard to discern whether or not he accepted his role as the champion of Islam, although, it did not 
prevent his chroniclers from portraying him in this fashion. 
                                                          
Salah al-Din & Jihad | 41 
Second Crusade. Zengi’s attack on Edessa provided a spark for some religious entities to 
revive the relationship between jihad and military duties, which up to that point could not 
be infused into the rulers. This moment in the Crusades reflects upon Zengi as the first 
major Muslim leader to recapture territory from the Franks.9  
  Instead of trying to recapture Edessa, the Crusaders recognized that the conquest 
of Damascus, a major Muslim city, would serve to bolster their power to new heights in 
the region.10 However, this decision proved catastrophic for the Crusaders, as it allowed a 
renewed mobilization of Muslim forces in response. The decision to attack Damascus 
exposed many in the city to the first hand presence of killing and pillaging by the 
Crusaders, which they had not seen because of their previous alliances.11 Moreover, 
when two members of the religious class, al-Findalawi and al-Halhuli who were zealous 
protectors of the Sunni Islam, died protecting the city, their martyrdom prompted a 
renewed spirit later shaped into the sentiments of jihad.12 The emotional impact of this 
invasion prompted the religious elites to renew their arguments of military duties in the 
face of external adversaries. 
Al-Sulami’s focus on resurrecting militant piety in Muslim rulers may have had a 
limited impact at the time, but his efforts were not completely in vain. A trace of his 
arguments manifested themselves in the works of Ibn Asakir who was present in 
Damascus during the siege of the Crusaders. With the decline of the Fatimid Shi’i 
caliphate, the attack on Damascus allowed Sunni scholars, such as Ibn Asakir, to use this 
9 Hillenbrand., 110 
10 Ibid., 116. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
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moment as an opportunity to draw a concrete connection between military duties and 
their religious inclinations through the lens of jihad.13 Zengi’s death in 1146 was met 
with the succession of his son, Nur al-Din, who furthered his father’s aggressive 
campaigns in the region. A series of victories against the Crusaders that brought Nur al-
Din control over Asia Minor and made any potential capture of Edessa by the Crusaders 
nearly impossible caused the Muslim religious elites in Damascus to recognize his 
potential to unify Sunni Islam.14 Sunni Islam’s unity in Damascus was the long-standing 
dream of many religious elites, especially since it was the capital of the first truly Islamic 
Empire, the Umayyads.15 The aftermath of the failed invasion of Damascus by the 
Crusaders led to the renewed treaties between the two sides, an action that prompted 
outrage amongst the religious elites. Thus, the success of Nur al-Din’s campaigns outside 
of Damascus was noted by the elites and he was recognized as an individual who could 
carry their banner against the Crusaders. With the leaders of the Damascus continuingly 
growing weaker and losing influence over their people, Nur al-Din was finally able to 
capture the city in 1154, with the help of the local population and unify both Syria and 
Sunni Islam.16 Upon his arrival in Damascus, Nur al-Din was welcomed by the religious 
elites and a connection was born between the two: elites received excessive patronage 
from the ruler and in return his ventures were religious endowed. This connection was 
reinforced by the parallel emergence of Muslim chroniclers who began to romanticize 
13 Mourad and Lindsay, The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader 
Period, 43. 
14 Ibid., 48. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 49. 
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those Muslim rulers who displayed great piety in embracing jihad as the framework for 
their conquests against the Crusaders. 
Salah al-Din emerges as the most prominent figure of these pious narratives. 
Thus, any understanding of Salah al-Din derives from the sources that consciously 
crafted his persona in history. This is an important observation to make because 
ultimately, Salah al-Din’s relevance to jihad and Islam can only really be seen by how his 
contemporaries, military commanders, personal advisers and varying demographics of 
the population, saw him and reacted to him. From a broader perspective, understanding 
how the Crusades were primarily understood as a Western concept and therefore were 
“not treated in any extant Islamic work as an isolated topic, recognizes how it has no 
particular resonance for Islamic ears and the Muslim historians are not concerned with 
it.”17 This does not mean that Muslim historians claim the Crusades did not take place, 
but rather that the eras significance was interwoven with the development of a Muslim 
identity and what it meant for religious and political entities to merge into a common 
theme with a common purpose. Moreover, the fact that there is still a wealth of work that 
remains inaccessible because of a lack of translation reveals how “the whole 
historiographical picture of an event or a reign from the Islamic side cannot be grasped” 
inevitably narrowing the lens that we are able to use to understand Salah al-Din and 
amplifying a reliance on the memories that do exist.18 Thus, analyzing these recollections 
requires both caution and due diligence when handling the primary sources of the time, 
being careful not to overemphasize their importance or “distort them, simply because it 
17 Hillenbrand., 9. 
18 Ibid., 13. 
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exists in the first place.”19 This does not mean that any conclusions drawn are invalid, but 
rather that they represent a certain angle and aspect of Salah al-Din’s personality as seen 
by specific observers. With this framework in mind, the relationship between a ruler’s 
success in his military campaigns and how he is remembered is a “direct link in the 
chroniclers’ minds between such literature and military action,” creating the society 
through narrative that revered those leaders who waged in war in the name of religion.20 
 Salah al-Din’s chroniclers build a particular vision of Salah al-Din’s character 
during his rise to the forefront of the Muslim umma. The development of this character is 
driven by how these events were variously constructed by chroniclers depending on their 
position and own narrative strategies. As a result, whether or not Salah al-Din acted for 
personal interest or for the sake of his community and the role that religious conviction 
played in his campaigns is colored by how chroniclers represented his actions. The period 
of Salah al-Din’s reign generated an unusual amount of evidence for the time, which in 
part may be linked to the growing associations between political and religious elites that 
began with the successes of Zengi and Nur al-Din.2122  
19 Ibid., 10 
20 Ibid., 166. 
21 Ibid., 171. 
22 The works of Imad al-Din al-Isfahani and Baha al-Din ibn Shaddad are most closely associated with 
depiction of Salah al-Din because of their roles as his personal biographers. Ibn al-Athir also detailed 
aspects of Salah al-Din’s life and the emergence of letters between close advisor, al-Qadi al-Fadil, depict 
Salah al-Din’s rule. The large number of chroniclers employed by Salah al-Din had in was unparalleled for 
that period of time. It is crucial to recognize that all of these individuals served in some important capacity 
in Salah al-Din’s court. Apart from Ibn Shaddad, Imad al-Din and al-Qadi al-Fadil enjoyed the most 
patronage from Salah al-Din with the latter being appointed as Salah al-Din’s vizier after he took control of 
Damascus. Al-Fadil then appointed Imad al-Din as his deputy and Chancellor of the court and both of them 
accompanied Salah al-Din on later expeditions in the Crusades. The fact that Imad al-Din had been 
banished after the death of Nur al-Din highlights how important Salah al-Din’s patronage was to him and 
the extent of which gratitude was shown in chronicles. 
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 This connection is worth keeping in mind when taking a closer look at the works 
of Ibn Shaddad and his representations of Salah al-Din because it places more emphasis 
on the role of the writer in creating a relationship between Salah al-Din and jihad as 
opposed to being reflective of the religion instead. An emphasis on how Salah al-Din 
embraced jihad reflects the works of Ibn Shaddad in a more influential light and 
accentuates the role the historian played in catapulting Salah al-Din to prominence, 
meaning there is additional caution we have to acknowledge when creating a relationship 
between Salah al-Din and jihad. Baha ad-Din ibn Shaddad’s23 recollections of his time as 
Salah al-Din’s personal biographer reveal a close insight into the leader’s reign, yet, 
“there is also an underlying political message in the work which is implicit in certain 
words that are put in the mouth of Salah al-Din himself. Whether the words were really 
spoken by the sultan, whether they represent thoughts that the author genuinely 
remembered to have been expressed or whether they are purposely inventions it is 
impossible to decide.”24 During Ibn Shaddad’s visit to Jerusalem in 1188, he had 
compiled a treatise, which he called The Virtues of Jihad and presented to Salah al-Din. 
The treatise earned him the patronage of Salah al-Din, and his permanent enrollment by 
June 1188 in the service of Salah al-Din.25 While his treatise influenced Salah al-Din, the 
extent to which it did or how reflective this treatise was of the Qur’an is certainly 
23 Baha al-Din ibn Shaddad is remembered as the Muslim jurist and scholar that spent the most amount of 
time with Salah al-Din due to his role as the leader’s personal biographer. Ibn Shaddad was summoned to 
Salah al-Din’s court after the ruler was impressed by his writings. Ibn Shaddad was later appointed judge of 
the army, which meant he was an eye-witness account to many of the siege’s Salah al-Din embarked upon. 
The patronage that ibn Shaddad received from Salah al-Din epitomizes the connection between religious 
elites and political entities during the Zengid dynasty, and is demonstrates the role of the chronicler in 
remembering an individual who provided them with great opportunities. 
24 Din, Baha, and D. S. Richards. The Rare and Excellent History of Salah al-Din, Or, Al-Nawādir Al-
Sultaniyya Wa'l-Mahasin Al-Yusufiyya. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2001, 4. 
25 Ibid., 2 
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questionable. The treatise itself highlights how Salah al-Din was not independent in his 
own understanding of the Qur’an and jihad, and emphasizes the role that Ibn Shaddad 
played in shaping the ruler’s connection to Islam. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that 
Salah al-Din has often been accused of initiating a policy of expansionism with religious 
pretenses when his campaigns were “directed at creating a personal power base strong 
enough to take on the Franks” meaning he often fought fellow Muslims and refrained 
from attacking the Franks for long periods of time.2627 However, the need to 
communicate an individual that could view the long-term importance of such actions in 
order to unify Islam was of greater significance to the narrative that Ibn Shaddad and 
other chroniclers wanted to represent for all future generations of Muslims. 
 
Developing the Image of Salah-al Din 
 
Attempts to recount Salah al-Din’s youth and educational exposure are clouded 
by the fact that many recollections were in response to his later rise to fame. An Islamic 
model of learning, which emphasized exegesis of the Qur’an and hadith, characterized 
education during the medieval era. As he was from a respectable family, it is quite likely 
that Salah al-Din participated in the normative educational patterns of the time, although 
he probably also “as the son of the commandant, the best teaching within reach.”28 His 
father’s rank as regent to Imad ad-Din Zengi suggests that education and the primacy of 
Islam surely occupied a more central space in Salah al-Din’s early education, no doubt 
26 Hillenbrand., 184. 
27 Such actions are reminiscent of the Zengid dynasty and were justified by chroniclers in the aftermath of 
Salah al-Din’s future success as he was credited with have the bigger picture in mind when conducting such 
conquests. 
28 Ibid., 66. 
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being “drilled for years in the Qur’an, Arabic grammar, and the elements of rhetoric, 
poetry, and theology...to instill the Qur’an and traditions, formed the chief aim of the 
learned but limited men who were entrusted with the training of distinguished truth.”29 
His education allowed him the avenue to also review the socio-economic context through 
literature beyond the Qur’an and learn about the elements of rhetoric through poetry 
perhaps highlighting a more complete disposition as opposed to one solely indoctrinated 
by Islam. The pivotal role of education in Salah al-Din’s childhood suggests that this 
experience could have “helped to identify with his Islamic background.”30  Combined 
with the military connection, his father’s service to Zengi, it is easy to claim a link 
between the two as a uniting factor when evaluating his future command. It is crucial to 
recognize that while Salah al-Din’s education was predominantly fuelled by Islamic 
teachings, this also entailed a more holistic idea of what it meant to form a 
comprehensive Muslim identity as part of a more unified sense of collective identity. The 
portrayal of Salah al-Din as having strong Islamic roots advances the connection between 
religious elites and political patronage. However, the extent to which Salah al-Din truly 
embodied the religion at such a young age is suspect in light of the lack evidence 
documenting his youth. Much of the representations of Salah al-Din’s early years were 
constructed in response to his eventual success as a ruler. Therefore, they only serve to 
advance an agenda of the future leader as the champion of Islam. 
Characterizations of Salah al-Din’s childhood derive from his father’s privileged 
position in the Zengid dynasty and from the hypotheses concerning general patterns of 
29 Ibid., 67. 
30 Lyons, M. C., and D. E. P. Jackson. Salah al-Din: The Politics of the Holy War. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1982, 5. 
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education and training during the period. If Salah al-Din did have a religious education 
that preached the tolerant virtues of Islam then it does call into question the criticisms 
that label him as power hungry or searching for a personal glory. At the very least there is 
no evidence to suggest that he was destined for the positions he would later achieve. Yet, 
these assumptions are just that, assumptions about a boy that history has no real footing 
to comment on and ultimately highlights “the fact that for the first twenty-six years of his 
life we have had no picture of him at all.”31 Regardless of the role his father had in the 
Zengid dynasty or afterwards when his uncle Shirkuh, Nur al-Din’s right-hand man, 
brought him into public life, there were no overwhelming reasons to believe that Salah al-
Din had the foresight to unite the various territories.32 However, we can assume that 
Salah al-Din was at least surrounded by a political atmosphere that would reinforce 
personal ambition and provide avenues for advancement when future opportunities would 
arise. Thinking about how able he was to reconcile this environment with his own 
personal beliefs and emphasizing jihad as the avenue that would bring the success he 
envisioned is, again, suspect in light of the absence of evidence. Therefore, the narratives 
that exist tend to restrain from fully glorifying his youth and begin with his role as a 
public figure. Thus, any ability to address the motivations of Salah al-Din’s later actions 
is merely a conjecture drawn from associations to Islam by his contemporaries. 
Salah al-Din’s move to Damascus, the center of Sunni Islam, prompted greater 
exposure to the renewed religiously motivated politics that Nur al-Din championed, and 
that Salah al-Din would later express. Salah al-Din’s predecessor is often credited with 
31 Ibid., 9. 
32 Poole., 75. 
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creating a religious framework for expansion that Salah al-Din would later utilize in 
uniting all the Muslim people. Throughout Nur al-Din’s time as leader there was a real 
effort to enable Sunni Islam to flourish with generous sponsorship given to the religious 
classes and a patronage of religious monuments to foster places the people could rally 
around.33 The development of this type of rule may have played a part in the formation of 
Salah al-Din’s own personality, and as historians have remarked “it is difficult to over-
stress the influence of Nur al-Din on Salah al-Din’s political education and on his career. 
Nur al-Din was an exponent of the politics of growth allied to the ideal of the Holy War, 
a manipulator of religious propaganda and a ruler who showed the value of setting men 
before money.”34 The religious spirit embodied by Nur al-Din, or at least portrayed in 
this light by religious entities, reflects the reorientation of Sunni Islam and the rise of a 
jihadi sentiment that could be advanced by the military. Consequently, acknowledging 
how the Sunni religious establishment had once again become a central political factor by 
revamping their image through the connection drawn between religion and politics 
furthers the narrative behind any jihadi ideology. Therefore, Salah al-Din’s own display 
of trying to lead a spiritually governed way of life also played into the rhetoric that would 
allow for a smooth transition after the reign of Nur al-Din. The connection between the 
religious and political elites created a mode of government that combatted the Crusaders; 
therefore, upsetting this balance at this moment in time would destabilize Islamic 
attempts to reconquer the lands they had lost.  
33 Hillenbrand., 122. 
34 Lyons., 71. 
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Thus, the first instances where we can see Salah al-Din attain any position of note 
are upon his appointment as Vizier of Egypt. There are many possible explanations for 
why Salah al-Din was promoted to this position. Ibn Athir suggests that he was weak and 
young, which made him an appropriate puppet leader for Nur al-Din.35 Yet, the reasons 
for his appointment become less relevant when evaluating how he handled and eventually 
thrived in this role possibly leading to his eventual rise to fame. His introduction to Egypt 
prompted a radical change in the operating of the city with the idea that it would be 
“dressed with religion” showing the first signs of Salah al-Din’s bond with his faith and 
the space it occupied in the way he administered his reign.36 His need to stamp his 
authority on Egypt was never so aptly seen as when recorded by Ibn al-Athir who 
recalled a speech Salah al-Din made to his new subjects: 
If Nur al-Din, had thought any of you capable of taking my place or being 
trusted as he trusted me, he would have appointed him to the governors of 
Egypt, the most important of all his possessions. If death had not 
prevented him, he would have bequeathed to none but me the guardianship 
and bringing up of his son. I perceive that to my hurt you have arrogated 
to yourselves the care of my Master, the son of my Master. Assuredly I 
will come to do him homage and repay the benefits of his father by 
service, which shall be remembered forever; and I shall deal with each of 
you according to His work, the abandoning of the defense of the King’s 
dominion.37 
Such a display that Salah al-Din made to his people was perhaps emblematic of what the 
future held in store, the need to deliver justice in accordance with “his” law leaves an 
ambiguous suggestion of whether or not he was referring to the Prophet and Allah or Nur 
al-Din. To a certain extent, it provided the baseline for rule grounded in the principles of 
35 Ibid., 28-29. 
36 Ibid., 32. 
37 Athir-al, Ibn, el-Kamil fi-t-tarikh: General History, written up to 1231 (ed. Tornberg, 14 vols., Leyden, 
1866-76; Recuiel, tome i., 1872; tome ii., I, 1887), 607-608. 
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Islam, because Nur al-Din himself was pivotal in revitalizing the Muslim identity prior to 
Salah al-Din’s emergence. Thus this speech can be viewed as an extension of a strong 
core of Islamic beliefs.  
In line with the education that Salah al-Din probably received in Syria, there is no 
doubt that the influences of Nur al-Din would have further amplified the religious 
dimensions of Salah al-Din’s own thought process. As Salah al-Din began to emerge as 
both a man and leader in his own right, there were traces that Nur al-Din’s ruling style 
resonated with his own as “of all the treasures that he found, Salah al-Din kept nothing 
for himself. Some he distributed among his followers or presented to Nur al-Din...the rest 
of the treasure was sold for the public purse.”38 Behaviors such as these represent how 
Salah al-Din was furthering the notion of creating a more spiritually governed way of life 
for the public, placing their needs at a premium in comparison to his. The reflection of 
Nur al-Din’s ruling style in Salah al-Din’s nature, prefaced the actions he would take in 
his most official role to date, as Vizier of Egypt. It foreshadowed the importance of how 
governing with religious underpinnings was key to maintaining control and creating a 
Muslim identity. 
There is certainly an opportunity in creating a religious atmosphere in order to 
secure his new position in Egypt as “to counter the challenge rulers needed the help of 
scholarship and religious propaganda. If, for instance, the basis of their rule could be 
linked to one of the fundamentals of Islam, then their position within the Islamic 
38 Poole., 115. 
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framework needed no further justification.”39 Ibn al-Athir’s recollections also support the 
narrative of creating the continuous lineage of Sunni rule that worked to the advantage of 
the religious elite. His account of Salah al-Din’s supports the narrative of strong Muslim 
leaders championing the cause of reuniting Islam and consolidating a Muslim identity in 
the face of the Crusaders. Hence, this notion is further emphasized by associating Salah 
al-Din with Nur al-Din and displaying their piety in the administration of Egypt because 
of virtuous reflection on Sunni Islam. 
Although there is evidence to suggest that piety influenced the decisions that 
Salah al-Din made in Egypt, his actions are more likely to have been a part of the broader 
religious and political dialogue that existed. His emphasis on providing an environment 
that appealed to the common man consistently disappointed the various members of his 
court. Such actions reveal Salah al-Din to be someone refusing to comply with the 
political game that had disrupted a collective Muslim identity in the region, working 
through “sound religious instruction according to the Sunnite rules by founding colleges 
and establishing approved teachers of orthodoxy in the capital and the chief provincial 
towns.”40 This type of behavior worked towards gaining the confidence of the people 
because it furthered the reorientation and intensification of Sunni Islam in what 
previously was a Shi’i dominated region. The connection that Salah al-Din built with the 
people of Egypt as a result of implementing policies inspired by the Qur’an, such as re-
emphasizing Sunni interpretations of faith, allowed people to refresh their view of Islam 
and demonstrated how by “sheer goodness and firmness of character, he [Salah al-Din] 
39 Lyons., 41. 
40 Poole., 108. 
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raised Islam out of the rut of political demoralization.41 Yet, this representation of Salah 
al-Din’s actions further emphasizes the role of the chronicler in constructing the pious 
image of their leader. The religious dimension that had shaped the Crusaders’ actions, 
and was now reciprocated by the Muslims, meant that Islam now served as the 
legitimizing foundation for any leader’s actions. Therefore, the mutually beneficial 
relationship developed between religious and political elites often materialized in the 
creation of Islamic schools because it further propagated the political rhetoric that 
leaders, such as Salah al-Din, were acting upon. 
The decision to increase the Sunni Muslim presence in Egypt is perhaps 
representative of Salah al-Din’s commitment to the religion during his leadership. 
However, the chroniclers further bolster Salah al-Din’s relationship with Islam by 
referencing two distinct moments. The first, an attempted assassination of Salah al-Din’s 
life, revealed the earliest signs that he was also willing to rule with the sword when 
necessary “swooping down upon the plotters, seizing the leaders, and having them all 
crucified on the 6th of April, 1174.”42 The need to supplement his generous ruling style 
with that of a hard resolve endowed Salah al-Din with the qualities to become the leader 
that Islam needed at the time. Following this event, Salah al-Din became deathly ill, and 
it suggested that during this time he reflected upon the “fragility of human affairs, waking 
him from the sleep of forgetfulness, consequently undergoing a moment of religious 
awakening after which he prosecuted jihad with a genuine sense of purpose, personally as 
41 Gibb, H. A. R. Salah al-Din: Studies in Islamic History. Beirut: Arab Institute for Research and Pub., 
1974, 176. 
42 Poole., 126. 
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well as publicly.”43 There is a tension in committing to this belief that Salah al-Din only 
began to pursue jihad after these events because it can allow one to cast doubt upon the 
previous actions he had undertaken as being religiously motivated. Yet, for chroniclers of 
Salah al-Din, while life of introspection must have impacted his decisions, this is the 
moment in which that contemplative life became a part of the public record. Such 
recollections allowed the chroniclers to infuse military actions with religious fervor in 
their narratives to a much greater degree, as they sought to explain and how Salah al-Din 
had received a call to action against the Crusaders. Moreover, the chroniclers depicted 
Salah al-Din as the perfect representative for Islam at this moment in time, because they 
situate his religious awakening in the context of having a greater goal to work towards. 
The result of this representation embellishes Salah al-Din’s efforts to embrace the greater 
jihad, and strengthens the narrative of reorienting Sunni Islam in the face of external 
threats. 
 
Consolidating a Sunni Islamic Identity 
 
If the commitment to his Muslim beliefs was questioned prior to embracing jihad 
as a rhetorical and ideological force, through the scope of his military activities, the 
chroniclers later illuminate how Salah al-Din’s military actions explicitly referenced jihad 
as he fought against the Crusaders. His recognition of the historical importance of Syria 
and its place as the seat of Islam refocused his military ventures towards administering 
any future campaign from this region. This would also reflect upon how Salah al-Din had 
truly embraced his renewed Islamic beliefs and further his cause of championing Islam. 
43 Hillenbrand., 183. 
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Such a concept was widely acknowledged at the time, with both Nur al-Din and Zengi 
conducting their business from Aleppo and Damascus, as “from the standpoint of 
religious propaganda, Egypt was part of the patrimony of Islam, a base for the Holy War 
but not as convenient a one as Syria.”44 Naturally, this prompted a response from the 
rulers in Syria, the vacuum left in the aftermath of Nur al-Din’s death made an opening 
that Salah al-Din could capitalize upon. However, his moves threatened elites and their 
way of life and lead to claims that he was “betraying his master [Nur al-Din].”45 Whether 
these claims can truly be substantiated can only be seen via the actions that followed 
Salah al-Din’s capture of such key Syrian cities, thus spending “his first decade in power 
fighting fellow Muslims in order to achieve a unified base.”46 These actions actually 
prompted support from many people who saw the decline of Islam after Nur al-Din’s 
death primarily as a result of individuals seeking personal rewards. This was remarked 
upon by Ibn al-Athir who stated: 
Amongst the rulers of Islam we see not one who desires to wage jihad or 
aid the religion. Each one devotes himself to his pastimes and amusements 
and wronging his flock. This is more dreadful to me than the enemy.47 
Taking into account Ibn al-Athir’s remarks actually justifies the steps Salah al-Din took 
in order to unite all Muslim people. His recognition of a lack of coordination between the 
various cities and why that was more important at the time than directly confronting the 
Franks promotes his own foresight in the matter. Salah al-Din’s conquests at this point 
indicate a resistance to indiscriminate violence because he “did not want to inflict losses 
on the Aleppans as they were after all, the soldiers of the Holy War,” which was the goal 
44 Lyons., 52. 
45 Ibid., 85. 
46 Hillenbrand., 172. 
47 Athir., 46. 
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of his endeavors in Syria, setting up a standard for jihad.48 The resistance that Salah al-
Din encountered was perhaps reflective of the abyss that had been left between Islam and 
religious piety and military actions. In fact Salah al-Din’s actions reinvented the 
perception of how jihad could strengthen collective Muslim identities. The controlled 
manner with which Salah al-Din conducted this battle, content with victory as opposed to 
destroying the forces that stood against him, highlights a commitment to a greater vision 
and struggle that he could see as more of a threat to Islam. Yet, the views of Salah al-
Din’s justified campaigns against fellow Muslims is another representation of events by 
chroniclers to portray Salah al-Din as an individual capable of envisioning the more 
important goals of Islam. The fact that his actions against Muslims were not explicitly 
condemned by religious elites highlights how it was important for the reorientation of 
Sunni Islam to have a leader capable of waging a jihad against the Crusaders. The 
practical measures he took infused with religious ideals resonated with the “personal 
inner renewal” he was embracing when conducting his jihad.49 The careful process of 
necessary action with tactile restraint highlighted how Salah al-Din had developed into a 
capable leader, one that used using Islamic principles to inform these decisions in order 
to create the united Muslim people that could engage more successfully with the Frankish 
forces. Therefore, his pious religious virtue is a portrayal that resonates amongst his 
contemporaries because it rationalizes a series of actions that led to the eventual retaking 
of lands from the Crusaders. 
48 Lyons., 196. 
49 Jotischky., 105. 
                                                          
Salah al-Din & Jihad | 57 
At the height of his power, Salah al-Din’s relationship with Ibn Shaddad took on 
added importance because the scholar began to record Salah al-Din’s actions and 
achievements and thus provided insights into the ruler’s personal life. Many of Ibn 
Shaddad’s memories and experiences have been translated to reflect Salah al-Din’s 
embracing of jihad and the central role it played in his conquests. Ibn Shaddad recalled 
how jihad began to consume every aspect of his life stating: 
The Jihad, his love and passion for it, had taken a mighty hold on his heart 
and all his being, so much so that he talked of nothing else, thought of 
nothing but the means to pursue it, was concerned only with its manpower 
and had a fondness only for those who spoke of it and encourage it. In his 
love for the Jihad on the path of God he shunned his womenfolk, his 
children, his homeland, his home and all his pleasures, and for this world 
he was content in the shade of his tent with the winds blowing through it 
left and right.50 
It appeared to Ibn Shaddad that Salah al-Din was no longer only enamored with the 
concept of jihad but had actually found his own jihad within the crusading context. By 
referencing Salah al-Din’s jihad as the “The Jihad” the chronicler endorses his actions. 
Such rhetoric used to characterize Salah al-Din’s ventures certainly displays the 
commitment to jihad that is often referred to in the Qur’an. Thus, Ibn Shaddad’s 
characterizations of Salah al-Din emphasize the leader’s role as the standard bearer for all 
Muslims and provide the foundations for future generations to recognize the importance 
of an individual in uniting Islam. The need to make Salah al-Din’s jihad pragmatic and an 
eventual reality are highlighted through the acknowledgement of “manpower” that would 
be crucial if Salah al-Din were to evict the Frankish forces from the Holy City. Yet, the 
mentioning of practical realities almost undermine the spiritual conviction that resonates 
50 Din., 28. 
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throughout the passage, with talk of Salah al-Din preferring a life of simplicity, 
undeterred and unavailed by the vices that perhaps consume a man not wholly committed 
to jihad. For a man of such power to reject all the worldly prizes that can be afforded to 
such a position certainly highlights a greater understanding of how jihad can be 
undertaken. Ibn Shaddad asserts that it is this commitment and subservience to jihad that 
serves as the base of Salah al-Din’s power: 
The sultan perceived that his gratitude for God’s favor towards was 
evidenced by his strong grasp on sovereignty, his God-given control over 
the lands and the people’s willing obedience, could only be demonstrated 
by his endeavoring to exert himself to the utmost and to strive to fulfill the 
precept of Jihad.51 
Ibn Shaddad sought to characterize Salah al-Din as the greatest leader of the time, and he 
did this by emphasizing how people were willing to subject themselves to Salah al-Din’s 
plan and become a part of this greater Islamic struggle as a result of Salah al-Din’s own 
dedication to jihad. The fact that Salah al-Din, at this moment in time, had highlighted 
himself as the most capable Muslim ruler as well as the most powerful perhaps left little 
alternative for the people even if they wanted to object. However, it has to be 
acknowledged that Salah al-Din had impacted the majority of his subjects in a positive 
way, deferring to mercy upon his initial overtures in Syria as opposed to killing all of 
those who had opposed him. Moreover, the fact that there was little in the way of revolts 
and revolutions to Salah al-Din’s rule does paint him as a force that managed to unite the 
Muslim people to some degree under the banner of jihad. 
 
51 Ibid., 72. 
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Religious Piety at the Height of Salah al-Din’s Power 
 
As the Sunni religious establishment continued to dominate the dialogue with 
their connection to military rulers, the key components of this spiritual venture 
materialized in both the lesser and the greater jihad. The displacement of Muslim ideals 
during the period of disunity meant a resurgence of traditional interpretations of the 
Qur’an and its role during the Second Crusades. Therefore, waging a united Muslim war 
against the Franks was a central tenet of the lesser jihad, as crafted by the chroniclers. As 
a result, Salah al-Din’s leadership position in this religious dynamic allowed him the 
opportunity to pursue both types of jihad, and spread this notion to other people. Salah al-
Din displayed little in the way of intentionally violent or merciless tendencies, instead 
emphasizing how his jihad necessitated a balance between being a firm ruler while not 
forgetting the virtuous principles of Islam that also comprised an important aspect of 
jihad. In his role as a supreme leader of the Muslim people, Ibn Shaddad discusses Salah 
al-Din as a man and the relationship he built with his people: 
Salah al-Din’s generosity was too public to need to be recorded and too 
famous to need to be recounted, and yet we will give an indication of it in 
general terms. He ruled all that he ruled, and, when he died, in his treasure 
chest were found only 47 Nasiri dirhams of silver and a single Tyrian gold 
coin.52 
Ibn Shaddad’s recollection of Salah al-Din’s pious nature during his time in the sultan’s 
service is significant to our reading of jihad because it demonstrates where the 
chronicler’s convictions lay when he outlines various ideals mentioned in the Qur’an 
regarding jihad. Salah al-Din’s willingness to make such engagements in all of the 
territories he ruled, as highlighted when Ibn Shaddad stated “he ruled all that he ruled,” 
52 Ibid., 25. 
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infers the depth of which Salah al-Din was truly working towards fulfilling his jihad. 
Extending from the generosity Salah al-Din showed towards his own people, Ibn 
Shaddad also commented on Salah al-Din’s relationship with the Crusaders stating “he 
received graciously anyone that came to him on a mission, even if he were an infidel,” 
revealing how Salah al-Din did not see his jihad as the extermination of all those that 
opposed Muslims in the region.53 The explicit reference by Ibn Shaddad of Salah al-Din’s 
hospitality towards those on official business is perhaps indicative of a greater code of 
honor that was held at those times, a tone that is consistent with many of the battles that 
took place and perhaps most commonly associated with the relationship between Salah 
al-Din and Richard the Lionheart. Yet, the fact that Salah al-Din did not see this code as a 
direct affront to his jihad reveals the origins of the portrayals that highlight Salah al-Din’s 
sense of tolerance that resonates with themes in the Qur’an and deter the unnecessary 
need to constantly shed blood in the name of jihad. 
 Displays of tolerance by Salah al-Din, as narrated by Ibn Shaddad, have also been 
corroborated in recollections by Christian chroniclers. The Christian chronicler Ernoul 
who was also present during the crusades as a squire of Balian of Ibelin, an important 
crusader noble in Jerusalem, witnessed the mercy of Salah al-Din in the aftermath of the 
Battle of Hattin in 1187. Ernoul wrote: 
Never did Salah al-Din show himself greater than during this memorable 
surrender. His guards, commanded by responsible emirs, kept order in 
every street, and prevented violence and insult, insomuch that no ill-usage 
of the Christians was ever heard of. Of the great courtesy which Salah al-
Din showed to the wives and daughters of knights, who had fled to 
Jerusalem when their lords were killed or made prisoners in battle. When 
53 Ibid., 35. 
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these ladies were ransomed and had come forth from Jerusalem, they 
assembled and went before Salah al-Din crying mercy...When Salah al-
Din saw them weeping, he had great compassion for them, and wept 
himself for pity, And he bade the ladies who husbands were alive to tell 
him where they were captives, and as soon as he could go to the prisons he 
would set them free. And he gave them so much that they gave praise to 
God and published abroad the kindness and honor which Salah al-Din had 
done to them.54 
Ernoul’s observations corroborate the greater understanding of jihad and Islam that Ibn 
Shaddad sets out in his position as judge of the army. From Ernoul’s account of Salah al-
Din’s behavior we can insinuate the goal of Salah al-Din’s jihad was never seeking the 
extermination of Christians or the humiliation of them upon his victories. Rather Salah al-
Din’s jihad is firmly rooted in his ability to empathize in another person’s suffering, and 
Ibn Shaddad portrays this understanding of war through the connection that Salah al-Din 
made between jihad and religious piety. Moreover, Salah al-Din’s empathy went beyond 
simply acting merciful to those that he conquered. He also provided them with the means 
to aid in rebuilding their lives, as suggested by Ernoul and emphasized further by 
secondary sources that acknowledge how “Salah al-Din showed himself worthy of 
victory, treating his prisoners generously, setting them free and sending many of them 
away with gifts.”55 In accordance with Qur’anic writings, there is no suggestion that 
Salah al-Din subjected his prisoners to any heinous treatment56 and working within the 
principles of war outlined in the Qur’an for correct acts jihad ensured that these women 
54 Ernoul, Chronique (ed. Mas Latrie, Paris, 1871), 227-233. 
55 Poole., 144. 
56 The exception to this statement is the execution of the Templars and Reynald de Chatillon after the Battle 
of Hattin. Yet, prior to this battle in 1187, there existed a truce between the Crusaders and the Muslim 
forces that was consistently violated by Reynald and the Templars. Such raids were a part of the catalyst 
that this battle took place. Therefore, in the aftermath of the battle, Salah al-Din’s pardoned most of the 
Christian army apart from the Templars and Reynald because of their dishonesty in violating the treaty. 
Salah al-Din’s actions were aligned with many passages of the Qur’an that advocate for the unnecessary 
shedding of blood except in circumstances such as these. 
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were acknowledged as non-participants in the war and consequently should be treated 
with respect as the Qur’an teaches. Moreover, Ernoul’s statements also suggest how those 
he commanded adhered to his strategy and orders thus reflecting the faith they had in 
their master’s ideals and the medium through which he conducted his jihad. The fact that 
there was a strict sense of discipline amongst the Muslim soldiers in such a vast army 
surely means that there was a common factor or ideology keeping them so tightly bound. 
As a result, the role of Salah al-Din is further emphasized in the chronicles as being 
responsible for this culture developing in the Muslim forces. The fact that chroniclers 
thrived during Salah al-Din’s era, further emphasizes how the lack of Muslim unity prior 
to his time allowed the chronicles another opportunity to accentuate such tales individual 
significance. 
The manifestation of jihad, displayed through the military ventures of Salah al-
Din has an interesting relationship between aggressive zeal and a lack of fanaticism. 
Based upon the ideas of the Qur’an, Salah al-Din was often believed to be the responder 
in his wars with the Crusaders; Ibn Shaddad has recorded his lack of preference for 
fighting: 
Later the sultan said, I charge you to fear God Almighty, for He, is the 
source of all-good. I command you to do what God has commanded, for 
that he is the means of salvation. I warn you against shedding blood, 
indulging in it and making a habit of it, for blood never sleeps.57 
Salah al-Din’s motivations for undertaking this jihad are not driven by bloodlust or 
personal glory as represented by Ibn Shaddad, but rather suggest his level of subservience 
to a higher power. Out of respect and recognition for this higher power there seems to be 
57 Din., 235. 
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a clear need to show restraint when fighting the Crusaders, which manifests itself in his 
refusal to shed blood needlessly. Moreover, Salah al-Din was consistently shown as a 
leader that rarely, if at all, enacted the violence against the Crusaders. This image has 
constantly been recognized in comparison to the leaders of the Crusaders such as 
Reginald of Chatillon who “had won for himself an unenviable reputation as a breaker of 
treaties, it was his delight to seize peaceful caravans of merchants and pilgrims on their 
way into Syria from Egypt or Mekka.”58 The infringement on Salah al-Din’s ability to 
safely protect the people he had sworn responsibility to was clearly an antagonism that he 
could not repeatedly tolerate. The lack of respect for Salah al-Din’s tolerance was clearly 
a mentality that had permeated the Crusader’s camps as it was understood that “treaties 
with soldiers of the Cross were worse than useless, so long as the doctrine prevailed in 
Christendom that no faith need be kept with the infidel.”59 The sense of religious 
animosity was one that was capitalized upon by the leaders of the West, invoking a 
fighting spirit that encouraged aggression against the enemy, yet, was not wholly 
reciprocated by Salah al-Din. In fact this Christian fanaticism was encouraged to the 
point that it created an atmosphere of mistrust in the Crusader’s camps with the 
“Christian sects having less to fear from the generous Salah al-Din than from the rapacity 
and tyranny of their Christian masters, to whom heresy was almost as hateful as Islam 
itself.”60 The difference in control that each side had imposed upon their armies’ marks a 
clearly delineated line in the culture and aims that these camps were derived from. With 
Salah al-Din seeing beyond the short term idea of a war against Christianity to a greater 
58 Poole., 198. 
59 Ibid., 148. 
60 Ibid., 218. 
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purpose or struggle that his jihad demanded, leading to a more balanced ideology 
implemented and adhered to by his army. Constantly seeking an alternative to war when 
one was available, even when it meant the release of key prisoners, his efforts were not 
returned equally, highlighted by the release of Guy of Lusignan in 1188 who “had 
promised not to bear arms against Salah al-Din, yet, in August 1189, he resumed the 
offensive.”61 Ibn Shaddad’s representations of Salah al-Din as the champion of Islam 
lead him to place greater emphasis on the ways in which the leader’s actions corroborate 
the teachings of the Qur’an. Therefore, displays of the Crusaders as the aggressors further 
the notion of Salah al-Din’s pious character. 
The consensus amongst the historians and scholars at the time seems to echo the 
idea that regardless of how much jihad and Islam motivated Salah al-Din’s action, it was, 
at the very least, a factor that had to be considered as occupying a central space in the 
sultan’s life. The fact that Salah al-Din prided himself on living a virtuous life is often 
believed to be categorical of his behavior, separate from how he ruled his people as 
suggested that “in his personal life, which was seen by only a handful of followers, where 
he is seen to be pious and God-fearing, which was extended by Ibn Shaddad into his role 
as ruler.”62 Were Ibn Shaddad alone in his claims of the impact of jihad upon Salah al-
Din’s life, there would certainly be a greater level of skepticism directed towards both the 
scholar and Salah al-Din, yet, Ibn al-Athir also suggests this was the case when he 
explicitly stated: 
61 Hallam, Elizabeth M. Chronicles of the Crusades: Eye-Witness Accounts of the Wars Between 
Christianity and Islam. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989, 152. 
62 Hillenbrand., 182. 
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The testimony of others and outsiders satisfactorily corroborates the 
statements of those close to Salah al-Din.63 
The belief that Salah al-Din would remain a perfect picture of Islamic and jihad practices 
is an idealistic framework that any person would struggle to live up to. Yet, the fact that 
Salah al-Din simply sought to incorporate and interpret the Qur’an as frequently as 
possible into all aspects of his life, both personally and publicly, suggests that it was the 
most honest representation of his religion and led to his recognition as such an 
irreproachable leader. The extent that this was seen across the Muslim and Christian 
divide with the common belief that his “moral superiority over his contemporary peers 
was acknowledged in his own lifetime by his enemies, the Crusaders; his image, even 
amidst the anti-Muslim bigotry of the European Middle Ages, remained unsullied, even 
romanticized, and that at a time when Europe’s attitude towards Islam was a sorry 
mixture of ignorance and hostility.”64 It is with little doubt that this moral code, derived 
from his understanding of appropriate warfare and jihad, that Salah al-Din strictly 
adhered to, was a factor that was absent in the opposing camp and perhaps led to the 
constant discord that plagued the Crusaders. The acknowledgement of this tension by 
observers in the crusading camps is attributed to a lack of cohesion amongst the leaders 
and their soldiers as remarked upon by William of Tyre: 
For five days the Christian army lay motionless, whilst their leaders were 
wrangling amongst themselves united only in one purpose, to defy the 
authority of Lusignan.65 
63 al-Athir., 183. 
64 Hillenbrand., 195. 
65 William of Tyre, Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum (Recueil: historiens occidentaux, tome 
i., Paris, 1844), 27. 
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The relationship between such dissent in the Crusading camps and the harmony in the 
Muslim camps has been regularly allocated to Salah al-Din’s rule. Thus, answering the 
question of what was so unique or special about his rule that was able to create such unity 
amongst the Muslims can be accredited with the reorientation of Sunni Islam that Salah 
al-din played a central role in creating. The impact of this spirit can be fully recognized in 
the aftermath of Salah al-Din’s time when “the charismatic leader had gone and the 
perfect focus provided for jihad in Salah al-Din’s time, was no longer a common will 
amongst the Ayyubid elite.”66 The belief that it was not just jihad that had created a sense 
of unity amongst all the Muslim people but rather the way that Salah al-Din practiced his 
jihad, which trickled into every part of society and became a reflection of how Islam 
should bring such tolerance and respect to those that have such belief. 
The narrative of Salah al-Din attempts to portray a connection of an individual 
and his faith in perhaps its purest form since the time of the Prophet Muhammad. The 
significance of such a portrayal is emblematic of the larger period of time where Sunni 
Islam was recovering from a period of flux and disunity. Therefore, the consequent 
portrayals of Salah al-Din as the champion of Islam and his ability to thwart the external 
Crusading adversaries takes on added impetus in consolidating a strong identity for Sunni 
Islam. Thus, the way in which the chroniclers represented Salah al-Din is a unique 
medium that acted as a way for Muslims to overcome obstacles to their faith. Such a 
representation perhaps overstates the role of jihad and Islam in Salah al-Din’s life as we 
accept that it can be argued that this was personal ambition that prompted the ensuing 
66 Hillenbrand., 225. 
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events.67  However, for future generations Salah al-Din’s monumental actions, as 
represented by the Muslim chroniclers, highlight a certain moral standard that all 
Muslims should strive towards. The consequences of this belief manifest themselves 
today in how many religious and political factions, such as Hamas and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, refer to Salah al-Din and the crusading context in order to emphasize the 
necessity for a leader capable of unifying Islam in the face of mounting external threats. 
 
67 Bartlett, W. B. Islam's War Against the Crusaders. Stroud: History Press, 2008, 201. 
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III 
The Ottoman Empire & Jihad: Realigning Religious Doctrine & the 
Rise of Competing Muslim Empires 
 
 
 
he legacy of Salah al-Din and the Crusades impacted the historical 
narrative and usage of jihad ideology in a way that popularized and 
legitimized the concept to the extent that it became the primary framework for conquest 
and expansion. In the fragmented medieval world, the sanctuary of religious doctrine led 
leaders to “reduce obedience to God’s will to the precise prescriptions of codified sacred 
law.”1 In the wake of Mongol invasions in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, new 
empires emerged that redefined geographical space through a renewed expansionary 
ethos.2 In part, new early modern dynasties emerged due to the inability of crusading 
mentalities, following Salah al-Din’s initial success, to secure a consolidated Muslim 
identity, which led to political fragmentation. Such issues created a splintering in the 
various factions of the Muslim community and created an opportunity for another empire 
to be built, with “rival sects and rival states dividing the community of the faithful.”3 
New political theologies concerning the relationship between religion and political power 
shifted conquest from spiritual dictates to conquest for wealth and territory. As these 
political shifts occurred, they were accompanied by changes in economic forces, social 
upheaval and the apocalyptic sentiment that coalesced into a period of major upheaval 
1 McNeill, William Hardy, and Marilyn Robinson. Waldman. The Islâmic World. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1983, 5. 
2 Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. "Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern 
Eurasia." Mod. Asian Stud. Modern Asian Studies 31, no. 03 (1997): 737. 
3 McNeill., 5. 
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across Anatolia into the Arab provinces.4 As a result, the early modern period can be 
characterized as a sustained movement from local fragmentation to political consolidation 
that culminated in the long-standing power of the Ottoman Empire.5 With the vacuum 
available and ripe for the ascension of a new empire, the Ottomans hovered 
“optimistically around the possibility of re-ordering of the known world.”6 Thus, this 
chapter addresses the dynamism of the Ottoman Empire that pivoted on ultimate loyalty 
to the Sultans and their ability to create a political force that could confront and conquer 
Muslim as well as non-Muslim entities. 
The reigns of Sultan Selim I and Sultan Sϋleyman epitomize this behavior as, 
throughout their tenure, they sought to wage a war against their neighbor while 
reconciling it with Islamic doctrine. Letter exchanges between Sultan Selim and his Shi’i 
counterpart, Shah Isma’il, highlight the different styles of each imperial order and give us 
an insight into how the Sultan tried to claim greater devotion to Islam and privilege his 
position as caretaker of the Muslim community. The study of Sultan Selim’s reign will 
also bring into focus the role of the Mamluks, another Sunni Muslim regime that the 
Ottomans overcame on their way to becoming supreme defenders of the religions. The 
significance of this conquest is unparalleled because it brought the holy cities of Mecca 
and Medina into the Ottoman fold and added greater purpose and credibility to their 
cause in later conflicts with the Safavids. During Sultan Sϋleyman’s reign a closer look 
must also be taken at the relationship between the religious institutes, the palace, and one 
of the most prominent jurists and Qur’an exegetes, Ebussuud Efendi, who effectively 
4 Ibid., 750. 
5 Ibid., 744. 
6 Ibid., 751. 
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reorganized the connection between the sultan and Islam without undermining the 
former’s power in the empire. Lastly, the reforms proposed by a seventeenth-century 
Ottoman statesman, Aziz Efendi, will explore a suggestion for a public policy through the 
regulation of the Kurdish regions of the Empire, and their relevance as a buffer zone 
against the Safavid regime. 
Foregrounding Ottoman imperial history highlights a particular set of governing 
practices that balanced Islamic ideals with practical realities. The intertwining of 
religious doctrine with territorial expansion as well domestic politics created a unique 
paradigm that led to the redefinition of Islam and of Muslim unity under the various 
sultans. While previous Muslim-based empires engaged in an almost binary policy of 
dealing with non-Muslim elements, the Ottomans recognized that the stability of their 
empire often depended on various degrees of tolerance crucial to maintaining law and 
order. Thus, this chapter shall examine various aspects of Ottoman law and explore how 
an unquestionable bond of loyalty to the sultan became the basis of Ottoman strength. 
This was achieved by hinging every aspect of public policy on the word of the sultan, 
which, then fostered a relationship between religious institutes and authorities and the 
palace that would then work harmoniously towards propagating a loyal demographic 
while preaching Muslim ideals at the same time.7 Such a relationship would become 
central when the Ottomans went to war with their Muslim neighbors, the Safavids and the 
Mamluks, as it provided a series of novel justifications that had not been seen before in 
Islamic governing parlance. The legal tradition that emerged during the Ottoman years 
7 Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002,3 . 
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allowed for non-Muslims to inhabit territories in the Ottoman Empire as well as in the 
ranks of government. The Ottoman mechanism for dealing with non-Muslim “peoples of 
the book” was enshrined in the early efforts of Muhammad to define social relations in 
Medina, and then used by every Muslim-based ruling establishment since. The Ottomans 
perfected this system, and made it applicable to ruling across a larger expanse. The shift 
in Muslim mentality that led to a large and diverse empire can be seen as a natural 
progression for a government seeking to maintain control. Thus, examining how the 
mechanics of the empire functioned through the relationship between religious bodies 
and the sultan, governance of the Kurdish people and war with their Muslim neighbors 
can cast a light on how the Ottoman Empire reached an unprecedented size and stature. 
 
Seyh Bedreddin and the Emerging Ottoman Empire 
 
Part of the reason the Ottoman Empire had achieved such success in their gradual 
ascension to power was due to its “openness to negotiation with social groups that cleared 
the way for agreement and compromise, even if it was temporary.”8  However, after the 
reconsolidation of the dynasty in the mid-fifteenth century, new strategies for alignment 
emerged. These can be fully explored within the context of a key revolt, led by the Seyh 
Bedreddin who came to represent large heterogeneous elements that had propelled the 
Ottomans to their initial success. The Ottoman Empire emerged from a severely 
fragmented Anatolian context. It was one of 16 small principalities that divided the 
territory after the collapse of Seljuk rule, and gradually created a following in battles 
against rivals and against the might of the Byzantine Empire. From 1299 to 1402, 
8 Ibid., 165. 
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Bayezid raised one of the largest armies in the known world until these forces were 
defeated by a rival imperial coalition, the neo-Mongol patrilineage of Timur Leng.9 This 
conquest would be short lived, and by the 1420s the Ottomans would surge back to 
prominence and Timur’s disbanded forces would re-unite in the Deccan Plateau, to found 
the Mughal Empire. 
The tensions between Seyh Bedreddin and the emerging Ottoman regime set a 
precedent for how notions of territorial sovereignty and mechanisms for allegiances to an 
imperial hierarchy were changing. Bedreddin was a well-travelled and well-educated 
theologian whose diverse background, with a Turkish-speaking father who had studied 
Jewish jurisprudential traditions and a Greek mother, meant that his broad understanding 
of different cultures and people could be seen as a threat to an order that was trying to 
capitalize on the empty political vacuum in the region. His constant preaching of “oral, 
popular and localized culture,” was an attempt to reconnect with the “peasant-nomadic” 
background of people in the area.10 It may seem ironic that an empire that had Christian 
and Jewish inhabitants would take such staunch offence to the work of a preacher, but 
their reasons lie in multiple elements of his preaching. In fact, the Ottomans in their vast 
empire had usefully deployed a lot of what Bedreddin represented, such as syncretic Sufi 
and Islamic practices and an emphasis on mystic elements more generally. Yet, his 
actions in the “rebellious context,” following a period of chaos in the wake of Timur’s 
9 The Battle of Ankara in 1402 was, once again, a clash between two Muslim armies, the rising Ottoman 
tribal confederacy and the neo-Mongol claims of Timur as the foundations of a new dynasty. 
10 Barkey, Karen. Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008, 170. 
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victories, demonstrated how these ideals could become a threat to the regime and were 
ultimately why his actions engaged a state response.11  
This rebellious context arose from the fact that Bedreddin was not willing to work 
within a system that shifted from gathering all participants in an imperial quest to one 
that sought to control the extent of such political and cultural diversity, thus “Bedreddin 
represents a moment when the Ottomans were maneuvering out of the unrestrained 
mystical diversity to a more controlled order of state-policed orthodoxy.”12 Bedreddin’s 
refusal to pay the high taxes demanded by the local representatives of the central 
Ottoman government displays a counter attack on the shift towards a consolidated 
Ottoman Empire that the government was trying to achieve. The fact that the Ottoman 
Empire had not yet achieved a sense of formal orthodoxy and established policy 
represents how a “state on the way to consolidation wanted order and legibility” before it 
could begin to address heretics more even-handedly.13 Bedreddin’s rebellion can be seen 
as a transitional moment in the region between acceptance and dissent and the historical 
shift from syncretism to rigid hegemony that shapes an “understanding of imperial 
longevity.”14 The openness that Bedreddin fought for was a model of the past, one that 
thrived in the vacant power vacuum, yet, upon the rise of the Ottoman Empire it was 
clear that the kind of life he led was becoming marginalized in favor of a more rigid and 
legible social order.15 This moment during the fifteenth century categorizes changing 
11 Ibid., 173 
12 Ibid., 171 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 155. 
15 Ibid., 174. 
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concepts of frontier empires and a consolidated identity that needed to precede the 
extensive eventual aims of territorial conquest the Ottomans adopted. 
 
The True Defenders of Islam: Establishing Ottoman Religious Credibility 
 
After the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, its biggest challenge became 
keeping control and credibility of the rulers in all aspects of their lives. With regards to 
conquest against non-Muslim entities and forays into Europe, Ottoman rhetoric was not 
vastly different from its predecessors; yet, the new challenge came in trying to expand 
into Muslim dominated areas. This has been most evident with the rise of the Safavids 
and Shi’i Islam, a new constellation of empire and religion that had also amassed a 
significant amount of support and existed in close proximity to the Ottomans. Prior to the 
rise of the Safavid state the Ottoman’s “true organizing principle was loyalty to the 
Ottoman dynasty,” a facet of the empire that grew as it “gradually accumulated a 
charisma of success.”16 The fact that a credible, united Islamic threat to the Sunni elite 
did not exist prior to the Safavids meant that religion did not occupy the dominant space 
when motivating territorial expansion. Instead, the Ottomans were “primarily motivated 
by the desire to conquer wealthy territories,” which had predominantly prevented them 
from being overly antagonistic towards non-Muslim communities that became a part of 
the Empire.17 However, the rise of their Shi’i neighbors prompted a reevaluation of 
public policy and expansionist doctrine, which as the conflicts became more intense, 
16 Dale, Stephen Frederic. The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, 50-56. 
17 Ibid., 56. 
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emphasized the Ottomans own devotion to Sunni Islam.18 This would become a strong 
tenant in forging the bond between the palace and the religious establishment in the 
Ottoman Empire because it allowed an avenue where loyalty to the sultan was 
maintained, while bolstering a commitment to Islam. The process of codifying these ideas 
into a dynamic interaction between dynastic and Islamic law can be traced throughout the 
reigns of Sultan Selim I and Sultan Sϋleyman the Magnificent or Law-Giver. These 
relationships set a tone that would legitimize a new type of war against fellow Muslims 
and demonstrates the shifting notion of jihad and warfare in the early modern period. 
The fact that the Ottoman Empire had risen to such heights on their ability to 
wage successful campaigns meant that the sultan’s role as a leader in war was enough to 
legitimize his rule.19 This was especially true in conquests westward towards Europe, 
where united forces sought to pit Christianity against Islam in a post-Crusades world. The 
legitimizing process began with referencing the sultans as ghazis, a word which has an 
everyday sense of “warrior” or “raider” but which, when Islamic jurists and historians 
adopted it as one of the terms for a person engaged in holy war, also acquired the sense of 
“holy warrior.” 20 The intertwining of the warrior and his actions against non-believers in 
the frontier gathered elements of Ottoman Turkish folklore and contributed to a new 
strand of literature dedicated to questions of jihad.21 This literature came to shape the 
ethos of the Ottoman ruling dynasty, and became a part of how history and rhetoric 
shaped the legitimacy of its rule. However, reconciling this rhetoric when combatting 
18 Hathaway, Jane, and Karl K. Barbir. The Arab Lands under Ottoman Rule, 1516-1800. Harlow, England: 
Pearson Longman, 2008, 37. 
19 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power, 120. 
20 Ibid., 120. 
21 Ibid. 
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fellow Muslims was a new challenge that had not previously been seen before and several 
justifications were propagated to maintain the credibility of both the sultan and the 
Ottoman Empire. In the fifteenth century, the early years of the Ottoman regime, 
chroniclers presented Muslim adversaries of the Ottomans as hindering the holy war, in 
essence questioning their devotion to Islam as a whole.22 This technique also included 
accusations of how the actions of these Muslim communities led to the oppression of 
other Muslims, “thus making the removal of oppression obligatory for the Ottomans.”23 
Conflating longer tales of history between Osman and his father, Ertugrul, and the 
Seljuks, which worked towards proving Ottoman claims of imperial legitimacy, 
supplemented these actions.24  
The spurious nature of the genealogical proofs that Ottoman historians were 
continuously creating allowed them to navigate the fifteenth century relatively 
unchallenged by their Muslim neighbors, yet, the rise of the Safavids saw the 
replacement of these proofs with newer reasoning adduced from the canonical texts of 
Islam. The nature of Shi’i Islam that the Safavids practiced was underpinned by their 
quasi-divine status, which allowed the Ottomans to present the Safavids as rebels against 
the legitimate authority of the Ottoman sultans and, more importantly, “as apostates and 
infidels.”25 Thus, from the early sixteenth century, as a response to the preaching of Shah 
Isma’il and the establishment of the Safavid order, the Ottomans were able to portray 
22 Ibid., 121. 
23 Kunt, İ Metin, and Christine Woodhead. Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in 
the Early Modern World. London: Longman, 1995, 145. 
24 Ibid., 146. 
25 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power, 121. 
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their Sultan as the sole legitimate defender of the holy law and to claim “that their rule 
was a precondition to its coming into effect.”26 
 
Muslim Rivalries: Letter Exchanges between Selim I and Shah Isma’il 
 
Initial confrontations with the Safavids and their ruler Shah Isma’il began during 
the reign of Sultan Selim I and after the 1502 establishment of the Safavid real. His reign 
from 1512-1520 sparked early concerns of how to deal with an empire that drew its 
power base from “religious sanctity.”27 While the Ottoman government gradually co-
opted the religious establishment, in the Safavid regime, religious ideals were the central 
factor in creating a legitimate government. The rise of Isma’il and his consequent success 
depended on his followers’ belief in his descent from Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali which 
made him the only legitimate successor to the Prophet.28 Such a doctrine was a danger for 
the Ottomans, as this new ideology attracted those whose religious and political beliefs 
were poorly-defined and who saw little place for themselves in the centralized Ottoman 
regime “being built on the ruins of other Anatolian emirates which once seemed equally 
viable.”29 Moreover, this claim was problematic for the Ottomans and Sultan Selim as it 
meant they, and all other Muslim rulers, were usurpers. Sultan Selim certainly tried to 
quell any form of support for the Safavids in his territories, resorting to force when 
necessary against those who sympathized with Shah Isma’il.30 However, the only way 
that he could directly come into conflict with the ruler of the Safavids, while preserving 
26 Imber., 321. 
27 Dale., 50. 
28 McNeill., 337. 
29 Finkel, Caroline. Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1923. New York: Basic 
Books, 2006, 96. 
30 McNeill., 337. 
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his own religious and political credibility, was through a religious justification.31 Such 
actions also brought him into direct contact with the Shah, and letter exchanges between 
the two leaders provide insight into what each person deemed important in legitimizing 
their claim to serve as the temporal leader of the Muslim community. Moreover, the 
relationship between the Ottomans and other Muslim leaders such as the Mamluks also 
shows how the inter-imperial conflict proved opportunistic for the Ottomans and allowed 
Sultan Selim to ultimately capture the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. 
In letters exchanged between Selim and Isma’il, the Sultan set out to defend his 
right to rule by quoting from the Qur’an and alluding to examples of history that further 
legitimized his claims. Yet his counterpart, the Safavid Shah, perhaps based on his 
genealogical claims, felt no such need to quote from the Qur’an or to make counter 
claims from history. Instead, Isma’il quotes from “seemingly contemporary Persian 
poetry” and appears to simply dismiss Selim’s arguments.32 Sultan Selim begins the 
defense of his empire and his claims to lead the Muslim people by quoting from the 
Qur’an: 
This is a Scripture We have sent down, blessed; so follow it, and be god 
fearing; haply so you will find mercy.33 
In trying to set a precedent that Shi’i Islam had complete diverted from the Qur’an and 
constituted a heretical movement, Selim aimed to eliminate any fundamental historical 
evidence that supported the claims of Shah Isma’il and his relationship with the Prophet. 
Not only did Selim undermine Isma’il’s claims to legitimate rule, but he also portrayed 
31 Finkel., 104. 
32 McNeill., 338. 
33 Ali., 6:156, 339. 
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the Shah as committing a grave sin against Islam and consequently asks him to repent. 
The Sultan supports his argument by quoting the Shah’s own words and his suggestion 
that the Qur’an constituted the myth of the Ancients, therefore stating that any 
justifications made on the text were certainly fallible.34 The Sultan argues that the image 
crafted by the Shah suggests he is above the rule of Islam. Selim, by contrast, possesses 
the appropriate humility to a divine power, which thus legitimates his position as a ruler. 
Selim follows these claims by suggesting that Ottoman success is due to the fact that their 
campaigns have been religiously justified and that all their enemies formed elements of 
anti-Muslim entities: 
We who are the Caliph of God Most High in this world, far and wide; the 
proof of the verse what profits man is haloed in victory, Faridun 
triumphant; slayer of the wicked and the infidel.35 
Here Sultan Selim asserts his own right to serve as the civil and religious leader of the 
Muslim world and grounding that idea in the claim that their expansion would not have 
been as successful if it were not sanctified by a higher power. The tactic of branding all 
enemies of the Ottoman Empire, to this date, as “infidels” furthers Selim’s claims that his 
actions were morally sound in the name of Islam. The letters also imply that Selim is not 
yet at the point of taking up arms against the Safavids, an idea that is later substantiated 
when he asks instead for fealty from the Safavids and states that they will be granted 
“royal favor and imperial patronage” in return.36 This reluctance to shed Muslim blood is 
perhaps representative of a broader problem in framing such actions with sanctioned 
religious pretexts. For the Ottomans to truly present themselves as defenders of the 
34 McNeill., 340. 
35 Ibid., 338. 
36 Ibid., 341. 
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Islamic faith, their actions against fellow Muslims would require more support from 
religious institutions, support that had not yet been necessarily provided.  
Sultan Selim thus opts for another tactic. His verbal attacks distinguish between 
religious and cultural differences of the people ruled by Shah Isma’il: 
Addressed to the ruler of the Persians, the possessor of the land of tyranny 
and perversion. You have incited your abominable Shi’i faction to 
unsanctified sexual union and to the shedding of innocent blood.37 
Selim thus distinguished between Muslim and Persian communities. The distinction is 
key because it provides a justification for Selim to wage war against the Safavids, as it is 
no longer a battle against fellow Muslims but a campaign against a cultural other. This 
theme is further substantiated when Selim calls Shah Isma’il a tyrannical ruler, thus 
meaning that it is Selim’s obligation to free those burdened by the Shah’s rule and bring 
them into the Sunni Islamic fold. The emphasis on the fact that Shi’i Islam is exclusively 
Shah Isma’il’s brainchild is also important, because if the two sides were to engage 
militarily, the deposition of Shah Isma’il would end the conflict and prevent Selim from 
shedding more Muslim blood. This idea is amplified in the last line where Selim 
attributes ownership of the Shi’i faction to Isma’il and associates the killings of other 
Muslims upon his shoulders. The need to consistently re-emphasize this theme is a 
central part of providing as many justifications for both waging a war against the Shi’is 
and further legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate. If Selim could show that the Shah’s 
practice of Islam was a departure from the “path of true Islam” then it was possible that 
37 Ibid., 339. 
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he could attain the expressed opinion from the religious elites to justify his actions 
against the Safavids.38  
The response of Shah Isma’il also warrants a closer look as it contains veiled 
threats as well as phrases that commend the Ottoman Empire. The way in which Shah 
Isma’il addresses Sultan Selim to begin with is peculiar and striking: 
May his godly majesty, the refuge of Islam, the might of the kingdom, he 
upon whom god looks with favor, the champion of the sultanate and of the 
state, the hero of the faith and of the earth, Sultan Selim Shah.39 
The apparent respect that Shah Isma’il affords to his counterpart is never reciprocated by 
the Sultan and begs the question as to why the Shah would resort to such kind words. 
They suggest a posture of cunning, and a willingness to engage in competitive, witty 
exchanges that showcase his literary talents and religious training. The feigned ignorance 
of the impending threats from the Ottomans is continued in the Shah’s response when he 
addresses to the antagonisms in the Sultan’s letter: 
Their [Sultan’s letter] contents, although indicative of hostility, are stated 
with boldness and vigor. The latter gives us much enjoyment and pleasure, 
but we are ignorant of the reason for the former...We have always loved 
the gazi-titled Ottoman house we do not wish the outbreak of sedition and 
turmoil once again as in the time of Timur.40 
The subtle defense of no wrongdoing taking place in the Safavid regime is under the 
guise of acknowledging the Ottoman’s as the worthy defenders of Islam, and a 
willingness to recognize their title of “holy warriors.” The reverence that the Safavids 
possessed towards the Ottomans was not an uncommon theme in their history, as many 
38 Finkel., 104. 
39 McNeill., 342. 
40 Ibid., 343. 
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Safavid chroniclers refer to the Ottomans “as a bastion of Islam in the face of European 
unbelief.”41 Such a defense places the onus upon the Ottomans to further justify their 
hostile claims, especially when the Safavids attempted to assert peaceful relations with 
their neighbors. While the responses of the Shah are complex, he does make clear that if 
the Ottomans continue their aggressive rhetoric or take action on their verbal threats, then 
the Safavids will not hesitate to respond in kind: 
If political necessity has compelled you on this course, then may your 
problems soon be solved. In all friendship we say do what you will. Bitter 
experiences has taught us that in this world of trial He who falls upon the 
house of Ali always falls. When war becomes inevitable, hesitation and 
delay must be set aside, and one must think on that which is to come.42 
In these last few lines, the intentions and aims of the Shah become visible. The first idea 
that the Shah communicates is that the Ottoman’s threatened campaigns has no religious 
ground and is born out of political need. From this moment the Shah removes all 
credibility from Ottoman propaganda, as he does not deem the foundations of leadership 
espoused by the Sultan to be legitimate. The directness of the Shah’s words is a clear 
departure from the rhetoric that comprised the rest of his response to Sultan Selim. The 
Shah boldly claims that any campaign against the Safavids is doomed to fail, as all other 
attempts in the past have failed to abolish the house of Ali. He ends his message with an 
acknowledgement of the foregone conclusion that the Ottomans will not heed the Shah’s 
warning but will most likely act upon their neighbors, and that this will potentially 
transform the dynamic between the two empires and set them on a path from which there 
can be no retreat. 
41 Finkel, 105. 
42 McNeill., 344. 
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As the Ottomans searched for religious justifications for their antagonisms with 
the Shah, they also found themselves in a unique predicament that potentially required 
action against the Mamluk order. This was an even greater challenge, as the Mamluks 
were also Sunni Muslims. The Mamluks, a dynasty ruling from Egypt that  controlled 
Palestine, Syria, Iraq and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, could scarcely be branded 
as heretics by the Ottomans “even in the interests of Ottoman realpolitik,” therefore a 
campaign against them was harder to justify than one against the Safavids.43 Yet, an 
opportunity arose when the Mamluk Sultan Qansawh al-Ghawri, hoping to keep his 
options open, refused to participate in an alliance with Selim against Isma’il. After Selim 
captured Çaldiran in 151644, he declined to enter into a pact with Isma’il against the 
Ottomans.45 Neutrality was an interesting option for the Mamluks but one that set the 
foundations for the Ottomans to attack their Sunni neighbors, as the nature of the conflict 
between the Ottomans and Safavids required absolute commitment to a particular Muslim 
ruling faction. In the eyes of the Ottomans, choosing not to side with fellow Sunnis, made 
you as guilty as those actively fighting the Ottomans. Therefore, the Ottoman religious 
establishment agreed to support a campaign against the Mamluks on the grounds “that 
[those] who aids a heretic is himself a heretic, and that to do battle against them might be 
considered a holy war.”46 The significance of the religious cities played a role in how 
such a justification was allowed to pass through the religious institutes without serious 
43 Finkel., 109. 
44 The battle of Çaldiran took place in 1515 between the Ottomans and the Safavids and ended in a decisive 
victory for the Ottomans. It was the first time the Ottomans annexed eastern Anatolia and Iraq into their 
order. 
45 Ibid., 108. 
46 Repp, R. C. The Müfti of Istanbul: A Study in the Development of the Ottoman Learned Hierarchy. 
London: Published by Ithaca Press for the Board of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, Oxford University, 
1986, 213-214. 
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rebuke, as victory over the Mamluks made Selim “guardian of the Holy Places of Mecca 
and Medina and guarantor of the pilgrimage routes by which the Muslim faithful had 
travelled to sites associated with the life of Prophet Muhammad.”47 The addition of these 
titles to the ruler of the Ottoman Empire added a significant amount of credibility to the 
role of the Ottomans in Islamic history and provided more leeway in future expansionist 
policies in the name of religion. The justifications provided by the religious elites to the 
Ottoman ruler, from this point onward, suggest a major reconfiguring of Muslim identity 
as both territorial and ideological threats were deemed serious enough to warrant 
reexaminations of Islam in order to find the appropriate pretexts for action. This 
relationship would be further formalized under Selim’s successor, Sϋleyman and his 
seyhϋlislam (head juris consult), Ebussuud Efendi. 
 
God on Earth: Reordering the Ottoman Hierarchy 
 
 Selim I’s conquest enfolded former Mamluk territories into the Ottoman domain, 
and for the first time the Empire possessed a majority Muslim population. The conflicts 
with the Safavids, and the conquest of Mamluk territories had both contributed to a new 
focus on religious orthodoxy within the palace administration. Thus, at the ascension of 
Sultan Sϋleyman I, after the death of his father, a formalization of the relationship 
between religious and imperial authority became a major component of the Sultan’s 
agenda. The need for Sϋleyman to consolidate the dynasty’s centralized control became 
an urgent priority, despite the fact that the Ottomans were now guardians of the two holy 
cities with their successful victory over the Mamluks, as they had not fully defeated their 
47 Finkel., 110. 
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Safavid neighbors. Furthermore, despite the conquests, opposition from other Muslim 
legal orders and regional religious establishments still posed a problem for consolidated 
rule. Thus, the incorporation of these new realms into centralized Ottoman control 
required in the first place “a historical justification for Ottoman claims to pre-eminence 
among Islamic sovereigns.”48 It was fortunate that this need arose when the ulema 
(religious scholars) had come to dominate the intellectual life of the Empire, and the 
result was a “reformulation of Ottoman claims to legitimacy in terms of orthodox, 
canonical Islam.”49 
The ulemas established the “Ottoman sultan as the absolute ruler.”50 The change 
in this dynamic, which had now been codified, allowed Sϋleyman to exercise centralized 
power over the broad expanse of the empire as demonstrated by the ability of “his 
officials to carry out land registration in European, Arab and Anatolian regions.”51 
Examples of this became prevalent when passages from the Qur’an were purposefully 
attributed to the role of the Ottomans in the history of Islam: 
God will bring a people whom He loves and who love Him, humble 
towards believers, but mighty towards the infidels, fighting in the path of 
God and fearing no one.52 
The “people” in the ulemas exegesis was the Ottoman dynasty, thus their acquisition of 
the two holy cities was scripted according to the Qur’an. In propagating this idea it 
provided a sense of prophetic meaning to the venture of the Ottoman Empire, as 
everything they were doing had not fulfilled the edicts of the faith itself. When justifying 
48 Kunt., 149. 
49 Ibid., 148. 
50 Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power, 319. 
51 Kunt., 182. 
52 Ali., 5:59. 
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the Ottoman’s campaign to conquer Mecca and Medina from the Mamluks, this claim 
prompted a wider change in the Ottoman government that led to redefining administrative 
practices in canonical terms. This process was pioneered by Ebussuud Efendi, the 
seyhϋlislam or the highest ranked person of the ulemas appointed by royal warrant. He 
created an “image of the Ottoman sultan as a truly orthodox sovereign whose rule was in 
effect identical with the shari’a.”53 Upon confirming the new Sultan, another duty of the 
seyhϋlislam, Ebussuud gave Sϋleyman the title of “the one who makes manifest the 
exalted word,” implying that the Sultan has almost divine status, as it is through him that 
God’s orders become known to the people.54 This reinforced the role of the ruler as being 
an absolute ruler, for now any disobedience expressed towards him would be a direct 
affront to the word of God, both deemed intolerable in the centralized Ottoman order. 
Thus, the process began of reconciling the shari’a with the governing structures 
of the Ottoman Empire. Under the new centralized order there was little room for 
multiple forms of legal opinion, therefore identifying a connection that could unite all of 
these processes and legitimating authorities was an essential aspect of Sultan Sϋleyman’s 
reign. While this was often an assumed aspect of the Ottoman Empire, the size and 
diversity that had emerged through expansionism meant, “an inevitable corollary was a 
legal pluralism.”55 The fact that the Ottomans remember Sϋleyman as the “Law-Giver” as 
opposed to the title “Magnificent,” that dominates western chronicles, suggests that “it 
was above all the legal order of his reign that was recreated.”56 During his tenure as 
53 Kunt., 151. 
54 Ibid., 151. 
55 Imber, Colin. Ebuʼs-Suʻud: The Islamic Legal Tradition. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997, 
6. 
56 Ibid., x. 
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seyhϋlislam, the relationship between Sϋleyman and Ebussuud materialized into an 
unparalleled administrative force for the empire as “what gave Ottoman legal practice its 
unity was the authority of the Sultan.”57 This became true regardless of the confessional 
differences and distinct legal school, as all were recognized by “virtue of appointment by 
the Sultan.”58 It was Ebussuud who codified this process and streamlined all religious 
authority through the Sultan in order to create an image of an all-encompassing leader 
who had political and spiritual endorsements for his actions. 
Ebussuud achieved this by creating a religious hierarchy that positioned Sϋleyman 
as the leader and appointer of all those who make legal pronouncements. This created a 
new norm of legal sovereignty, and jihad too became more inextricably linked to the 
relationships drawn between imperial, legal, and religious authority and to the edicts of 
appointed jurists.59 Their actions were no longer autonomous from the authority of the 
sultan, as Ottoman practices were based upon the Hanafi tradition, which associated a 
legitimate authority with the person that “successfully seizes and holds power.”60 This 
idea became the foothold that provided the ruler with his power base that would hold 
throughout his various territories because “from him the judges acquire their authority” 
meaning that all implementations of the law were, in theory, an extension of the sultan’s 
will.61 Key to the reorganization of the religious hierarchy was the emergence of an elitist 
cadre of ulemas, deriving from this system of centralized power. The strengthening of the 
sultan’s position came through the constant dissemination of these ulemas from the center 
57 Ibid., 6 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid., 65. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 66. 
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of the empire outwards to the more distant territories. Thus, with this model in place the 
jurists in their various regions did not have to provide sufficient justification for their 
rulings or concern themselves with Sϋleyman’s will as their actions had already been 
justified. Upon the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, the jurists’ role was reconciling the 
“legal status of persons, land and taxation in an Islamic sovereignty,” and to do so they 
deployed legal opinions concerning the role of jihad in defining relations with conquered 
territories.62 The fact that Sϋleyman and his predecessors had always rationalized their 
conquests with the jihad ideology meant that their new acquisitions were subjected to the 
“specific rules of warfare” formulated by the jurists.63 As a result of the jurists’ 
appointment by the sultan, these rules were not seen as undermining his authority or 
independent of the sultan’s rule, but were rather aligned with both the ideological and 
strategic goals of the Empire. The fact that religiously justified warfare and its conduct 
“has a central position in the general structure of Hanafi law,” also determined the legal 
status of individuals, of land and taxation, and legitimized an Empire that contained a 
diverse range of ethnicities and religions.64 The tradition adopted by the Ottomans to 
replace the poll tax with threats of forceful conquest of conversion ensured that they 
could both wage jihad against the “infidel” while minimizing the amount of bloodshed 
such campaigns might normally entail. The overarching system that Ebussuud sought to 
establish was a religiously and politically sound government with roots in Islamic 
tradition effectively ensuring the tactical ability to regulate such a large empire. The 
former was especially crucial during the reign of Sϋleyman I, due to the increasing threat 
62 Ibid., 67. 
63 Ibid., 68. 
64 Ibid. 
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of the Safavid Empire, where little incentive was needed for the Shi’i faction to question 
the religious legitimacy of the Ottoman order. 
For this Ottoman administration and regulatory body to exist, Ebussuud also had 
to reorder the hierarchy in the Empire so that the Sultan was undeniably the ruler of the 
people and, perhaps even more importantly, an extension of the Prophet and God. This 
process was initiated through the Hanafi theory of ruler ship that through its legal 
definition gave the sultan absolute power via successful conquests into new regions. Yet, 
this legal definition was built upon the fact that religious precepts stated the sultan was 
the leader of the holy wars and heir to the Seljuk dynasty, meaning that all the lands he 
conquered, regardless of whether they were Christian or Muslim had already been 
legitimized.65 This rhetoric was amplified after the acquisition of the two holy cities, 
which reenergized the Ottoman campaign against the “heretical” Safavids as the sultans 
were now presented as defenders of the shari’a and Islam, of which neither could survive 
without the Ottoman dynasty’s active protection.66 Ebussuud formalized Sϋleyman’s 
embodiment of this idea when he gave him the title of “Law-Giver,” and inscripted it 
onto the Sϋleymaniye Mosque, with the words “as Caliph, he is both the interpreter and 
executor of God’s Law and possessor of the kingdom’s of the world.”67  
The need to build the idea of Sϋleyman as the leader of Islam served the more 
abstract purpose of winning the ideological battle with the Safavids; yet, it was not the 
motivating factor that drove the army to fight for their leader, as it was during Salah al-
65 Ibid., 73. 
66 Ibid., 74 
67 Ibid., 76. 
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Din’s reign. Instead, military service to the sultan “was a contractual obligation” that 
differentiated between taxpayers and non-taxpayers as opposed to Muslim and non-
Muslim.68 This is a significant distinction to make because it highlighted how the 
relationship between the palace and the religious elites had created a structure of 
government that allowed the Ottomans to portray themselves as the defenders of Islam, 
while having non-Muslim entities involved in the army. The reconciliation of practical 
administration and ideological rhetoric is a crucial turning point in the mechanics of a 
Muslim empire as it facilitated holy war rhetoric as a medium for broader justifications of 
Ottoman actions. This internal sense of tolerance that was a norm in the Ottoman Empire 
was consistently rationalized by the work of Ebussuud and his peers, which prompted 
little backlash from the Sultan as it gave him greater freedom to pursue his politics. 
 
Regional Challenges and Pragmatic Policies 
 
The triumphs of Sϋleyman and his chief juris consult Ebussuud may have crafted 
a new legal and imperial framework for the authority of the sultan, but it could not 
preserve the Empire from continued regional challenges and external threats. These 
would reach a climax in the early to mid-seventeenth century, when shifts in global trade 
and new imperial powers transformed the Atlantic Ocean into a dramatic challenge to 
Ottoman sovereignty. Ottoman reformers became intent on creating strategies to 
reinforce the power of the Empire, and these addressed both regional and ideological 
challenges in a new mode. 
68 Ibid., 77. 
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 Aziz Efendi, a seventeenth-century Ottoman statesman, highlighted the need for 
practical domestic policies in the face of these new challenges. He explicitly made these 
points concerning revived threats along the Safavid frontier, and suggested that the 
Kurdish populations in this region should be targets of Ottoman efforts to assert greater 
control. His main point was that “denying material support to the Kurdish in the border 
areas would hamper the Ottomans’ ability to function as an effective deterrent against 
Safavid incursions.”69 This type of message was interesting because it was phrased as an 
explicit need to protect the Kurds, who were part of the Ottoman Empire, but a departure 
from the tradition of anti-Shi’i polemic. Aziz Efendi held that even though the Kurds 
were practicers of Sunni Islam “economic necessity or military insecurity” could force 
their hand into a new allegiance with the Safavids, and therefore the government should 
seek to prevent this from happening.70 Aziz Efendi remarked upon the changing 
administration of these lands not because any territorial shift had taken place in Ottoman 
governing, but rather because the sheer expanse of Ottoman territories had afforded 
power to certain individuals in these regions that did not necessarily comply with 
imperial rule. While Aziz Efendi’s remarks come after the reign of Selim and Sϋleyman, 
they provide clear insight into issues present throughout the entire Ottoman dynasty. 
Aziz Efendi began his recommendations by reminding his audience about the 
governorship that was intended in the lands, which was aimed to protect the people while 
ensuring a system of economic efficiency. These processes were built with administrative 
69 Efendi, Aziz, and Rhoads Murphey. Kanûn-nâme-i Sultânı̂ Li ʻAzı̂z Efendi: Aziz Efendi's Book of 
Sultanic Laws and Regulations: An Agenda for Reform by a Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Statesman. 
Cambridge, MA: Printed at Harvard University, Office of the University Publisher, 1985, v. 
70 Ibid., viii. 
 
                                                          
Tracing Islamic Extremist Ideologies | 92 
effectiveness with detailed registers of how tax and revenues could be collected without 
imposing unfair practices upon the people: 
Stewards, in turn, protected and preserved the villagers and collected the 
revenues with justice and equity, aware that when they gave account of the 
revenues in detailed registers each foresighted minister would ask them to 
swear that they had not included any forbidden or ill-gotten gains in their 
accounting.71 
While, the legitimacy of this process did rely on the promise of an individual, in essence 
it worked due to the fact that it was an efficient way to administer such a large empire. It 
was also a mechanism that assigned a specific occupation for the protection of the people 
in these lands that meant that there was a greater sense of security for their own finances 
and the government’s finances. Yet, this process changed under the administration of 
greedy Ottoman officials in the area: 
The vezirs abandoning the above-described imperial system of assigning 
long-term trusteeship over their prescribed lands to trusted stewards 
farmed out these domains formerly belonging to the imperial domain on a 
short-term year-to-year basis to members of their own household and 
allowed them to ruin and destroy them.72 
Vezirs, Ottoman provincial governors afforded a degree of autonomy in their respective 
regions, had clearly violated the system set up to ensure economic efficiency in return for 
imperial protection. Such blatant disregard towards the rule of the sultan was perhaps 
uncommon in an empire that had inspired such devotion to their ruler, but certainly not 
unheard of. It was these actions that Efendi was most concerned about because of the 
Kurdish region’s strategic importance to the Ottoman order. Consequently he was unsure 
71 Ibid., 4. 
72 Ibid. 
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of whether or not their religious convictions were enough to prevent them from favoring 
new leadership: 
Not only is this treachery to the sovereign, but it also gives consent and 
encouragement to oppression and injustice and creates obstacles to good 
deeds and benefactions.73 
 
Aziz Efendi’s comments are a clear departure from what the sultan had intended Ottoman 
rule to consist of in these provinces. Creating an informal code that had allowed the 
Ottoman’s to maintain order in their empire in return for collecting taxes, the Ottomans 
assured that all of their people would be provided with protection. Such a system 
guaranteed security from the government while not appearing overbearing and intrusive 
in these regions: 
Sultan Sϋleyman too on his part satisfied and delighted the hearts of the 
Kurdish commanders by issuing grants of proprietorship containing clear 
terms of conferral and extended to them the shade of imperial protection.74 
Yet, the nature of the Ottoman Empire allowed these vezirs to often govern as they saw 
fit, mainly because the Ottomans had conquered so many territories that it was impossible 
for the sultan to overlook the administration of all of them. This relationship had worked 
somewhat successfully when the importance of strategic location was of greater priority 
to the provincial leaders, but when the vezirs ignored their duty to the Empire, the 
potential distress caused to the sovereignty of the sultans could be significant. This was 
especially the case for territories that were not in close proximity to the capital or major 
provincial garrisons, where dispersing the army could be achieved with less logistical 
73 Ibid., 5. 
74 Ibid., 14. 
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stress. Thus, part of Aziz Efendi’s comments contains a request for the current sultan to 
take action in this region because of its importance: 
Under the circumstances therefore if it should be the will of his imperial 
majesty in whom felicity abides that the country of Kurdistan to be 
restored to its prosperity and abundance and that the Kurdish chiefs 
acquire strength and power and attain the capability for the services which 
until this date they have performed.75 
Thus, were the sultan or central government to take action in this region it would ensure 
greater protection for the empire as a whole. This is a point that Aziz Efendi tries to 
communicate by remarking upon the services that the Kurds potentially provide, 
foreshadowing that while they have engaged in these duties so far, their continued loyalty 
is not a certainty and something that should definitely not be taken for granted. Therefore, 
Aziz Efendi proposes that the sultan’s intervention would prevent such a possibility from 
every manifesting: 
Then whereas previously they [Kurds] had all been reduced to weak 
kittens, not only would they be transformed into fierce lions and 
comparable to raging elephants in seeking out the Iranian heretics, but 
they would also act as a firm barrier and a coterminous boundary and 
obstacle between the territory of the Iranian redheads and your majesty’s 
well-protected realm, thereby, by God the exalted commander and with 
the fortune and strength to be able to challenge the Shah of Iran, would not 
this be a most great and momentous blessing?76 
In Aziz Efendi’s final plea to the sultan, he reconciles the same issues that Ebussuud 
struggled with in trying to marry practical administration with ideological superiority. 
Aziz Efendi believes that his suggestion is an extremely logical and religiously sound 
proposition because it empowers the Kurds strategically to the point that they do not have 
to question their Sunni Muslim faith. Moreover, there is the sense that the Kurds would 
75 Ibid., 15. 
76 Ibid., 17. 
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be able to take a more active role in the defense of the Empire as Aziz Efendi suggests 
such empowerment would not only be able to protect them from advances by the 
Safavids, but also enable them to fight the Shah preemptively. Whether such independent 
decision-making was envisaged in the sultan’s plans is certainly an intriguing question, 
but it does allow for more flexibility when determining how to become the singular, more 
dominant faith. There is also an interesting acknowledgement of the status of the Kurds 
in the Ottoman Empire, who were being described as an “obstacle” to a foreign invasion 
and suggests their communal status in the Ottoman order. This was certainly recognized 
in the nineteenth century of the Ottoman Empire as the Kurdish beys, chieftains of small 
tribal groups, rebelled against their leaders and spearheaded new territorial shifts in 
Anatolia. 
In the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire it is important to acknowledge that 
yoking religious doctrine to ideological supremacy often invoked recrimination and 
violent opposition. After the reign of Sultan Sϋleyman, various groups emerged that 
became part of a backlash to the assertion of imperial power through religious 
justification. There were a number of revolutions and revolts, where students and scholars 
tried to reinforce their interpretation of the law and imperial space. As part of this 
movement, there was a reassertion of the purity of Islam and an effort to return to the 
fundamentals of the faith. Of particular note were the Kadızadeli movement and the role 
it played in the post-Sϋleyman Ottoman order. The emphasis of this movement rivaled 
the Sufi orders in the seventeenth century, and its leaders premised their claims upon the 
need to rid any corruption they found inside the Ottoman order. For the movement, 
corruption was portrayed as innovation, and the result of the Empire’s distortion of Islam 
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as it conquered new territories.77 Yet, these corruptions were located not only in the 
credibility that the Ottoman religious elites had preached in order to profess the sultan as 
the one true ruler, but also towards certain types of prayer, pilgrimages to the tombs of 
saints, the use of coffee, tobacco, and opium, and Sufi rituals that included dance and 
song.78 Thus, a movement that aimed to assert more binary notions of what constituted a 
true Islamic identity challenged the tolerant atmosphere that the Ottoman rulers had 
attempted to propagate. The fact that the followers of this movement were drawn from 
modest aspects of the Ottoman political spectrum was particularly appealing because 
many of these people had watched as Christians and Jews had risen to much higher ranks 
in the Ottoman government. While, the Kadızadeli movement was not successful in the 
reorganization of the Ottoman order, it was not because their ideology was deemed 
infallible, but rather because it depended upon elite patronage that was often manipulated 
to specific ends.79 Thus, if certain political figures no longer had need for the movement 
or they found that the militaristic elements of it were deemed to be too destabilizing to 
not only the Ottoman order but also their positions, the movement was often cast aside. 
Yet, this movement demonstrates that the Ottoman administrator’s efforts to bend 
religious legal precepts and the doctrine of jihad to its own will had not gone unnoted. 
Thus, the nature of Ottoman conquest, the establishment of a new version of imperial and 
religious orthodoxy, and the opposition to this move from Seyh Bedreddin to the 
Kadızadeli movement illustrate the diverse ways in which jihad was mobilized in the 
77 Zilfi, Madeline C. "The Kadizadelis: Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul." Journal 
of Near Eastern Studies 45, no. 4 (1986): 254. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 260. 
                                                          
The Ottoman Empire & Jihad | 97 
Ottoman realm. These historical processes reveal a new dimension for the concept of 
jihad, one that could be incited when its ideological importance served the purpose of 
maintaining law and order. Or, when frontier problems continued to plague the Empire, 
might be minimized when practical administrative duties prioritized cooperation over 
volatile rhetoric. 
The chronology of the Kadızadeli movement is of particular interest, as its 
eventual demise in the 1730s was on the eve of the rise of Wahhabism. Links between the 
founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and aspects of the Kadızadeli 
movement are crucial in determining where the foundations of the future Saudi state 
emerged. Similarities between the two ideologies can be seen in their respective tenets 
with the ultimate aim of returning to traditional interpretations of the Qur’an and 
dispelling other notions of Islam that had arisen during the rise of the Ottoman Empire. 
The connections that Wahhab had to significant patrons of the Kadızadeli movement 
cannot be understated, especially “given the staunchness of the Kadızadeli in general and 
their prominence on the Ottoman scene for so long” an environment that Wahhab was 
raised in.80 Wahhab himself, who is described as having studied under numerous 
scholars, “specifically gaining scholarly authorizations in hadith from three of his 
teachers, Shaykh ‘Ali Afendi al-Daghistani, Shaykh ‘Abdullah ibn Ibrahim al-Najdi and 
Shaykh ‘Abd al-Latif al-Ahsa’i, all of whom studied in Damascus,” creates a connection 
to the strongest advocates of the Kadızadeli movement.81 Thus, tracing the lineage of 
80 Currie, James. "Kadizadeli Ottoman Scholarship, Muhammad Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhab, and the Rise of the 
Saudi State." September 24, 2015. Accessed April 3, 2016. 
http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/110266323/kadizadeli-ottoman-scholarship-mu-ammad-ibn-abd-
al-wahh-b-rise-saudi-state, 279. 
81 Ibid., 280. 
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scholarly authorizations from Wahhab to his predecessors and the chronology of the two 
movements means that some of the teachings that influenced Wahhab would have had 
their roots in the movement a few decades earlier. This is especially likely when 
considering that the scholarly authorizations that his teacher’s received were from 
“Hanbali hadith circles in Damascus, at a time of heightened Kadızadeli activity there.”82 
While the geographical distance between Damascus and Najd, where Wahhab began 
preaching, challenges the relationship between the two, it does reveal the prevailing 
winds of change that had gripped Islam in the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Ultimately, 
it was this window of opportunity that Wahhab would embrace in reviving many aspects 
of the Kadızadeli movement in his own ideology of Wahhabism. 
 
 
 
 
 
82 Ibid., 283. 
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IV 
Modern State Making: Institutionalizing Religious Zeal & Political 
Aims through the Ikhwan & Ibn Sa’ud 
 
 
 
espite the Ottoman Empire’s unprecedented amount of success in both 
establishing and administering such a vast region of land, its gradual loss 
of territory amidst increasing interstate global competition allowed new politically empty 
spaces to emerge. While for many territories this decline provided an opportunity to 
retake their independence, in the central and eastern parts of Arabia the fortunes of the 
Ottoman Empire had little impact on the lives of many tribal systems that had long since 
existed. The aridness of the region meant there were few incentives for either the 
Ottomans or the Europeans to seek out territorial influence or fully conquer this area. As 
a result, an exploration into the movements of the eighteenth century can largely be seen 
as arising and responding from local conditions.1 Of these movements grew one of the 
most significant political and religious entities that would re-shape Sunni Islam’s identity 
on the global stage. The union formed between Muhammad ibn Sa'ud and Muhammad 
ibn Abd al-Wahhab would become a powerful bond that forged a new nation, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and a lasting basis for the legitimacy of the state. While critics 
of the Kingdom assert that the form of Islam practiced in the Kingdom is at complete 
odds with contemporary standards of human rights and misinterprets the egalitarian 
vision of Islam, the Kingdom’s steadfast affirmation of the foundations it was based upon 
1 Bas, Natana J. Wahhabi Islam from Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004, 8. 
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is a testament to the lasting union between two influential individuals in its history. The 
very basis of the Saudi state was founded upon a religious and political union that set a 
precedent for the future of the country. The relationship between ibn Sa'ud and Wahhab 
reveals how different spheres of influence were reconciled with one another in order to 
achieve a single power. However, this was not always such a blessed union and the 
relationship’s troubled history reveals the immense effort entailed in this state-making 
enterprise. Moreover, the rise and fall of the Ikhwan Movement, an Islamist ideological 
commitment to purifying Islam, forms a critical component in the history of Saudi Arabia 
as it highlights the return of a crusading mentality dependent on binary connotations of 
insiders and outsiders. The movement also articulates the tension that exists in any effort 
to preserve a certain type of religious sanctity with political goals crucial to the progress 
of a nation. Once again, in this context, zealous religious rhetoric, espoused as jihad, 
resurfaces as a cornerstone of the Ikhwan’s actions and played a central role in the 
emergence of the modern Saudi Kingdom. 
 
The First Saudi State: Wahhabi Ideology & Political Patronage 
 
The very foundations of Saudi Arabia provide the first instance of a relationship 
between religion and politics, one that would be revised two centuries later with the 
emergence of the Ikhwan. The relationship built between ibn Sa'ud and ibn Wahhab grew 
out of unique circumstances that later shaped the nature of the Ikhwan movement as well. 
The history of Saudi Arabia can be traced back to the central region of Najd, where a lack 
of interest from foreign conquerors meant the region’s history had been marked “more by 
local tribal warfare and chieftains struggling for power than by its position as part of a 
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broader state or empire.”2 Such an environment was able to exist in Najd because the area 
“had no claim to commercial or religious importance” thus held little interest for the 
stronger powers in Arabia, such as the Ottomans.3 This culture allowed the Najdis to 
retain their individuality and independence without incurring serious repercussions from 
any surrounding centralized power.4 Thus, there was little pressure in Najd to conform to 
a particular Muslim identity or political authority, leaving an ideological open space for 
the promulgation of different forms of Islam. It was in this space that Wahhabism first 
gathered momentum, and would later contribute significant character to the future Saudi 
Arabian identity.5 
Within this ideological open space a consistent emphasis on tawhid, or the 
oneness of God, emerged almost as a reaction to the diverse set of interpretations taking 
place in the Ottoman Empire. In essence, the reformers that were present in Najd 
advocated for a return to the fundamentals of faith - the Muslim scriptures of the Qur’an 
and the hadith - as the “sources of guidance that would lead to the socio-moral 
reconstruction of society.”6 The fact that these reformers were aware of the changing 
nature of Islam is an important issue to be aware of, because it acknowledges that these 
preachers had travelled throughout the Arabian region and observed such interpretations 
2 Ibid., 7. 
3 Ibid., 8. 
4 Vassiliev, Alexei. The History of Saudi Arabia. London: Saqi Books, 2000, 70. 
5 This is not to say that the Ottomans had little interest in the Arabian Peninsula as a whole. The Ottoman 
occupation of Yemen, 945-1045/1538-1636, highlights foreign interest in the region. Yet, it is crucial to 
understand that at the most simple level, Ottoman interest in certain parts of the Peninsula provided specific 
assets. In the case of Yemen, the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina were brought into the Ottoman order as 
well as key trade routes with India in spices and textiles. Whereas, the aridness of the Najd did not provide 
these benefits or an equivalent hence, its ability to go relatively unnoticed in its social, religious and 
political development. 
6 Bas., 9. 
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and their role in defining a political system. Therefore, derivatives of certain religious 
movements, such as the Kadızadeli movement, may have had an influence on the 
religious sentiments that later emerged in this space. The belief that important Qur’anic 
interpretations had been lost as Islam became inextricably tied to a more centralized and 
modernizing political system was a new challenge that had not previously existed for 
Muslim-based polities. It was the aim of these reformers, through the fundamentals of 
Islam, to enable society to rediscover the meaning of the religion in its original context in 
order to determine “the eternal value or ethical guidelines” contained within it.7 
However, it is crucial to acknowledge that these reformers, although they called on the 
authority of a pure Muslim past, acted in a new medium of the modern. The past 
legitimized their novel actions in the present, especially in that sense that they sought to 
re-interpret the heritage of Islam in ways that would be meaningful “in both the private 
and public spheres.”8 This meant that the proponents of ibn Wahhab challenged the 
authority of tribal orders, as they inserted religious beliefs into public life, and proposed 
that God should stand at the center of the political order. As a result, it became necessary 
for the reformers to seek a political alliance for their own protection, and they in turn 
provided a legitimate religious base for the tribal leaders.9 These associations were to 
become the foundations of Saudi Arabia, as it was during this tumultuous time that the 
tribal lineage of ibn Sa’ud provided protection to the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab. 
7 Ibid., 11. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 13. 
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A local Najdi, ibn Wahhab spent time travelling throughout the region, 
accumulating knowledge on Islam and its practices from the various parts of the Ottoman 
Empire. His exposure to the religion came primarily through Hanbali juridical doctrine, 
what is perceived to be the most conservative legal school of Islam. The Hanbali School 
of jurisprudence requires a very literal reading of scripture and eschews interpretative 
efforts by scholars; consequently it is of little surprise that ibn Wahhab’s teachings 
required such an orientation to scripture.10 Moreover, Wahhabism’s fundamental precepts 
are derived in part from the medieval jurist Ahmad Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya and his 
student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, which were both aimed at returning to orthodox Islam 
in the midst of Mongol invasions, and defined true Islam as that “practiced by the very 
first generations.”11 Throughout ibn Wahhab’s travels he noticed how the Muslim umma 
and its political leaders had deviated from the principles of monotheism as “people 
indulged in bida, considered the worst sin” for orthodox Islamists.12 Bid’a was the act of 
innovation in religious matters and often used as a mode of recrimination against 
temporal power. These accusations were reminiscent of the backlash the Ottoman Empire 
faced in the aftermath of Sultan Sϋleyman’s reign by the Kadızadeli movement. Thus, 
there was certainly a reactionary element to the changes in Islam that came from 
reorganizing the religion to fit a political mold. However, for Wahhabism to be 
sustainable it had to accommodate the shifting arrangements of its time, otherwise it 
would have endangered itself to the point that it would have ceased to exist. 
Consequently, it is interesting that Wahhabism preaches a return to orthodox Islam in 
10 "Wahhābīya." Encyclopedia of Islam, First Edition (1913-1936), 3. 
11 Lacroix, Stéphane, and George Holoch. Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in 
Contemporary Saudi Arabia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011, 11. 
12 Vassiliev, 74. 
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order to ensure the power of religion to shape political conditions, when it too was 
dependent on alliances for its very preservation.13 Wahhabism flourished precisely due to 
political and social upheaval, as the consistent sense of political turmoil in central Arabia, 
with multiple warring tribes, had led to “an atmosphere of widespread popular 
dissatisfaction in the area of religion.”14This fostered an environment that perhaps 
encouraged religious influences in political affairs as “striving for new ideals” in order to 
quell chaos created a sustained link between Islam and politics in the Arabian 
Peninsula.15 The challenge lay in finding an aspect of Islam that resonated with the rule 
of a particular political leader, and more importantly, one that would not pose a threat to 
the administration of their territories. The alliance between the House of Sa’ud and ibn 
Wahhab achieved a unique balance--it wove political stability with religious legitimacy 
and thus created a cohesive mechanism for centralized rule in the heart of the Najd. 
Wahhabi doctrine required ultimate commitment to its beliefs. The fact that there 
needed to be both private and public recognition of the oneness of God meant those who 
could not outwardly prove their dedication would not be deemed as true advocates of the 
fundamentals of Islam. It is interesting that followers of ibn Wahhab never named 
themselves Wahhabis, instead, the members of the religious sect thought this would have 
been contradictory to their teachings, as it would detract from the principle of oneness 
and fierce dedication to perceived unity in the past. To provide ibn Wahhab with public 
recognition or superiority in a religious context was to say that he shared the same space 
as God, and that was not what ibn Wahhab was preaching. Thus, those who did follow 
13 Lacroix., 4. 
14 Vassiliev., 76. 
15 Ibid. 
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this interpretation of Islam referred to themselves as either “monotheists or simply 
Muslims” with the inherent implication that this was the only true form of Muslim 
belief.16 Wahhabi followers therefore viewed any other Muslim that did not share their 
teaching to be far worse than polytheists.17 To a certain extent, this was not particularly 
surprising, as Muslims who did not adhere to this dogma were deemed partially 
responsible for the corruption of the religion that had caused the moral decay of society.  
Despite the rigidity of its ideological convictions, the movement quickly gained a 
popular following due to its intrinsic connection to Najd, an area that had been left 
relatively unscathed by the religious innovations taking place in the Ottoman Empire. 
Therefore, central to maintaining the success of ibn Wahhab’s ideology was making sure 
the unity in Najd remained untainted, as it was the central population base that the 
followers originated from.18 In many respects the ideology of Wahhabism fit perfectly 
with the bedouin19 mentality because it did not require them to change practical aspects 
of their lives, such as conducting raids for economic support. This was how the bedouin 
maintained their economic independence, and as such it was an extremely integrated part 
of their lives. Through Wahhabism, such behavior did not have to change instead, under 
the banner of jihad and Islam it provided increased impetus to engage in such actions.20  
Direct linkages between the context of the Arabian Peninsula in the lifetime of 
Muhammad and the patterns of contemporary living in the region reinforced the 
relationship between Wahhabi principles and tribal realities. Furthermore, a union 
16 Ibid., 74 
17 Ibid., 77. 
18 Ibid., 79. 
19 The term bedouin is the anglicized version of bedu, which was a specific designation that literally 
translates to nomad or wanderer. 
20 Ibid., 80 
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between Wahhabis and tribes was particularly appealing because it provided an 
extremely mobile military force that could materialize with little notice when necessary, 
which would later become significant in the formation of the Ikhwan as well.  
The banner of jihad would prove to be a central force in the growth of 
Wahhabism, and it also fueled an ideological division between in-groups and out-groups. 
The nature of Wahhabism promoted the idea of returning to the fundamentals of the 
religion and interpreting and reinterpreting the holy texts in order to gain a more 
insightful and long lasting set of beliefs. Yet, interpretation led to difference, and the 
proliferation of opinion was something Wahhabi traditions guarded against. They did so 
by forming a rigid distinction “between exclusivists and inclusivists.”21 This divide was 
important because “inclusivists” were of the thought process that regardless of whether or 
not a Muslim decided to follow the Wahhabi track, they were still believers in Islam.22 
Whereas, the exclusivists were definite proponents of a binary interpretation of jihad and 
asserted that those who were not Wahhabis were infidels. This division materialized in 
later dealings with the Egyptians in 1818. The fact that the prevailing trend of Islam 
practiced in Egypt was not Wahhabism led to eventual clashes with the Egyptians. Yet, 
the inclusivists advocated for a different course of action that may have prevented the end 
to the second Saudi state. Their preferred mode of action would have led them into 
discussions with the Egyptians, not to accommodate their beliefs but to reveal that it was 
inferior to Wahhabi ideology.23 It can be argued that this method of action was merely 
preventing the inevitable, as it seems unlikely that the Egyptians would have conformed 
21 Lacroix., 12. 
22 Ibid., 11. 
23 Ibid., 13. 
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to their Wahhabi counterparts, especially when they were aware of their superior military 
strength. Yet, it does reveal that even though Wahhabism was a strictly conservative form 
of Islam, within it there were differing attitudes in how this conservatism should be 
enacted in order to achieve goals that united politics with religion. 
The union between ibn Sa'ud and ibn Wahhab resulted from particular 
circumstances that made each of them aware of the mutual benefits that might arise from 
their union. Ibn Wahhab’s influence in his home of ‘Uyayna had increased to the point 
where many locals had embraced his interpretation of Islam and were enforcing it as a 
mechanism of governance. This enforcement reached a climax when a case of adultery 
was brought to him and a woman admitted to the act and was punished with stoning, in 
line with Wahhabi doctrine.24 Ibn Mu’ammar, the ruler of ‘Uyayna, had allowed Wahhab 
to act freely up to this point because the latter had agreed to support and expand 
Mu’ammar’s rule “over Najd and possibly beyond.”25 However, ibn Wahhab’s actions 
gained the attention of Ibn Ghurayr, of the neighboring tribe Bani Khalid, who held 
substantial influence over Najd, and he pressured Mu’ammar into forcing Wahhab to 
leave ‘Uyayna.26 While there is speculation over why Ghurayr acted in this manner, there 
exists the possibility that he had made his own agreements with his own religious ulemas 
who were the driving force behind these actions, thus preserving their religious power 
base against the rising popularity of ibn Wahhab. The expulsion of ibn Wahhab led him 
to Diriyah, which was ruled by ibn Sa'ud. With the common trend in Najd consistently 
24 Vassiliev., 80-82. 
25 Lacey, Robert. Inside the Kingdom: Kings, Clerics, Modernists, Terrorists, and the Struggle for Saudi 
Arabia. New York: Viking, 2009, 53. 
26 Bas., 24. 
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forcing religious and political leaders to unite in order to more effectively serve their 
goals, ibn Sa'ud and ibn Wahhab consequently discussed a union. Having witnessed the 
influence ibn Wahhab possessed over the people of ‘Uyayna, he recognized what 
prospects were possible with this relationship and how they would aid his own 
“ambitious plans.”27 On the other hand, ibn Wahhab had realized that his influence had 
little worth if he had no means to protect his followers or to ensure that his practices 
would not encounter any backlash. Thus the need for “military support” and political 
backing was a necessity.28 The alliance was concluded in 1744 and with that, the first 
Saudi state emerged. 
The union between these two influential individuals was divided on the basis that 
ibn Wahhab would be responsible for religious matters and ibn Sa'ud would be in charge 
of political and military issues. This arrangement was intended to take the form of ibn 
Wahhab interpreting the sacred text and ibn Sa’ud being responsible for the governance 
and application of Wahhab’s interpretations. Moreover, ibn Sa’ud would also be 
responsible for the wellbeing of all areas where their texts could not be interpreted or 
lacked an opinion “provided the actions did not contradict any clear shari’a principle.”29 
With a firm platform set, and clear guidelines as to how this dynamic would operate, ibn 
Sa’ud conducted his very first raids on his neighbors. The rewards were distributed in 
accordance with Wahhabi doctrine, “one fifth went to Muhammad ibn Sa'ud and the rest 
to the fighters.”30 This was an important moment in the new union because the success of 
27 Vassiliev., 82. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Vogel, Frank E. Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia. Leiden: Brill, 2000, 163. 
30 Vassiliev., 83. 
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these raids ensured the protection of ibn Wahhab as his doctrine of Islam brought clear 
material rewards for the efforts of those who subscribed to it. This success was the 
catalyst of a chain reaction that changed the “very character of local power” as supporters 
of ibn Sa’ud gradually replaced independent sheikhs.31 The exponential growth of 
Wahhabism in the first Saudi state did not go unnoticed or unchallenged and in fact, one 
of the biggest opponents of this renewed commitment to Islam was Wahhab’s brother, 
Sulaiman. The sheer aggression with which Wahhabists pursued and executed their new 
beliefs brought Sulaiman and Muhammad into confrontation: 
Sulaiman once asked his brother Muhammad, ‘How many are the pillars 
of Islam, O Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab?’ ‘Five’, he answered. 
Sulaiman replied, ‘No, you have added a sixth one. It reads that one who 
does not follow you is not a Muslim. To you, it is the sixth pillar of 
Islam.32 
The belief that Wahhab’s teachings had grown to the point that he was now regarded in 
an almost divine status is certainly ironic, given the importance that was placed on fierce 
monotheism and the absolute oneness of God. The fact that Wahhabism had filled a void 
of religious zeal that had been absent from the Arabian world for a few centuries is 
crucial in understanding why his teachings were so passionately embraced. It is in this 
light we can see the foundations that would bind the House of Sa'ud and Wahhabism for 
the next 300 years and recognize that the relationship would consistently dominate 
political practices. 
 
 
31 Ibid., 124. 
32 Daḥlān, Aḥmad Ibn Zaynī. Khulāṣat Al-Kalām Fī Bayān Umarāʼ Al-Balad Al-Harām. Al-Qāhirah, 1888, 
232. 
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Political Instability in the Intervening Years 
 
The first Saudi state existed until 1818 when the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, 
Mehmed Ali Pasha, destroyed it. If the Wahhabists had kept their raids in the general area 
of Najd, there is little chance that the rest of the Muslim world would have noticed their 
actions, as had been the general history of Najd. Yet, after the death of ibn Sa'ud in 1765, 
the lineage of the House of Sa’ud continued to expand the Wahhabi mission and in 1801 
these raids extended towards Karbala, the Shi’i shrine in eastern Iraq, and the Sunni 
controlled town of Hijaz.33 Throughout the Ottoman Empire, the Hijaz was a territory 
that the Ottomans refused to concede to local leaders, yet, at this juncture in their reign 
they were not in a position to fully engage with the Saudis in order to recover it. 
Therefore, they sent Mehmed Ali Pasha, the semi-independent commander of their 
garrison in Egypt to recapture the city.34 Mehmed Ali came into conflict with Saud’s 
great-grandson, ‘Abd Allah ibn Sa'ud ibn ‘Abd al Aziz, who was quickly overcome by 
the strength of the larger and superior Egyptian army. As a result, ‘Abd Allah took the 
opportunity to retreat back into the center of the Saudi state, however, they were further 
pursued by the Egyptians and made their final stand in Diriyah, which they managed to 
hold onto for two years before capitulating.35 Prior to these conflicts, ibn Wahhab had 
also passed away although in the nineteenth century his religious field was expanded to a 
small number of other families from Najd. These families soon emerged as a “veritable 
religious aristocracy, the exclusive guardians and preservers of the intellectual legacy of 
33 Metz, Helen Chapin. Saudi Arabia: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress, 1993, 5. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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al-Wahhab against his detractors.”36 Yet, without a strong military to support this 
religious doctrine, it was also subdued for a period of time. 
The disappearance of the first Saudi state sparked a series of competitive battles 
and tension within the House of Sa'ud regarding who should be responsible for its return. 
This competition was shaped by who had access to power and what resources they could 
afford to assert a claim to become a worthy successor to his rule.37 During this period of 
time there seems little to suggest that much had changed in the Wahhabi ideology, and 
consequently it became more of background issue while the House of Sa'ud tried to 
reorganize its political structure. The fact that a smaller second Saudi state reemerged in 
the Najd in 1824, and was unable to extend its influence beyond this region, is reflective 
of the political instability that marked this period of time. This was the general trend of 
the early- to mid- nineteenth century and climaxed towards the end of the century when 
the al-Rashid family challenged the House of Sa’ud from Jebel Shammar, in Northern 
Najd.38 The power struggles between the different brothers in the House of Sa'ud had led 
to a power vacuum, which was the direct cause of the defeat and exile of the Sa'ud in 
1891.39 As the al-Rashid tribe emerged as the ruling family of Najd, the House of Sa'ud 
retreated for sanctuary to Kuwait.40 It is from these roots that the role of the Ikhwan 
would become significant and the world would see Wahhabism emerge with renewed 
vigor in alliance with ‘Abdulaziz ibn Muhammad al-Sa'ud or as he would simply become 
known as, ibn Sa'ud. 
36 Lacroix., 10 
37 Ibid. 
38 McLoughlin, Leslie J. ibn Sa'ud: Founder of a Kingdom. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, 11. 
39 Ibid. 
40 "History of Arabia." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Accessed February 20, 2016. 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Arabia. 
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The Rise of ibn Sa'ud & Founding the Ikhwan 
 
During his exile in Kuwait, ibn Sa'ud built a relationship with the ruler of the 
country, Sheikh Mubarak predominantly based on a series of consistent conflicts between 
the Kuwaitis and the Rashidis. Under Mubarak’s tutelage, ibn Sa'ud was exposed to 
various political and military teachings as well as having the opportunity to campaign 
with Mubarak on multiple occasions. His father took an active role in imparting 
Wahhabist beliefs and thought processes, which also supplemented these experiences in 
the formative years of his life. This is an important moment in ibn Sa'ud’s life as Sheikh 
Mubarak was not an extremely strict adherent of Sunni Islam, and ibn Sa'ud’s father’s 
disapproval of this way of life was the beginning of his son’s relationship with Wahhabist 
Islam. The commitment that ibn Sa'ud would make to Islam would become much more 
formalized after marriage to his third wife, Tarfa “a descendant of the founder of the 
Wahhabi doctrine.”41 The commitment that ibn Sa'ud had made to the history of 
Wahhabism is crucial in determining his orientation on the spectrum of Wahhabism and 
how he balanced it’s extremely conservative ideals with political pragmatism. After the 
death of Muhammad ibn Rashid in 1897, there was a significant opportunity for the 
House of Sa'ud to recapture Najd, as his successor was young and inexperienced.42 Thus, 
after gaining the support of the Kuwaitis, ibn Sa'ud, 26 at the time, set out on a raiding 
expedition into the Najd, which proved to be relatively successful. Consequently, it 
provided the momentum for ibn Sa'ud to further these exploits leading to the successful 
41 McLoughlin., 38. 
42 Ibid., 18-20. 
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attack on Riyadh and the beginning of the third Saudi state.43 The success of ibn Sa'ud 
once again prompted the intervention of the Ottomans, aiding the Rashidis, who defeated 
a Saudi army. However, the death of ‘Abdulaziz al-Rashid at the hands of the Saudis in 
1906 ended the Ottoman presence in Najd. With the opportunity to restore the House of 
Sa'ud to its former glory in Najd almost complete, ibn Sa'ud looked to establish a similar 
style of order as in the first Saudi state, which led to the founding of the Ikhwan. 
The motivation for creating this union between religion and politics was to bring 
back a semblance of order as it existed in 1744. Between the combined power of religion 
and “the sword” the new Saudi state would ensure a greater degree of security for its 
people as well as “centralization of governmental authority and universality of religious 
practice.”44 The bond that ibn Sa'ud sought was thus not unique to Saudi history and in 
fact he actively recognized that the Najd had the “inherent superior capacity to re-unify 
the peninsula” because of the foundations laid there by his forefathers and by ibn 
Wahhab.45 Recognizing that he needed his own force to protect the territories he had 
captured, the Ikhwan proved to be the perfect weapon in the early stages of this Saudi 
state for several reasons. Due to the nomadic bedouin lifestyle, movement amongst these 
people was central to the culture, a factor that ibn Sa'ud counted upon when he began 
“preaching an Islamic revival.”46 His success in persuading these people to settle into 
“semi-religious-military-agricultural communities called hujar” was the basis of the 
43 Fisher, Sydney Nettleton, and William Ochsenwald. The Middle East: A History. Boston, MA: McGraw-
Hill, 2004, 697. 
44 Habib, John S. Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the 
Sa'udi Kingdom, 1910-1930. Leiden: Brill, 1978, 4.  
45 Ibid., 5. 
46 Ibid., 6. 
 
                                                          
Modern State Making | 114 
Ikhwan lifestyle, as it required little change to their everyday activities.47 These efforts 
were not extremely difficult as the history of the Najd elevated Wahhabism to become the 
spiritual center of the region, and ibn Sa'ud simply reminded people of this in the post-
Rashidi era.48 With this in mind, ibn Sa'ud recognized the benefits of approaching the 
bedouin people in the formation of a militant arm as they provided an “ascetic, military 
force, which could be mobilized and demobilized swiftly with the political reliability and 
loyalty of the villager.”49 Through this medium of protection, ibn Sa'ud ensured that these 
settled colonies were strategically placed around the Najd in order to ensure the most 
effective style of security he could guarantee.50 In securing a military force for the 
protection of this region, ibn Sa'ud had carved out a renewed independence for his 
people, which was secure enough to prevent any immediate threat to its borders. 
The perfectly crafted mechanism by which ibn Sa'ud managed to convince the 
bedouin people to join his cause was the inextricable link between their lifestyles and the 
principles of Wahhabism. As a result, the Ikhwan of Najd emerged in 1913 and came to 
be known as those bedouins “who accepted the fundamentals of Orthodox Islam of the 
Hanbali School as preached by Abd-al-Wahhab.”51 The literal meaning of the term 
Ikhwan is “Brethren” or “Brotherhood” and was the uniting factor and term for men of 
the bedouin population who “left their abodes and became settled in a special place 
[Islam], and built for their homes mud huts known as hujar as a sign that they left their 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., 10. 
49 Ibid., 6. 
50 McLoughlin., 43. 
51 Habib., 16. 
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own detestful life for another more beloved life.”52 The bedouin lifestyle and mentality 
was now grounded in religious sanctity, and became the main ideological driver of their 
aggressive raids and conquests of other lands. The renewed crusading mentality that was 
based in religious zeal was reminiscent of Salah al-Din’s speeches that motivated his 
troops against the Crusaders. The sense of spiritual invigoration that dominated the lives 
of the Ikhwan came to be their identifying factor as they carved out an image of military 
enforcers for the House of Sa’ud. This posture soon earned them a badge of fear from 
non-Wahhabists and furthered their own commitments to the ideals and beliefs that ibn 
Wahhab had highlighted a few centuries ago. 
As ibn Sa'ud continued to expand in the Najd region and beyond, the Ikhwan 
became even more important for achieving the successful unification of territory. At the 
same time, however, a British foreign presence was also increasing in the region as they 
sought to create resistance to Ottoman power from within the Arab provinces. While the 
Ikhwan continued to become a threatening armed movement with increasing fanaticism, 
it served ibn Sa'ud’s interest “to conceal the rapid rise and military capability of the 
Ikhwan.”53 In doing so, ibn Sa'ud could prevent the British interference in these affairs, 
which was continually requested by the Sharif of Mecca and King of Hijaz, Hussein ibn 
Ali al-Hashimi, both of whom were concerning about ibn Sa’ud’s expanding power. At 
this time, the British were in favor of aiding Hussein because it served their purpose 
against the Ottomans, yet, a threat to Hussein’s power could also bolster the Ottoman 
forces in European territories. While King Hussein appealed to the British for help in his 
52 Wahbah, Ḥāfiẓ. The Arabian Peninsula in the XXth Century. Beirut: Slim Press, 1961, 293. 
53 Habib., 20. 
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matters with ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan, the fact that ibn Sa'ud had managed to cloak the 
Ikhwan’s military capability was central in any aid coming, as seen in these 
correspondences between Hussein and the British: 
What concerns me above everything else is that HMG should compel the 
Emir [ibn Sa'ud] to abolish and disperse what he calls the Ikhwan - the 
political society in the cloak of religion.54 
The British version of events suggests a different story: 
King Hussein would hardly be justified in demanding the suppression of 
the Ikhwan in ibn Sa'ud’s sphere, though he may take what measures he 
chose to exclude them from his own. As this is primarily a religious affair 
concerning independent Arabs, it would be difficult for HMG to take 
action.55 
In these instances the veil of religion proved more powerful than ever for ibn Sa'ud as it 
allowed the Ikhwan to act with political immunity and without fear of backlash from a 
British supported King Hussein. The fact that the British perceived mutually exclusive 
spheres of politics and religion and refused to become involved accordingly, worked to 
ibn Sa’ud’s advantage. The British, concerned with the outbreak of war in other parts of 
central and southeastern Europe, avoiding becoming entangled in what they perceived to 
be an issue of religious ideology. This moment isolated King Hussein from his foreign 
allies despite recognizing the central role that the Ikhwan played in ibn Sa'ud’s 
expansion.  
 
 
 
54 Letter from King Husayn to the Acting British Agent, Jidda, 18 September 1918, Public Record Office, 
MSS, Foreign Office, Vol. 3390, Document Number 161898. 
55  Letter from King Husayn under cover of a letter sent by Wingate to Balfour, 3 October 1918, Public 
Record Office, MSS, Foreign Office, Vol. 3390, Document Number E 177496. 
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Institutionalizing the Ikhwan & the Growth of Political Power 
 
As part of their broadening relevance to ibn Sa'ud’s expansion, the Ikhwan came 
to embody several mannerisms that were crucial in the process of establishing a sense of 
identity and independence of their own. The central tenet that appears in all accounts of 
the Ikhwan is their “religious fanaticism, more, their eagerness to die in battle on behalf 
of God and Islam,” which gave birth to all other practices of the Ikhwan.56 Consequently, 
actions such as refusing to return the Islamic salutation to non-Ikhwan individuals or 
covering their face as opposed to looking at those perceived to be infidels, fed into the 
notion of a religiously motivated duty to keep their religion as pure as possible.57 This 
behavior comprised elements of the Hanbali school of thought as it required literal 
interpretations of the holy texts in order to “return to pure Islam which Muhammad had 
preached and where is worship is due to God alone.”58 The Ikhwan’s unwillingness to 
compromise in their actions was rooted in the fact that they believed such behavior to be 
virtuous. Moreover, becoming an armed faction of ibn Sa'ud’s order propagated their 
religiously fanatic mannerisms due to the political patronage received.59 The origins of 
the Ikhwan came from ibn Sa'ud seeking them out and providing them with this religious 
purpose, while their fanaticism was cultivated as they grew more and more powerful. In 
many respects the bedouin’s religious education would have come from the local ulema 
that espoused these ideas as they circulated through religious education.60 At the 
beginning of ibn Sa'ud’s political ventures it served him well to have this overly zealous 
56 Habib., 25. 
57 Ibid., 31. 
58 Ibid., 32. 
59 Ibid., 36. 
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sect because it compensated for a lack of imposing military forces, yet, as the movement 
continued its growth and as more bedouins became enamored with it, the rigid 
ideological goals of Wahhabism began to pose a threat to the political stability ibn Sa'ud 
sought. 
Thus, the relationship between ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan constantly changed in 
response to the shifting power dynamics in Arabia. As already mentioned, the Ikhwan 
served a significant purpose at the beginning of ibn Sa'ud’s campaign for power as there 
was little else he could rely on to change the status quo. However, once ibn Sa’ud had 
established himself as a political entity, he had to play a much more diplomatic game in 
order to ensure stability and thus the acquiescence of the people he presumed to rule. His 
focus on status quo diplomacy challenged the revisionist goals of the Ikhwan and the 
orthodoxy of Wahhabi ideologies more generally. Still, while ibn Sa'ud did not 
necessarily share all the ideological commitments of the Ikhwan, the reality was “he was 
unable to be the omnipresent overseer of Ikhwan conduct,” in all parts of the kingdom.61 
The movement itself was out of his control. The success of the Ikhwan caused a rush to 
replicate their standards and way of life, “with a zealousness that could not be contained,” 
and as this progression took place the Ikhwan continued to bring “nonconforming to 
obedience.”62 In many respects the Ikhwan were aware of this, and consequently assumed 
a degree of autonomy in their activities stating they were sanctioned by ibn Sa'ud even if 
this was not the case: 
61 Ibid., 37. 
62 Ibid., 79. 
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Assaf ben Hussein el Mansur to Brother Rcheidren Smeir. Greethings! 
YOU are aware that the Sultan of all the Arabs has ordered me to write 
you this letter to inform you that you must let me know by special 
messenger whether you are following the Moslem creed of Abdul Aziz. 
Safety is for those who understand. You have been warned. You only have 
yourselves to blame.63 
Such a statement demonstrates the way in which the Ikhwan also used their connection to 
ibn Sa’ud for their own purposes, but as ibn Sa’ud increasingly turned to ensuring a 
position of absolute supremacy, he feared the impact of doctrinal dogmatism. In fact at 
the height of the Ikhwan’s power, ibn Sa'ud tried to prevent forced conversion because he 
realized the backlash it would have from the British, one that would prevent him from 
attaining a position of absolute power.64 The changing relationship between the Ikhwan 
and ibn Sa'ud reflects the struggle between defining a movement by its religious goals as 
opposed to its political goals. For the Ikhwan, their birth revolved around religious texts 
and fighting in a battle that had been waged since the Crusades, whereas, ibn Sa'ud 
recognized the importance of this history but tried to reconcile it with modern standards 
of political deliberation and deliberation. 
In order to maintain the fragile balance between these two potentially 
contradictory forces, ibn Sa'ud had to define the parameters in which the Ikhwan could 
operate in the new Saudi state. Therefore, ibn Sa'ud continued his pragmatic efforts in 
using the Ikhwan for his own ends while “skillfully bypassing its more extreme 
requirements.”65 Ibn Sa'ud approached this relationship by formalizing certain aspects of 
Wahhabism that the Ikhwan were concerned with, in order to ease the tension between 
63 Transmittal of documents by Field-Marshall Viscount Allenby to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, 17 
October 1922, Public Record Office, MSS, Foreign Office, Vol. 7715, Document No. E 11186/248/91. 
64 Habib., 38. 
65 Vassiliev., 231. 
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the political and religious bodies.66 By appeasing the Ikhwan through the introduction of 
strict Wahhabist regulation, ibn Sa'ud was able to show his own commitment to the 
religion and ensure that a greater proportion remained loyal to him as opposed to the 
Ikhwan. One mechanism for achieving this was through the establishment of the League 
of Public Morality. This organization enabled ibn Sa'ud to demonstrate his own religious 
beliefs, and yet still emphasized his control over the zealous Ikhwan, as it was an 
institutional pathway to religious control. Within the League, ibn Sa'ud “ordered the 
Ikhwan to inform them about all deeds that were permitted by the faith, although they 
were not allowed to take unauthorized reprisals.”67 The centralization of religious 
authority restrained the Ikhwan from being able to enforce their own methods of religious 
governance and gave greater power and control to ibn Sa'ud. The need to reign in such 
religious zeal became even more apparent as ibn Sa'ud acquired increasing political status 
after the conquest of Mecca in 1925. While he was able to do this with little bloodshed “it 
was essential that ibn Sa'ud should win the approval of the Muslim world and reassure 
Muslims that the new custodianship of the Holy Mosques was a change for the better.”68 
In many ways, control of Mecca gave the Ikhwan increased impetus to continue their 
religious incursions, as they now felt sanctioned as defenders of these cities. However, 
after ibn Sa'ud became the ruler of these newly acquired lands he realized the importance 
of tempering the movement as greater gains could be made through diplomatic ventures. 
This new development in the relationship meant the Ikhwan’s role would be duly 
66 Ibid., 270. 
67 Ibid., 271. 
68 McLoughlin., 80. 
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subdued and potentially cast aside in favor of diplomacy and consequently brought the 
Ikhwan and ibn Sa'ud into open conflict. 
The need to reorder the hierarchy of ibn Sa'ud’s regime was closely related to 
growing relations with the British, who recognized him now as the superior force in the 
region. Curbing the Ikhwan’s religious zeal was crucial for preventing greater British 
intervention and preserving the newfound independence that ibn Sa'ud had fashioned. 
The inability to control the Ikhwan during the pilgrimage season of 1926 led to severe 
conflicts with the Egyptians and a large casualty rate that ended diplomatic relations with 
the country for 10 years.69 The fact that such behavior would warrant closer attention 
from other Muslim nations as well as the wider world meant ibn Sa'ud had to take more 
concrete action to protect his political legitimacy. Consequently, the ruler ordered that 
“no Ikhwan leader was to be governor of any Hejaz city” hopefully disassociating 
himself and his government with the image of “unrestrained savagery” that the Ikhwan 
now presented to the world.70 The actions of ibn Sa'ud were not entirely unprecedented, 
as the history of Saudi Arabia had predominantly recognized the role of tribal groups as 
those who “were expected to fight for the state, not to function in any leading political or 
administrative capacity.”71 However, in the formation of ibn Sa'ud’s rule, the Ikhwan 
recognized that the role they had played was much greater than any other previous tribal 
entity and understood from this that they formed the basis of the Saudi military forces. 
These practical factors, combined with their own religiously motivated, political 
69 Ibid., 85. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Kostiner, Joseph. The Making of Saudi Arabia: 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State. New 
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993, 74. 
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ambitions presented ibn Sa'ud with special problems.72 Moreover, the fact that ibn Sa'ud 
continued to build his relationship with the British caused internal struggles as the 
Ikhwan had become known in his regime as protectors of the “legitimate interests of 
Islam” winning them support from many of ibn Sa'ud’s peers.73 After winning Mecca, 
ibn Sa’ud had been seen as distancing himself from the people in order to gain favor from 
the British, and this compromised both his local legitimacy and his standing in the eyes of 
other regional Muslim political leaders. These issues would confront each other as the 
Ikhwan soon realized how ibn Sa'ud was trying to further subdue their religious mission 
in favor of a different type of political stability. 
 
British Influence & the Decline of the Ikhwan 
 
As ibn Sa'ud’s actions against the Ikhwan increased, these tensions began to 
escalate and led to disruptions with regards to the future course of the Saudi state. The 
Ikhwan were becoming more and more aware that ibn Sa'ud’s actions against them were 
driven, at least partially, by the growing British influence in Saudi affairs. As a result, 
they became more vocal about ibn Sa'ud’s lack of commitment to Wahhabism’s ideals 
because of his growing contact with the English, and how such actions were contrary to 
the state the Ikhwan were committed to creating.74 The dynamic between the Ikhwan and 
ibn Sa'ud became more obvious to the British who appeared to empathize with ibn Sa'ud 
in the situation: 
72 Ibid., 102. 
73 Habib., 129. 
74 Habib., 80. 
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The Ehwan are hated and feared. They hardly form a suitable basis for 
Eben Sa’ud’s empire, since, with their commander, they would be the first 
to reject Eben Sa’ud should he fail to follow all of the prescriptions of 
their creed. They now accuse him of being too mild toward other Muslims 
and too obedient to the Europeans, and their disapproval of his attitude is 
increasing with his introduction of various reforms.75 
The political sentiment voiced by the British resonated with the stability that ibn Sa'ud 
was attempting to build. The key challenge between the Ikhwan and the emerging Saudi 
state lay in differing motivations and priorities of the two groups. Ibn Sa'ud’s political 
sentiments did not make him devoid of his religious obligations, rather “certain areas 
gradually became understood as depending exclusively on the princes, such as relations 
with foreign powers, explaining why the traditional Wahhabi ulema did not oppose Saudi 
Arabia’s alliance with the United Kingdom in the early twentieth century.”76 Yet, the 
Ikhwan saw this as a corruption of Islam, and the state they wished to create would not 
consider foreign powers, especially non-Muslims ones, as allies as these alliances would 
stain the purity of Islam. 
As the situation progressed, ibn Sa'ud realized that he would have to confront the 
Ikhwan in a manner that would prevent a full-scale rebellion from not only the Ikhwan, 
but also from many tribal leaders who sympathized with their cause or resisted the 
incursion of centralized control more generally. As ibn Sa’ud worked to restrain the 
activities of the Ikhwan, he issued orders that prevented them from raiding Iraqi citizens, 
a controversial action because Iraq’s non-Wahhabist doctrine presumably opened them 
up to raids and military challenge. British reactions to such dealings applauded ibn Sa'ud 
75 Musil, Alois, Northern Negd (A Topographical Itinerary): American Geographical Society, Oriental 
Explorations and Studies No. 5, edited by J.K. Wright, 303. 
76 Lacroix., 8. 
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as a model politician who had managed to restrain the Ikhwan as much as possible, as 
former Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb recalled: 
Caution had always distinguished the policy of Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud. He 
had been confident of his power to defeat other Arabian princes, like Ibn 
Rashid, but he was not prepared to engage in hostilities with Britain. The 
Ikhwan were able to quote against him his own pronouncements of an 
earlier date. The Iraqis, they claimed, were renegade Muslims, whose lives 
and property were forfeit to the Ikhwan. Ibn Sa'ud was a model of a 
common sense and prudence. If he encouraged fanaticism, it was to use it 
as an instrument to achieve his object; he was never himself a fanatic. To a 
wild and unruly people, however prudence and common sense offered few 
attractions.77 
Britain recognized the superior position of power that they held in the situation due to 
their military supremacy and growing financial interest in the state. Ibn Sa'ud also shared 
this knowledge, which was perhaps what fuelled his compliance with British officers 
whenever needed. However, the Ikhwan were unable to see the pragmatism of the 
situation because the religious sentiment that motivated them was not to be challenged on 
the basis of logistical alliances. As far as the Ikhwan were concerned, the British 
represented the infidels that Islam had been at war with for centuries, and consequently it 
was their religious duty to fight them. It is this ideology that also motivated the Ikhwan in 
their actions against the Iraqis and drove them to questioning ibn Sa'ud’s rule because he 
was foregoing the principles the Saudi state was based upon: 
The Ikhwan were intoxicated with their own strength, and claimed that it 
was their fighting power, which made ibn Sa'ud great. By challenging the 
king on the question of war with Iraq, the Ikhwan were able to claim 
religious sentiments on their side. The Iraqis were not Wahhabis and were 
therefore renegade Muslims, against whom holy war was a duty. It was 
77 Glubb, John Bagot. War in the Desert: An R.A.F. Frontier Campaign. New York: Norton, 1961, 193. 
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ibn Sa'ud who was guilty of religious laxity in being unwilling to engage 
in hostilities against the enemies of God.78 
By framing the situation from a religious standpoint, the Ikhwan were unwilling to 
concede ground on such matters. Moreover, the fact that the Ikhwan had been successful 
in their campaigns thus far was further incentive for them to continue fighting because in 
their eyes, victory was a result of having a morally superior reason to go to war. The 
main Ikhwan leaders, Faisal al-Dawish and Sultan bin Bajad, were aware of this 
argument and saw no reason to compromise their actions, especially with a non-Muslim 
power: 
The issue was complicated by the fact that the movement was conducted 
under a religious banner; claiming to be genuine defenders of the faith and 
accused ibn Sa'ud of ignoring the true religion and collaborating with the 
infidel British for the sake of his vested interests.79 
Amongst other grievances that the Ikhwan listed against ibn Sa'ud was his use of modern 
technology, borders delineated towards British forts so as to protect them, and his 
consistent efforts to disrupt the expansion of holy warfare.80 Ibn Sa'ud gradually 
reorganized that he needed to create a military force of his own, since he could no longer 
rely on the Ikhwan, and began campaigning amongst other tribal leaders in his kingdom. 
The rhetoric communicated to these leaders was two-fold: first, he claimed that the 
Ikhwan were seeking an independent state that prescribed religious conformity, and that 
this move would require these leaders to lose all control over their tribes. Second, he 
insisted that the superior technology of the British meant it was extremely implausible 
that the Ikhwan would continue to proceed unchecked in their raiding ventures; instead, it 
78 Ibid., 200. 
79 Ibn Hizlul, Saud. Tarikh Muluk AlSa'ud[The History of Saudi Kings](Matbaa al-Riyadh, Riyadh, 1961), 
293. 
80 Habib., 133. 
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was simply a matter of time before the British intervened more aggressively. The fact that 
the Ikhwan raids in Kuwait had already engaged an RAF response, and the Ikhwan were 
threatening other realms that had treaties with the British, meant the Ikhwan were 
provoking the inevitable and ibn Sa'ud implored these leaders to see reason.81 Ibn Sa'ud 
played upon the traditional issues that divided nomads and settled people when recruiting 
these leaders to his cause with the nobility from the oases “keen to protect its interests 
against the rebel nomadic population.”82 
After raising an army fully capable and equipped to fight against the Ikhwan, the 
two sides met in the Battle of Sabilla in March of 1929. The outcome was unanimous in 
favor of ibn Sa'ud because of his willingness to embrace modern technology. The 
Ikhwan, with swords and sticks, came up against a Saudi force with machine guns and 
cavalry. The victory for ibn Sa'ud was essential in consolidating his rule once and for all 
and changed the nature in which religion and politics interacted. In the aftermath of the 
battle an important development was the “rejection of the claim of the Ikhwan that they 
could proclaim Holy War, without the permission of the Imam, that is to say ibn Sa'ud.”83 
The modern union that ibn Sa'ud had formed between religion and politics left him in an 
unparalleled position of power in the new Saudi state. This is not to say that Wahhabism 
moved towards a less conservative position, but rather that it was now realigned with 
contemporary political practices managed by the state apparatus. The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia, as it exists today, still practices Wahhabi Hanbali Sunni Islam, and in many ways 
81 Wilson, Peter W., and Douglas Graham. Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 
1994, 45. 
82 Wahbah., 302. 
83 McLoughlin., 89. 
                                                          
Tracing Islamic Extremist Ideologies | 127 
this form of Islam has been unchanged since the eighteenth century.84 Yet, ibn Sa'ud 
recognized the importance of the institutionalization of Wahhabism in order for the 
country to grow socially, economically and politically. As the political landscape 
continued to change, it was important for ibn Sa'ud to reconcile Islam with broader 
standards of the time. As a result, the relationship between ibn Sa'ud and the Ikhwan 
demonstrate another crucial moment in the history of Islam and jihad where a particular 
context defined the medium through which the tension between religious ideology and 
political realities was expressed. Thus, the history of Saudi Arabia illustrates the way in 
which even internal to a region and a political ideology the fortunes of affiliation to 
doctrine and belief change based on various historical conjunctures. 
 
 
 
 
84 This is not to say that the tension between religious and political institutes no longer exists today and in 
fact, in some instances it has been exacerbated. A common criticism of the Kingdom is that it does little to 
prevent interpretations of Islam that encourage the use of violence against outsiders. The Interpretations of 
the Meanings of the Noble Qur’an in the English Language by M. Khan and T. Hilali highlight such an 
instance. Within this text the authors interpolate the words “the Jews” and “the Christians” when the 
Qur’an refers to the infidels, based upon a specific historical moment between the Prophet Muhammad and 
his initial followers. The impact of such action takes away from the contemplative nature that many 
Islamists, including Abd al-Wahhab, state that Muslims should follow when reading the Qur’an. The 
actions of the authors, which was certified by the religious institutes and distributed around the world, 
attributes fixed meanings to the Qur’an and consequently explains the perpetual state of war certain 
Muslims feel their lives require. This example highlights the tension that exists contemporarily between the 
religious institutes and their political counterparts. While ibn Sa'ud constrained the activities of a 
particularly zealous sect, his actions do not detract from the overall influence that Islam has had in the 
formation of a Saudi Arabian identity. Therefore, it will always be difficult to restrict religious intensity in 
Saudi Arabia and why a complete overhaul of governance is unrealistic because of its inextricable link to 
the country’s origins.  
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Epilogue: Identificatory Politics 
 
 
 
he events of September 11th, 2001, incited a global conversation about the 
relationship between religious devotion and violence. This led to new 
identificatory politics that assumed linkages between Islam as a belief system and the 
violent actions of the September 11th perpetrators. The all-too easy collapse of Muslim 
into terrorist has escalated with the rise of Da’esh and a new global concern with the 
relationship between Islam and violence. I remember exactly where I was when 9/11 took 
place; I had just returned home from a football match in Bahrain, and it was a week 
before my 8th birthday. My parents were sitting on the couch, my brother was standing in 
the doorway, and everyone’s eyes were fixated on the TV. Yet, all I make out was a big 
plume of smoke. I often talk to my parents about that day and ask them if they ever could 
have imagined the implications of that moment. Their response suggests they feared a 
backlash, as my dad had been involved in the first Gulf War, and had a sense of the 
political dynamics of the region. But neither had ever comes close to conceptualizing the 
chaos that has now engulfed the region for over a decade. This region, my home, played a 
significant role in shaping my own identity. As an Indian that had never lived in India, a 
Hindu that did not speak Hindi and a Catholic that had never been confirmed, my identity 
was in flux, and yet also inextricably linked to the culture and community that had 
become my home. For 18 years, until I came to America to continue my education, this 
culture and community was a mixture of expatriate and local Arab influences. Yet,
T 
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questions concerning a global dialogue about Islam and violence never permeated my 
thought process on a regular basis because I was still young and more importantly I was 
still at home, in the Arab world. I choose to call it the Arab World because it is a gross 
oversight to regard the entire Middle East as a composite of Muslims; this is a simple and 
common oversimplification of the history of the region. This oversight is partially what I 
have tried to address in my research, highlighting the shifting narratives and historical 
processes that have led to the present day emergence of nation-states and their uneasy 
relationship with Islam. 
As a result of these events it has become easy to scapegoat Islam, and Muslims 
find themselves in similar positions as other marginalized groups, such as the LGBTQ 
community, African-Americans or other immigrants. For each of these communities it is 
easy to blame the entire group when fears and insecurities are consistently propagated by 
skewed rhetoric, regardless of the source. However, when such behavior takes place, we 
have to ask the question who will bear the brunt of such speech? I look upon this question 
with a personal affliction, having spent so many years in Arab and Muslim communities 
that raised me to be aware of my surroundings and the people that inhabit them. Islam 
now faces increasing criticism and believers have been forced to defend the faith in the 
face of every new instance of violence. This constant pressure to defend the religion has 
also forced Muslims to choose whether or not to publicly acknowledge their faith. This 
choice plagues believers and turns faith into an issue of identificatory politics. 
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Identity Conflicts in America 
 
 Having attended college in California, my interpretation of this conflict certainly 
has an America-centric perspective to it, but I believe this perspective captures key 
dynamics that can be used as a microcosm of a more global perspective. While I have my 
own opinions of what Islam consists of and what it means to people, Muslim-Americans 
have to wrestle with the narrative propagated by mass media and align it with their own 
beliefs. There is a large number of personal blogs that pertain to the identity conflict, and 
they all make a point of first acknowledging that the writers were Muslim and 
Americans, or Muslim-Americans. The need to dispel any notion that one part of the 
hyphen constitutes a greater proportion of their identity than another was immediate. 
Moreover, these blogs assumed that both components of the hyphenated identity could be 
reconciled in today’s world. This assertion emerged as the blogs addressed several sub-
topics that have impacted the emergence of a narrative that defends this composite 
identity. This is especially the case as blog writers discuss the difference between the 
Islam practiced by radical groups and propagated by conservative politicians and 
activists, and what they truly believe the religion represents. Or when they confront rising 
Islamophobia and its role in the immigration debate. 
With the USA in the midst of an election season, many of these rhetorical 
messages have embodied a larger degree of polarization that has amplified attitudes, both 
positive and negative, towards the Muslim community. Many Muslims have directed 
their outcry towards politicians who have used their public platform to advance popular 
misconceptions about the religion. As one blogger stated, “In the 1st debate, Rick 
Santorum spoke at great length about Islam not really being a religion thereby excluding 
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it from the same legal protections as other religions. To hear him speak about Sunnis, 
Shia, Jihad, and the Caliphate you’d think he were an expert on Islamic Studies. Except 
all his “facts” were wrong.”1 The disturbing reality that such blatant oversights regarding 
Islam now have a platform that reaches many people is certainly a cause for concern and 
contributes to making boundaries that currently divide global communities. For many 
Muslims, statements such as the one made by Santorum mean that on a daily basis they 
have to actively clarify what Islam really is to friends, neighbors, and colleagues or else 
face increased marginalization and suspicion. In this volatile contemporary world, 
religious beliefs do not hold the same private sanctuary in a person’s life as they did in 
years past; to some extent critics argue that when those private beliefs disrupt the public 
order than rights to religious devotion are forfeited. Yet, this argument overlooks the fact 
that Islam was never monolithic and contains an inherent conversation concerning the 
relationship between religion, politics, and violence, has drastically shifted in its sense of 
communal welfare from its inception in the late antique world to its current realization 
across the globe.  
However, when the religion carries years of historical developments and nuances, 
overlooking these differences accentuates binary thinking, xenophobia, and contributes to 
antagonistic frameworks of in-groups and out-groups. The same blogger acknowledged 
the need to differentiate the way in which vocabulary is used to describe violent actors 
and alienate potential allies stating, “The phrase ‘Radical Islam’ is insulting to potential 
Muslim allies. When you insult your allies, you help recruit for ISIS. The war they claim 
1 "An American Muslim." An American Muslim. Accessed March 07, 2016. 
https://salaamsblog.wordpress.com/.  
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to want to win is prolonged every time they put their low information base above the 
safety and security of all Americans and our troops overseas.”2 The complexity of the 
situation places the Muslim community in an extremely difficult position, with those who 
want to help unable to consistently do so for fear of being typecast as the same people 
conducting crimes against humanity. When a scenario like this one arises, how can a 
cohesive effort emerge that combats the actors elements that have resorted to such brutal 
means under the banner of Islam. Suggestions that groups like al-Qa’eda and Da’esh arise 
inherently from Islam, or can be explained solely through religious factors, insults both 
the inherent diversity of that religion’s history, as well as the socio-economic and 
political developments in the present that shape the evolution and the rhetoric of these 
groups. 
The intersection between politics and religion is certainly not a new phenomenon; 
yet, the added degree of polarization that has accompanied it in recent decades contains 
more worrying implications. Recognizing that people in powerful positions have the 
ability to profoundly shape public opinion through new media platforms and do so across 
the political spectrum heightens the problem. Rick Santorum is not the only individual 
who has raised anti-Muslim sentiments, Michelle Bachmann, Allen West, John Bennett, 
Bill Maher and of course Donald Trump have all “made discriminatory and Islamophobic 
statements regarding Muslims in recent years.”3 Elected representatives, candidates, and 
popular media figures freely express discriminatory sentiments. In past months many 
2 Ibid. 
3 "Enough Is Enough: No More Tolerating Hate from Elected Officials." Young American Muslim. 2015. 
Accessed March 07, 2016. http://blog.chron.com/youngamericanmuslim/2015/01/enough-is-enough-no-
more-tolerating-hate-from-elected-officials/. 
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Americans have debated whether these sentiments merely reflect public opinion, or are 
part of a new media environment that builds on inflammatory statements. Preying on a 
tense environment of fear allows for great political gains to be made, doing so, however, 
by questioning the religious viability of Islam “fuels the cycle of hate and ignorance” and 
undermines the very principles that this country was founded upon.4 This is not a 
criticism leveled only at America, as anti-migrant points of view have become a feature 
of public discourse across Europe as well, and contributed to the revitalization of fascist 
parties. The greater concern is how such standpoints rest in personal opinion rather than 
those grounded in historical awareness. The propagation of these ideologies leads not 
only to a society of greater partisanship, but also endangers the lives of everyday 
Muslims who seek to reside in harmony with the country they call home. 
With such polarized public opinions becoming more of a norm, the Brookings 
Institute conducted a survey with regards to the American public's attitude towards 
Muslims and Islam. The conclusions drawn from the survey are of particular note, as 
many Americans clearly differentiated between Muslim people and the religion of Islam, 
viewing the latter more unfavorably than the former.5 The ability of politicians to take a 
commanding role in defining the direction the dialogue takes highlights the importance of 
the individual spokesperson in this national narrative concerning Islam. It is easy for 
people to hate an abstract concept, yet, meeting an individual and recognizing that they 
may share similar goals and aspirations changes the dynamic of that relationship. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Telhami, Shibley. "What Americans Really Think about Muslims and Islam." The Brookings Institution. 
December 09, 2015. Accessed March 07, 2016. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/12/09-
what-americans-think-of-muslims-and-islam-telhami. 
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Ultimately, this phenomenon (acceptance of the individual and discrimination against the 
religion) becomes hard to ignore when confronted with anti-immigration policies that 
also specifically target Muslims and contribute to rising Islamophobia. Yet, creating an 
environment that facilitates mutual understanding and sympathy on an individual level 
becomes difficult, especially for the Muslim community as one blogger stated, “being 
Muslim in America means being identified by only one aspect of my identity. It means 
being told exactly what it means to be Muslim in America and having very little control 
over the narrative.”6 Many critics of immigration believe that the principles of Islam 
cannot be reconciled with democratic institutions and principles; yet, this cannot be true 
because, as the same blogger stated, “American Muslims encompass a number of sects, 
races and viewpoints on domestic and international policies, presidential candidates, and 
everything else.”7 As such, American Muslims embody the deliberative and diverse 
aspects of the country that center on the freedom to embrace different beliefs and ways of 
being. However, as a result of 9/11 and the chaos that has ensued, freedom to create one’s 
own identity has been denied to American Muslims, leaving them instead in a posture of 
defense. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 
As the title of this thesis suggests, there is an increased focus on the role of jihad 
in Islam, yet, the historical examples provided in the chapters do not always explicitly 
mention jihad. A historical investigation of the relationship between Islam and 
6 Naqvi, Zehra. "What's It Like Being Muslim in America?" The Huffington Post. November 16, 2015. 
Accessed March 07, 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/zehra-naqvi/what-its-like-being-muslim-in-
america_b_8569378.html. 
7 Ibid 
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justifications for warfare requires a constant comparison between religious ideology and 
its context. At times historical processes led to the propagation of aggressive elements of 
jihad and Islam and at other times either minimizing these elements or using rhetoric to 
sustain political positions without outright warfare. As this thesis explores only a few 
contexts, it can also only offer partial assessments of the historical evolution of jihad as 
both a mode of warfare and a political ideology. Yet this research is a singularly 
important, as the prevailing theme in the post 9/11 world ignores history and denies the 
importance of comparative theories concerning the relationship between jihad and 
religious belief. As a result, oftentimes Muslim organizations, such as the All Dulles Area 
Muslim Society, have had to publicly state their position on issues involving Islamic 
groups or risk being an advocate for extremist actions, as a spokesman stated “we feel 
responsible, as citizens, as Muslim, to defend our faith from these evildoers. At ADAMS 
this also means ensuring that children learn to become both good Muslims and good 
Americans.”8 I always find it interesting when an entire group of people is held 
accountable for the actions of the minority. The events of 9/11 have not only 
reinvigorated the rhetoric of the Crusades, the binary of conflict between Islam and the 
West but also reflect an inherent imbalance in this rhetoric. The fact that mass media 
often postulates Islam versus the West, rather than Islam versus Christianity, and does not 
take into account the complex relationship between religion and violence within the 
history of Christianity highlights this imbalance. As a result, few, if any, blame 
Christianity for the Holocaust, but rather a particular political figure, Hitler, and the 
8 "Setting the Record Straight." The Economist. March 09, 2015. Accessed March 07, 2016. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2015/03/muslim-americans. 
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movement he mobilized, Nazism. Yet, Islam is consistently blamed for the actions of 
Osama bin Laden, al-Qa’eda and Da’esh. 
A crucial point of contention that arises from the current predicament that 
Muslims find themselves in concerning defensive postures revolves around the different 
set of standards that their religion is subjected to. Criticisms of the religion as a whole 
stem from its inherent complexity and the multiple interpretations that emerge as a result. 
This is a concept that I wished to highlight throughout my thesis, the fact that in different 
times, different people propagated a particular form of Islam to achieve certain goals. 
Again, this is not a new or radical perception of either religion or history, but critics of 
Islam tend to ignore both. Moreover, they conflate misinformation for truth for example 
by arguing that “there is no single authoritative interpretation of Islam - unlike Catholics, 
Muslims have no pope who can settle doctrinal debates.”9 The idea that a complete 
centralization of authority in Islam would solve all the issues associated with the religion 
is another gross oversight, and is an entirely invalid comparison to make. The internal 
splintering within the Christian religion is not unlike the various forms of Islam; 
therefore, the premise that a central authority for the majoritarian branch of the religion is 
the reason for its perceived unity undermines the historical developments in the religion 
itself. Critics further contend that the form of Islam practiced by extremist groups 
“derived from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam,” a statement that on its 
own is not entirely false.10 While this idea may be true, it should also be accompanied by 
the fact that religions based on scripture always contend with questions of interpretation. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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This is true for each monotheistic tradition, where for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
debates concerning how religious should be interpreted are a core part of the historical 
evaluation of each faith. These groups have, in many cases, taken their direction from 
certain aspects of Islamic theology but if the core of the religion is the Qur’an and the 
hadiths, then as stated throughout this thesis, a true understanding requires intensive 
examinations between all texts. When taken in isolation, anyone would be able to 
communicate that Islam represents a particular point of view, but this argument 
oversimplifies the religion. Therefore, the burden rests in how one interprets the texts and 
their connections to each other. The gravity of the implications of this problem is 
highlighted by the fact that scholars have attempted to tackle this topic over many years 
and have yet to come to a definitive conclusion. The various interpretations that could 
exist also prompt critics to believe that Islamic groups have “as much legitimacy as 
anyone else,” yet, this becomes an issue for the individual as opposed to the religion 
itself.11 Within any religion, one could argue that there are elements of aggressive and 
violent actions especially that of the book, but the religious spectrum that emerges rest in 
individual interpretation. 
The cycle that begins from such criticisms of Islam perpetuates the divide 
between different communities. Having lived a significant proportion of my life in the 
Middle East, I have benefitted from the generosity of the religion and its people. 
Therefore, I often think about how I can help others see and believe that Islam does not 
inherently advocate extremist behavior, such as that of Da’esh, as much as another 
religion does. The study from the Brookings Institution found that “demographically, 
11 Ibid. 
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younger people and those with higher education have slightly more favorable views of 
Islam and Muslims.”12 It is not specifically that having an education means you 
understand the historical diversity of Islam but rather it encourages an individual to think 
critically about the issues at hand, providing a different dimension to the conversation. 
Consequently, generating a personal connection to the religion in any form increases 
“favorable views of Muslims; this holds across the political spectrum.”13 Such 
conclusions provide me with optimism in the sense that I hope those who read this thesis 
will also critically question their beliefs and endeavor to further understand Islam. I have 
never been particularly religious, yet, my mother, a conservative Catholic, always argues 
that religion provides a sense of peace and sanctuary to many people and that is its 
ultimate beauty. I cannot fault such an argument because as an institution, religions have 
emerged parallel with the emergence of settled human life and cooperative communal 
system. Therefore, I would state that in holding different religions to different standards 
we place a different value on the lives of those who practice different religions. If this is 
the case, then humanity has undermined itself to a much larger degree and forgotten that 
“identity is a relationship and people define themselves in part as a function of how 
others view them.”14 With this in mind it is important to recognize differences between 
communities and individuals without labelling them and to allow this difference to enrich 
patterns of global connectivity rather than to set standards which demonize them. 
A recent talk by Michael Sells, the John Henry Barrows Professor of Islamic 
History and Literature at the University of Chicago and a specialist in Qur’anic scripture, 
12 Telhami. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
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stated that the way in which the academic community can combat Islamophobia and 
groups such as  Da’esh is to communicate the complexities of the religion in a clear and 
cohesive way. However, this task becomes inherently more difficult when a majority of 
the population in America has no background in Islamic history. Therefore, Sells 
suggested that more than delving into the depths of the religion, one should speak about 
Islam and religion as a whole with “due respect.”15 In order to do so, Sells stated that 
there were three criteria one must adhere to: sensitivity, no oversimplification of events 
and people, and, most importantly, no moral judgment.16 Presenting Islam in line with 
these principles opens a line of communication between individuals that potentially casts 
aside previously held prejudices. Still, it is difficult to insert a respectful approach to the 
religion if participants in a conversation assume from the onset an antagonistic 
relationship to Islam. It is thus my conviction that students and scholars have a moral 
obligation to circulate new knowledge and interpretations of the past, so as to work 
against the biases that have developed, and thus perhaps challenge the barriers the plague 
religion and the global community in the 21st century.
15 Sells, Michael. “Wahhabi Doctrine and Global Conflict.” Lecture, Claremont McKenna Athenaeum, 
Claremont, CA, March 25, 2016. 
16 Ibid. 
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